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This thesis is divided into three parts. The first is concerned with the different 
uses of the term energeia. I argue that the term has many different applications in 
Aristotle but in its perfect sense it describes the divine noun and its noetic activity. I 
also claim that although individual human noetic activity is also described by Aristotle as 
an energeia, this is a different sense of the term energeia. For the human nous contains 
potentiality and its noetic activity also cannot exclude the threat of relapsing into 
potentiality. 
I also investigate the concept of noes, particularly in De Anima. I argue that 
Aristotle employs the term with different senses in several contexts and the language of 
divinity used by him is far from implying that the individual human nous is divine. 
The second part is an enquiry into the concepts of discursive and non-discursive 
thinking. It deals with the essential features of discursive and non-discursive thinking in 
Aristotle. I claim that non-discursive thinking is best described by Aristotle in 
Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9 where Aristotle actually tells us the nature of the divine nous 
and its noetic activity. I also try to elucidate the relation between the terms energeia, 
theoria and eudaimonia in relation to metaphysical and ethical concerns. 
In the final part of this thesis I examine the interpretations of Aristotle's theory 
of the intellect, with special reference to the question of discursive and non-discursive 
thinking. In the course of my investigation I have come to see that Aristotle's 
conception of discursive and non-discursive thinking has been completely misconceived, 
mostly due to the neo-platonising efforts of Aristotle's theory of intellect. 
Islamic Aristotelian commentators in particular attempted to relate the individual 
human noes to God by way of individual experience which was based on non-discursive 
ii 
intellectual activity, in spite of the fact that Aristotle nowhere speaks of participation of 
the human nous with God. Non-discursive thinking activity has nothing to do with 
coming into contact with God: that is why I argue that we are left with nothing but the 
task of demystifying the concept of discursive and non-discursive thinking in Aristotle. 
The third part contains a critical survey of interpretations of Aristotle's theory of 
intellect by ancient, Islamic and recent commentators. 
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Words have determinable sense only within a complex of unstated 
assumptions, all interpretation must therefore go beyond the given 
material. Understanding of another's philosophy is an aspect of the 
interpreter's own philosophical growth and the result should not be, 
because it cannot be, assessed as matching or missing an unknowable 
and possibly non-existent 'original version' but as an intelligible and 
(hopefully) plausible way of seeing the world that is developed by 
meditation on the chosen tradition. (Stephen R. L. Clark) 
Interpretation is always re-creation, whether good or bad, ... 
(Stephen 
R. L. Clark) 
An interpretation of Aristotle must be assessed upon other grounds. That 
it should be unduly elegant and the like may indeed be required but it 
must also pretend at least to some degree of truth, and especially 
practical truth. If the thoughts suggested to us in our reading of Aristotle 
have no practical consequences for us to enact then our reading is clearly 
'inauthentic' far more truly than in some trivial anachronism. It is also 
barren. (Stephen R. L. Clark) 
Every writer creates his own predecessors and so does every philos- 
opher. (Stephen R. L. Clark) 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to investigate discursive and non-discursive thinking in 
relation to human and divine thinking in Aristotle. The discussion of the ethical and 
metaphysical implications of the discursive and non-discursive thinking is also central to 
this study. The main texts to be inspected are De Anima, Metaphysics, Nicomachean 
and Eudemian Ethics. Although the former two will receive a lot more attention, the 
latter two are also indispensable to this enquiry. 
What is the nature of discursive and of non-discursive thinking? What place do 
the two kinds of thinking have in Aristotle's philosophy? What are their ethical and 
metaphysical implications? Why does Aristotle distinguish these two kinds of thinking? 
It is well known to those interested in discursive and non-discursive thinking that 
the activities of intellect are divided into two kinds, one of which is called discursive and 
the other non-discursive. The former involves change, for example from one element of 
a thought to another, or a logical transition from a premise to a conclusion. Non- 
discursive thinking, on the contrary, excludes any sort of change. 
As far as I am aware, the discussion of discursive and non-discursive thinking 
has been strictly confined to the distinction between the discursive activity of the 
intellect (dianoia) and the intuitive activity of the intellect (noun). However, it is clear 
that Aristotle does not keep a clear distinction between the two types of activity of the 
intellect. ' Again, in Nicomachean Ethics at 1125a 29, phronesis is called the opposite 
of nous. The relation of nous to sensation comes from De Anima and Nicomachean 
Ethics. For at 427b 8-9 nous makes all kinds of judgements and is not infallible at all. ' 
One should therefore bear in mind that Aristotle does not automatically identify 
discursive thinking with dianoia and non-discursive thinking with nous in the case of 
human thinking, but the position is different for the divine nous. It is also true that 
Aristotle uses the term nous in several contexts. This is why it is important to 
distinguish the different meanings of the term nous in Aristotle, without which the 
conception of discursive and non-discursive thinking is bound to remain obscure. 
I believe that knowledge by intuition is a myth and that the identification of non- 
discursive thinking with intuition is doomed to be mysterious at best, if not completely 
vain. That is why I do not intend to investigate discursive and non-discursive thinking 
in Aristotle in relation to epistemological concerns. Instead, I turn to Metaphysics, De 
Anima and Ethics in my investigation of the subject which will enable an investigation of 
the subject of discursive and non-discursive thinking in relation to ethical and 
metaphysical questions. 
In doing so, the analysis of certain terms, namely noes, energeia, entelecheia 
and theoria, appears to be absolutely crucial to an understanding of discursive and non- 
discursive thinking. For Aristotle describes the noetic activity of nous as energeia 
regardless whether it is human or divine thinking. To the best of my knowledge, there 
have been no attempts to explain discursive and non-discursive thinking in this context. 
I am therefore very well aware of the real possibility of failure in doing so. But then, I 
immediately return to Aristotle himself to defend myself against the army of Aristotelian 
scholars and what I read in Metaphysics XII, particularly chapters 7 and 9, De Anima 
111.4 and 5 and Nicotnachean Ethics X, reassures me that I am not completely at a loss 
in my attempt to understand the subject matter in this way. 
Aristotle's replies to questions are not dogmatic. It is his approach to refuse to 
press for a single answer when the reality points to several. Therefore, the best strategy 
appears to be that one should begin with particular problems, a particular text or a 
particular term so that through this one may hope to reach a solution that a certain 
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problem demands. As what Aristotle says is related to our experience, our life, our 
world, it is the purpose of this study to show the significance of the conceptions of 
discursive and non-discursive thinking to our experience of noetic activity. 
Aristotle never advocated that a philosopher should seek a mystical revelation 
which separates him/her from others. He also does not ask whether the world we live in 
is real or not. He insists that we must try to solve problems by setting out exactly what 
has been said about the problems but not hoping to solve them with a prayer for sudden 
insight. That is why intuition plays no role in my effort to understand discursive and 
non-discursive activity of the intellect. 
It is important to note that there has been an enormous amount of interest in 
Aristotle's theory of intellect in the past two decades or so, which also witnessed a 
resurgence of activity in the philosophy of mind. The complex nature of the subject has 
been addressed by philosophers of mind and their endeavour to solve problems in the 
field have made us appreciate the subtlety of what Aristotle says, particularly in De 
Anima, Metaphysics and Ethics. 
There are three terms which are indispensable to the investigation of the 
discursive and non-discursive thinking in Aristotle, namely energeia / entelecheia, nous 
and theoria. By the analysis of these terms I intend to demystify the conception of non- 
discursive thinking, and also hope to discover the real spirit of Aristotle's theory of non- 
discursive thinking. For after all, Aristotle nowhere occupies himself by trying to 
decode the knowledge that nous might possess. His main aim, however, is to 
differentiate the process of searching for knowledge from coming to understand reality. 
In other words, to bridge the gap between the intellect and the world. 
In Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9, Aristotle describes divine thinking as pure activity 
(energeia). It excludes any sort of potentiality and thus any kind of change. Divine 
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nous has no contrary to itself. Although human noetic activity is also described as 
energeia, it is nevertheless not immune to change. How, then, is one supposed to 
understand divine noetic activity and human noetic activity? Are they different from 
each other? Why does Aristotle connect happiness with the activity of nous? These 
questions are of course central to the investigation of this project but it would be wrong 
for me to think that I have given satisfactory answers to all of them. 
It is true that Aristotle describes both human and divine thinking as energeia. 
One of the loftiest achievements of human nous is thus considered to be thinking in 
terms of energeia. However, one should be careful about the different applications of 
the term energeia in Aristotle. Human noetic activity has two aspects, one of which is 
searching for and the other knowing reality, to come into contact with reality. It is 
obvious that the process of searching for knowledge is imperfect and incomplete. It has 
an end, it has to cease at some point. That is why I call this process of seeking for 
knowledge 'kinetic thinking'. On the other hand, the human noetic activity does not 
stop with kinetic thinking. The search has an end and that is where it gives way to the 
state of energeia which I call 'active thinking'. In 'active thinking', one is in touch 
with reality. It has nothing to do with contemplation of concepts or propositions, for 
thinking of reality is bound to be discursive and it is always of the expression of reality 
but not reality itself. In active thinking, human notes seems to eliminate the threat of 
change. However, this cannot be so for the individual human nous for it always has the 
danger of falling into the state of potentiality. It cannot go on thinking continuously. In 
addition, the individual human nous shifts from the state of activity to the state of 
potentiality. Thus I argue that although Aristotle describes human thinking as energeia, 
this does not allow itself to identify with divine noetic activity. For divine noetic activity 
excludes any sort of potentiality and change, it does not even suffer from the slightest 
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change. 
Thus, although human noetic activity has kinetic and active aspects, divine 
thinking activity is described as pure energeia, which is why it is important to note that 
one should distinguish the different meanings and applications of the term energeia in 
Aristotle. I also conceive the conception of discursive and non-discursive thinking in the 
light of Aristotle's definition of thinking in terms of energeia. 
Metaphysics XII signifies the climax of Aristotle's thought and in Metaphysics 
XII. 7 and 9 Aristotle describes the nature of divine nous and its thinking activity. It 
emerges that divine noetic activitymay be importantly different from human noetic 
activity. The formulation of the divine noetic activity as noeseos noesis marks the 
important difference between human and divine thinking, for the formula is not used 
anywhere else to describe human thinking. The characterisation of divine noetic activity 
as such, I argue, is nothing but perfect non-discursive thinking as energeia. 
Although it appears that human noetic activity as energeia can be considered as 
non-discursive, nevertheless there are serious questions about whether human non- 
discursive thinking is the same as divine non-discursive. One therefore might speak of 
the relativisation of the concept of non-discursive thinking in Aristotle. 
The analysis of the concept of nous in Aristotle is also crucial to the investigation 
of the subject of discursive and non-discursive thinking. The reason for this is that 
Aristotle employs the term nous in several different contexts. In the first place, it is 
spoken of as a capacity to think in the individual. In Posterior Analytics it is conceived 
to be the source of the principles of knowledge. In addition, Aristotle speaks of noun 
poietikos in De Anima 111.5 which is described as pure energeia and something that 
makes everything actual. In Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9 the Unmoved Mover, or God, 
itself is nous, which is the principle of everything on which the universe depends. 
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It is obvious that the term nous does not have a single meaning in Aristotle. It 
has different uses in Aristotle's philosophy. Once this is established, one of the biggest 
difficulties in understanding discursive and non-discursive thinking will be removed. 
It is also well known that Aristotle has a penchant for treating noes as something 
divine. He provides the account of human thinking mainly in De Anima 111.4 and 5, 
Ethics and Metaphysics. How are we supposed to understand what is meant by calling 
human thinking something divine? Aristotle's use of language seems to be always 
tentative, which is why I argue that it is very difficult to establish any genetic identity 
between the human and divine nous. He seems to speak of the divinity of the human 
notes and its activity in terms of as-if divinity, if that is the case one could speak merely 
of relativisation of divinity in relation to the human nous in Aristotle. 
Once it is established that the human nous does not share the same ontological 
status with divine nous, then one is in the right position to discuss whether human noetic 
activity is identical with divine noetic activity. It has also been said that one should bear 
in mind the different meanings of the term energeia in Aristotle too. 
To sum up, the analysis of the terms energeia and nous are indispensable to the 
discussion of human and divine thinking in this study. Since I identify divine thinking 
with perfect non-discursive thinking, it becomes crucial to discuss human thinking as 
energeia and see whether human noetic activity is identical with divine noetic activity or 
not. It also becomes important to discuss any possibility of ascribing non-discursive 
thinking to human thought. 
It seems that my account of discursive and non-discursive thinking faces at least 
two problems, one of which is the danger of presenting Aristotle as more fully involved 
in the discussion of the subject than he really is. I know of no way to eliminate the risk 
of anachronism in advance. We can look at a given account and examine how 
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accurately it follows the text, but this can be done in more than one way. However, one 
of the extreme ways of doing this is 'narrow textualism' which insists on following the 
literal message dogmatically. In this case, one argues that if Aristotle did not say it then 
we have no right to claim that he might have meant it. On the contrary, 'wide 
intentionalism' allows the text to be interpreted in virtually any way one would like. 
Then the problem of consistency arises and it becomes very hard to eliminate the 
constraint of consistency. Of course it would be wrong to assume that there are pure 
examples of 'narrow textualism' and 'wide intentionalism' but they nevertheless exist in 
some forms. The point is that the text is not as undetermined as wide 'intentional ism' 
assumes, nor as determined as 'narrow textualism' presumes. The latter tends to be 
strictly historicist and in virtue of this, interpretation is bound to be constrained by 
problems that were set by pre-Aristotelian philosophers and so on. I do not wish to 
deny the importance of considering the historical side but it leaves the problem it 
originally aimed to address untouched. This is particularly true of Aristotle. He 
proposes theories which are themselves of sufficient complexity and completeness, 
which is why we are able to consider and investigate his theories on the basis of shared 
theoretical concerns. Nonetheless, I shall pursue several complementary strategies for 
interpretation which I hope will help me in explaining the subject matter. 
I will also try to avoid studied scepticism that is primarily concerned with 
producing a single coherent account which does justice to the variety of texts we have at 
our disposal. Some say that what Aristotle says about, for example, nous, particularly 
the nous poietikos, does not fit into a central theory of De Anima or Metaphysics or the 
Ethics. Other Aristotelian commentators have despaired of giving any role to nous 
poietikos. Others have gone so far as to argue that Aristotle merely contradicts himself 
on the subject so that it is wrong even to think that one can consider the question of nous 
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poietikos in the light of Aristotle's general account of the intellect. As a result, recent 
studies on Aristotle appear to focus on selected parts of what Aristotle says here and 
there, and I believe this has resulted in diminishing the power of Aristotle's thought. In 
this study I wish to remedy their negative approach by trying to give an account of 
discursive and non-discursive thinking by and through a comprehensive treatment of the 
concept of the intellect in Metaphysics, De Anima and Ethics. 
In addition to examining particular passages, some of which stand on their own, 
this study has three main purposes: 
1. to show that Aristotle's conceptions of discursive and non-discursive thinking are 
to be understood in the light of analysis of the terms nous and energeia; 
2. to provide an account of Aristotle's views on human and divine thinking; 
3. to raise questions about any isomorphism between human thinking and divine 
thinking. 
I am particularly interested in seeing how far a certain line of interpretation of 
Aristotle's theory of thinking can be achieved. Those merely interested in the first aim 
might say that Aristotle coined the term energeia and so, of course, the formulation of 
human and divine thinking requires no justification. This is not true, however. It is far 
from being a settled matter. I shall try to prove that precisely the opposite is the case. 
In addition to bearing in mind the different meanings of the terms nous and energeia 
throughout the study, I will devote Chapter 1 to clarifying the meaning of the term ener- 
geia. I maintain that there is no single meaning of the term in Aristotle. This will, of 
course, provide only a partial view of his conception of discursive and non-discursive 
thinking. One factor that also appears to be absolutely crucial to the full picture is the 
global role played by the term notes. That is why Chapter 2 deals with the concept of 
noun in Aristotle. It emerges that the term nous is used in several different contexts by 
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Aristotle. 
Chapter 3 expounds Aristotle's theory of intellect, what I call the theory of 
human thinking. This theory, which is introduced in De Anima 111.4, fits neatly with a 
naturalist reading of Aristotle's theory of intellect in general. In particular I argue that 
nous poietikos does not belong to the human individual but, on the contrary, it is 
identical with the divine nous of Metaphysics XII. 9. Aristotle's theory of thinking then 
takes on a distinctly diverging flavour when we also add the fact that, besides the 
different applications of nous and energeia, the language of divinity does not also ipso 
facto countenance that human thinking is identical with divine thinking. 
In Chapter 41 shall first investigate the concept of discursive and non-discursive 
thinking in general. Then I particularly deal with the nature of non-discursive thinking 
in Aristotle. I argue that non-discursive thinking is superior to discursive, for the 
former is complete (an energeia) whereas the latter is incomplete (a kinesis) 
The interpretation of nous poietikos I am proposing here diverges from that of 
almost all interpretations thus far and carries with it a considerable number of 
interpretive demands. Furthermore, as far as I know there is no single study which 
deals directly with the problem of discursive and non-discursive thinking in Aristotle, let 
alone considers the topic in the light of De Anima, Metaphysics and Ethics, arguing that 
in De Anima 111.5 noun poietikos is the same as the divine nous of Metaphysics XII. 9. I 
am not only isolating the account that admittedly best suits a Neoplatonist theory of 
mind but also giving it an importance over other things Aristotle says about nous 
poietikos. It is also well known that he has other things to say on the subject, some of 
which seem to be incompatible with his formulation of human thinking. Thus Chapter 5 
will deal with the problem of a divergence between the human and divine noetic activity 
in relation to discursive and non-discursive thinking in Aristotle. It also argues that the 
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human nous does not share the same ontological status with the divine nous. I also 
discuss that although Aristotle conceives of human thinking in terms of energeia, 
nevertheless it appears that divine noetic activity differs importantly from the human 
noetic activity. 
Chapter 6 explores the relations between the terms theoria, energeia and 
eudaimonia. Theoria is defined as perfect eudaimonia by Aristotle and it also turns out 
to be described as an energeia, for eudairnonia cannot be kinesis and is not for the sake 
of something. Here the distinction between the terms kinesis and energeia becomes 
crucial to the understanding of discursive and non-discursive thinking. In a sense, the 
distinction enables us to understand the kinetic-destructive, kinetic-incomplete nature of 
discursive thinking and the complete-perfect nature of non-discursive thinking. It also 
transpires that the distinction also plays a very important role in understanding the nature 
of divine happiness and human happiness. In sum, Chapter 6 is concerned with the 
implications of discursive and non-discursive thinking in connection with psycho-ethical 
questions. 
Providing Aristotle with a thoroughly naturalistic account of human thinking is 
recommended by his use of the term noun, which can also be viewed as a desideratum in 
its own right. Chapter 3 has already dealt with an especially vexed issue, the status of 
the nous poietikos in De Anima 111.5.1 have argued there that nous poietikos does not 
belong to the individual so that the conclusions reached of the relation between the terms 
theoria, energeia and eudaimonia in Chapter 6 also implies that divine non-discursive 
may not ascribed to the individual human being. 
In Chapter 7I shall try to expose and examine the views of commentators on 
Aristotle's theory of intellect in general. I wished to write a chapter which may help to 
show how the question of different types of thinking has been perceived throughout 
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many centuries. In addition, Chapter 7 tries to demonstrate somewhat vague conceptions 
of discursive and non-discursive thinking in previous conceptions of Aristotle's theory of 
intellect. I am particularly interested to see how interpretations of Aristotle's theory of 
intellect may be related to the discussion of discursive and non-discursive thinking. In a 
sense, Chapter 7 tries to discover the interpretations of Aristotle's theory of intellect and 
their implications in relation to psychological, ethical and metaphysical questions. 
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I am very concerned to counter an increasingly popular view, namely ultra- 
rationalism, particularly in one of its recent guises which countenances that human and 
divine thinking are the same in kind. In order to establish the claim, it identifies the 
divine nous of Metaphysics XII. 9 with the nous of De Aninia 111.4 and 5.1 raise 
questions about the suggestion that they are the same in kind. I shall argue against this 
partly because the arguments for the view fail, mainly because human noun does not 
share the same ontological status with divine nous. Thus it is possible to think that 
human noetic activity may not be the same as divine noetic activity. Although human 
thinking accepts kinesis and energeia, divine thinking is described as pure energeia 
which excludes any sort of kinesis. In a sense, then, it is the conception of divine nous 
as being pure energeia that establishes the difference between the two types of thinking. 
It will be quite obvious to anyone familiar with recent discussions on the subject that 
much of what I say in this thesis runs against contemporary received opinion, which is 
why I devote much attention to major competing views. I also acknowledge the 
stimulus I have received from this impressive body of studies. The first cause of this 
project could be traced back to my first introduction to Aristotle's Metaphysics at the 
University of Agean, Izmir, Turkey in the autumn of 1985. During my MPhil studies 
on the relation between energeia and entelecheia at the University of Essex, the subject 
kept occupying my mind relentlessly. I decided that what Aristotle meant by 
characterisation of divine thinking in Metaphysics XII. 9 and human thinking in De 
Anima 111.4 and 5, could be made clear by looking at the terms nous, energeia and 
theoria. This was more than a decade ago and my mind has been intermittently 
occupied with the details of the theory ever since. 
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Notes to Introduction 
1.. See for example De Anima 427a 23 and Nicomachean Ethics 1143a 25. 
Aristotle also calls 'noun' praktikos at 433a 14 but dianoia praktike in line 18. 
2.. It is also useful to compare 427b 27 with 1139b 17-18. Of the infallibility of 
noun, see De Anima 435a 26 and 428a 17-18; Nicornachean Ethics 1139b 17-18. 
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I ON THE NATURE OF ACTIVITY (ENERCEIA / ENTELECHEIA) 
AND MOTION (KINESIS) IN ARISTOTLE 
The aim of this study is to investigate discursive and non-discursive thinking in 
relation to psychological, ethical and metaphysical questions in Aristotle. In doing so I 
shall particularly concentrate on what Aristotle says in Metaphysics, De Anima and 
Ethics. Certain terms are crucial to the analysis of discursive and non-discursive 
thinking, namely nous, energeia, entelecheia and theoria. Let us now start with an 
investigation into the term energeia in Aristotle. 
1. On the Terms Energeia and Entelecheia 
It is rather surprising that the origin and uses of the terms energeia and 
entelecheia in Aristotle have received little attention, whereas his philosophical develop- 
ment has been subject to intense scrutiny. 
Aristotle was puzzled by the question of change, as were his predecessors. 
However, he did not turn away from the fact of change, instead he tried to explain it 
and his explanation is one of a very radical nature. 
There are two terms used by Aristotle to describe 'what-is-not kinesis' or 'what- 
is-not-in-motion' in Aristotle, namely energeia and entelecheia. The latter is less 
frequently used than the former. However, they both describe something that is 'what- 
is-not kinesis'. Both terms have no pre-Aristotelian history, they are simply coined by 
Aristotle to explain his new understanding of reality. ' 
That is why one cannot hope to get any help by looking at a dictionary in order 
to understand what the terms energeia and entelecheia mean. Rather, one has to go 
back to the texts of Aristotle to discover what he means by them. 
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Reading Aristotle in translation conceals the meaning and importance of these 
terms in Aristotle's philosophy for, as soon as one consults the Greek text, certain 
problems are inevitably confronted. Why are there two terms to denote 'what-is-not 
kinesis'? Why did Aristotle feel any need to coin these terms to explain reality? Do the 
terms energeia and entelecheia have a single meaning in Aristotle? If they have, why 
does the Oxford translation as well as others translate the term energeia sometimes as 
' actuality', sometimes as 'activity'? If both terms supposedly mean the same thing, 
why is entelecheia translated as 'actuality', 'fulfilment' and 'complete reality'? 2 
It is not difficult to see that energeia and entelecheia are not simply ordinary 
terms which are analogously and ordinarily used to explain reality by Aristotle, but they 
are very much technical terms and are used to describe the fundamental and radical 
understanding of beings by Aristotle. ' 
The etymology of the word energeia suggests that it describes inner or inward 
activity. The part of it, en means 'in' and ergeia, which is the noun from ergein, which 
is a rare active form of the common verb ergasthai which means 'to do' or 'to act'. 
The use of the active form indicates the intensity of activity, therefore it may be inferred 
that Aristotle might have deliberately chosen the active form to mark that energeia 
describes activity which is not directed outside itself. ' 
I have raised questions above, rendering the term energeia as 'actuality' in 
essence. It appears that it is wrong and futile to translate it as actuality from the 
etymological point of view. I also try to outline briefly why it is so by pointing out 
different applications of the term energeia in Aristotle. 
There are eight principal uses of the term energeia, which are the following: 
1. It is of beings except potentially existent. ' 
2. It is of perfection. ' 
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3. Energeia itself describes ousia. ' 
4. Energeia in the meaning of actualisation which is used only for those beings that 
are subject to change and then include the potentialities. ' 
5. Energeia in application to sensation and thinking. ' 
6. Energeia is different from kinesis. 'o 
7. Energeia in its application to divine nous. " 
8. It signifies the highest good. 12 
Of the different meanings of the term energeia, three of them are most relevant 
to our present purpose. These are: (i) the principle of highest good, (ii) divine nous as 
energeia, and (iii) energeia as opposed to kinesis. Thus I would like to explain them in 
some detail. 
Although I have said at the beginning that there are eight principal meanings of 
the term energeia, nevertheless they could also be grouped as follows. 
i) The term energeia signifies activity of a subject. In other words activity 
necessarily involves a subject and it varies according to the ontological status of the 
subject. There is a necessary relation between the quality of an activity and of the 
quality of its subjects. 13 Human and divine noetic activity belong to this group, for both 
require subjects. 
ii) Actuality or actualisation: in this sense, the term energeia describes biological 
and physical realities. Anything that is actualised is also actual. It excludes any sort of 
subjective or individual activity and hence they should be distinguished from the first 
group. 
2. Energeia: the Principle of Highest Good 
In Aristotle, human life is mainly characterised by two chief activities, namely 
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thinking and knowing. All movements are subject to necessity to some extent, whereas 
all activities, particularly thinking and knowing, are directed by the subject and are not 
subject to necessity. That is why intellectual and ethical life are of activities. In this 
context the term energeia signifies a definite activity of soul which distinguishes humans 
from other beings. 
Aristotle tells us of the natural human good in Nicomachean Ethics at 1098a 15- 
65, that (a) human good is activity, (b) ethical life consists of activities, (c) activities are 
the activities of nous and (d) what is active is perfect. 
Although human beings happen to live in the world of kinesis, there is 
something within us, that is our nous, that enables us to stand above the flux. In virtue 
of being able to be involved in the activity of thinking, human beings can realise their 
real self, which happens to be nous. Aristotle, in his enquiry into the nature of the 
highest good as far as ethical human life is concerned, arrives at the conclusion that the 
human good which is happiness is the activity of soul in accordance with virtue and, if 
there is more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete. Aristotle 
also tells us in Nicomachean Ethics (X, 7,7-22) that this activity is thinking activity. In 
his own words: 
If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should 
be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing in us. 
Whether it be reason or something else that is this element which is thought to be our 
natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be 
itself also divine or only most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance 
with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is thinking 
(theoretike). 'a 
What this passage shows is that there is an intrinsic relation between the terms energeia 
and nous. Our happiness is defined in terms of the activity of nous (energeia and nous), 
however it remains to be seen whether the human happiness is the same as divine 
happiness (see the discussion of human and divine thinking in Chapter V). 
I believe that to elucidate the meaning of energeia in its application to divine 
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nous will also shed some light on our discussion of divine noetic activity. It should be 
said once again that Aristotle does not employ the term energeia in a single way. On 
the contrary, he applies it to different cases. Aristotle also appears to suggest that the 
quality of the activity is dependent on the ontological determination of beings in the first 
place. The distinction between energeia and kinesis serves very well to confirm that 
idea. All beings have some sort of share of activities but only perfect being or God is 
pure energeia. This enables us to make connection between the ontological structure of 
beings and their activities. This distinction is made particularly clear in Metaphysics, 
XII. Aristotle endows God with perfect activity. Divine nous in Metaphysics as pure 
activity is neither the exercise of capacity nor the actualisation of potentiality. As 
opposed to human noun, it is the activity of a perfect being, God, which has no 
potentiality in it in any sense. There cannot be any sort of actualisation, for there is no 
need for it and no desire to actualise anything. The subject of pure activity is therefore 
the perfect being, God. In other words, only God is to be described as pure energeia. 
As human beings we are generally inclined to think of something which is of a 
kinetic nature, therefore we have positive feelings about those concepts which imply 
changing, progressing, completing etc. In virtue of this it is almost unthinkable for us 
to think of something which is not completed but complete, which is not perfected but 
perfect, which is not what it is now but is what it is for ever. In describing the nature of 
divine noes, Aristotle abolishes all kinds of developmental concepts. It appears that one 
source of our inability to understand motionless activity is our tendency to think of only 
motion-like perfection or activity. 
In his inquiry into the principle of movement, namely in Metaphysics XII, 
Aristotle arrives at the conclusion that the principle of eternal motion must be pure 
activity. He identifies it with Unmoved Mover that is also called noun, 'God', and 
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finally 'thinking of thinking'. 
3. On God and Being Absolutely Potent 
Beings could be said to be impotent or potent in virtue of these reasons: 
a) to be capable of changing for the worse (erq)atheia tour kheirenon) 
b) to be capable of changing because of being impotent (katan adynamian) 
c) to be resistant to change either for the worse or good (apatheia) 
d) not to be capable of being changed (dysp)atheia) 
(see Soulhe, J., 'Etude sur le terme Dynamis, Paris, 19.19; Vocab. de Philos, V. 
Puissance, 654-655 with a note of Robin; See also Tricot, J., La Metaphysique with 
commentary, Paris, 1370, Alex C 387,38 and 390.21; and also compare Metaphysics, 
XII. 1073a 5 and 1073a 10). 
Among the different senses of the term potency it seems to be possible that d) 
is of God. It has no potency to change in any way. What moves is independent of that 
which is moved. However, the moved is not independent from the ontological point of 
view, here it is dependent on the mover and is open to affection by the other. 
God as pure energeia is also absolutely potent in terms of not being affected by 
anything. It moves without being moved. It is something eternal which is both 
substance (ousia) and actuality (energeia). It is neither changeable nor corruptible 
(Metaphysics, 1072 a 29-30; 1072 a 25-27), it exists necessarily. However, it seems to 
be difficult to perceive incorruptible but changeable substance in the same way. 
Furthermore how can we consider the activity of that which exists necessarily and is 
what it is necessarily with that the cause of its existence lies in somewhere else then 
itself and its activity to be the same? Let us imagine that there are A and B: 
1. A is what it is forever 
2. B is like A sometimes. 
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B neither exists necessarily nor acts in the way necessarily. What we can infer from 
this example is that B may cease to exist at some time and its action, as a result, stops. 
Although B has participated in the activity of A for some time can we still say that just 
because of this B's activity is nothing different than A? (See Metaphysics XII -6 and 
7 in particular). 
4. Perfection and Lnperfection: Energeia versus Kinesis 
The reality of perfection and imperfection is not mythically rooted in the 
philosophy of Aristotle. There are in essence two sorts of 'movements', namely 
energeia and kinesis. They are thought of beings which are to exist in different ways. 
Energeia and kinesis are attributed to beings which are subject to change, 
whereas there is only one sort of being, that is perfect being, God, which excludes any 
sort of kinesis. The distinction between energeia and kinesis has been the source of 
confusions but I believe that the distinction between energeia and kinesis provides a 
radical understanding of reality. The reason for this can be explained as follows. 
1. It enables us to interpret the universe from an ethical and aesthetical point of 
view 
2. The energeia and kinesis distinction establishes the foundation of ethical life. 
However, the ontological equality on the basis of ontological aristocracy is superseded 
by the ability of subjective realisation of the self. One simply and necessarily has to 
distinguish the life of movement from the life of activity, both of which are said to 
constitute the aspects of human beings but in a different way. Let this suffice as 
preliminary remarks on the question of energeia and kinesis and as an outline of the 
fundamental differences between energeia and kinesis. 
I will not go into a detailed discussion of how to distinguish energeia from 
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kinesis, but just state generally accepted differences between these two terms, which 
are: '5 
i) energeia is complete in every moment but kinesis is incomplete; 
ii) energeia is perfect whereas kinesis is not (the imperfection arises from incom- 
pleteness); 
iii) kinesis is subject to time but energeia is not. ' 
Energeia has its own telos within itself whereas kinesis is directed to something 
external. In the case of energeia there is nothing outside to reach in order to become 
complete, while kinesis has its end outside itself, and in virtue of that kinesis is incom- 
plete, imperfect for the end of constructing, walking from Aphrodisias to Thebes lies 
beyond that movement. The second and third aspects of energeia are closely related to 
the first feature of energeia. 
5. A Further Note on the term Entelecheia 
The etymological explanation we get from Liddel's and Scott's dictionary allows 
us to understand the word 'entelecheia' to denote something 'at an end' or complete. 
However, the alternative explanation given by Blair seems to be more suitable. The 
' en' is an obvious parallel to that of energeia. The telos in the accusative makes it 
possible to render the term entelecheia as 'having an end within itself'. The etymo- 
logical explanation given by Liddel and Scott makes it possible to render the term 
entelecheia as 'being at, one's end' but following Blair the term entelecheia signifies 
possessing one's end inside oneself. " 
I conclude my discussion of the terms energeia and entelecheia by saying that no 
matter what, the translation of these two terms as 'actuality' is wrong. In essence, 
energeia means 'activity' and entelecheia describes the internal possession of the end. 
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6. On the Principle of Destruction (Kinesis) and Activity (Energeia) 
As I have already said, the terms energeia / entelecheia and kinesis are used 
throughout Aristotle's writings. However, there are no common points of agreement as 
to how to translate them into English, nor of their meanings in general. Most 
importantly, the terms energeia / entelecheia and kinesis have received almost no 
attention in relation to Aristotle's conception of discursive and non-discursive thinking, 
which I believe has been the source of real difficulty, particularly in understanding the 
nature of discursive and non-discursive thinking. I believe that without the clarification 
of the nature of energeia / entelecheia and kinesis, the concept of discursive and non- 
discursive thinking in Aristotle is bound to be blind. Only through gaining a real insight 
into those terms can discursive and non-discursive thinking be demystified. 
Some recent Aristotelian scholars have virtually dismissed any sensible concep- 
tion of non-discursive thinking by saying that it excludes any sort of excitement on the 
part of those who are engaged in intellectual activity. " Others have come to identify the 
process of seeking knowledge with the aim of seeking. 19 In other words, those such as 
Rorty appear to neglect the very fundamental difference between energeia / entelecheia 
and kinesis and as a result of her mistaken approach there is no difference left between 
the process of searching to know and to know, the means and the end, and discursive 
and non-discursive thinking (see Chapter VI). 
Although Aristotle speaks of the distinction between energeia and kinesis in 
terms of tense-logic, others have reduced the difference to merely linguistic scrutiny 
which has also resulted in missing the real concern in Aristotle's radical understanding 
of reality in the light of the concept of energeia / entelecheia and kinesis. 20 I believe 
that the distinction between these two terms determines the whole of Aristotle's thought 
and therefore it is vital to understanding Aristotle. 
22 
First of all, it appears that it is wrong to confine the distinction between energeia 
/ entelecheia and kinesis to merely linguistic logic. For by and large most of the verbs 
have the form of present perfect and present continuous in English; for example 
cooking, cleaning. However, the important thing to remember is that some of our 
actions contain their telos within themselves whereas some others do not. In other 
words, they are directed to particular ends, for example seeing, living, being happy, 
walking in the sense of strolling (spazieren) which are their own ends and in virtue of 
being their own ends these sorts of activities do not have to cease. The important 
passage on the subject comes from Metaphysics: 
Since no action which has a limit is an end, but only a means to the end, as e. g. 
the process of thinning; and since the parts of the body themselves, when one is 
thinning them, are in motion in the sense that they are not already that which it is the 
object of the motion to make them, this process is not an action, or at least not a 
complete one, since it is not an end; it is the process which includes the end that is an 
action. E. g., at the same time we see and have seen, understand and have understood, 
think and have thought; but we cannot at the same time learn and have learned, or 
become healthy and be healthy. We are living well and have lived well, we are happy 
and have been happy, at the same time; otherwise, the process would have had to cease 
at some time, like the thinning process; but it has not ceased at the present moment: 
we both are living and have lived. 
Now of these processes we should call the one type motions (kineseis) and the 
other actualisations (energeiai). Every motion is incomplete - the processes of thinking, 
learning, walking, building - these are motions, and incomplete at that. For it 
is not the 
same thing which at the same time is walking and has walked, or is building and has 
built, or is becoming and has become, or is being moved and has been moved, but two 
different things; and that which is causing motion is different from that which has 
caused motion. But the same thing at the same time is seeing and has seen, is thinking 
and has thought. The latter kind of process, then, is what I mean by actualisation 
(energeia) and the former what I mean by motion (kinesis). Z' 
I would first like to say that Aristotle's argument about the distinction between 
energeia and kinesis is not merely based on tense-logic. His point is that energeia 
describes activities which are not relative to an end but contain their end. It is not that 
they do not take time, rather they are not completed by a process by which they become 
complete. The second important point that distinguishes between energeia and kinesis, 
made in the passage above, is that energeia is not directed to a particular end, it is the 
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end and in virtue of being the end it is complete and perfect. The other passage which 
also supports this line of understanding energeia with reference to teleological concerns 
comes again from Metaphysics: 
... 
in some cases the ultimate thing is the use of the faculty, as e. g. in the case of 
sight seeing is the ultimate thing, and sight produces nothing else besides this. 22 
It could be said that the passage conveys the view that with regard to some faculties, 
their function, their activity is the only telos of their being, for there is nothing toward 
which that activity is in turn directed. However, this is not in conflict with the point I 
have been making. 
Although the analysis of the terms energeia / entelecheia and kinesis from 
linguistic points of view may be useful, nevertheless I believe that it does not enable us 
to gain a real insight into the conception of reality as energeia. Aristotle is much 
concerned with the nature of motion and activity. At the end he comes to define reality 
(ousia) as energeia. 23 That is why I argue that understanding reality as being energeia 
requires more than linguistic analysis of some verbs. 
As Aristotle himself says in the passage just quoted, there is nothing external to 
an energeia, for example seeing. Building, on the contrary, cannot be thought of 
without 'having been built'. The telos of building is having built but the telos of seeing 
it is just seeing. The telos of kinesis is not included in it whereas energeia is the acting 
itself. In other words, there is nothing to identify it with but itself. Seeing and having 
seen occur together for they are one and the same thing. Also, note that it is not the 
case that energeia lasts long or can go on indefinitely, whereas kinesis is destined to 
cease. Energeia is complete in the sense that its completeness is present in every instant 
of its occurrence. It is indivisible in the sense of excluding any sort of potentiality and 
change. This sense of the energeia describes the ousia of God and its thinking activity 
as well as human thinking (see Chapter 5, section 4). 
24 
This is why Aristotle says that possessing knowledge is superior to seeking it, 
for seeking has no end in itself. It cannot go on for ever, it has to cease at some point. 
For example, the process of solving a problem can only be ended when the problem is 
solved. It would be rather absurd to say that one can go on busying oneself with it 
without aiming to solve it. As far as the human noetic activity is concerned, searching 
for truth can be no other than kinesis, and it is not intelligible without active thinking, 
i. e. to come to understand reality, to contact reality, which has no aim beyond itself. 24 
The real issue here is not that discursive thinking cannot be enrergeia but 
discursive thinking cannot be its own end and because of this discursive thinking is not 
be be considered energeia qua discursive thinking. I can only be defined in elation to 
the aim of knowing reality. It is important here to note that in Metaphysics 1 X. 10 
Aristotle tries to investigate how we can contact, how we can know reality. This is 
also Plotinus' problem that he is committed to deal with. (Lloyd, AC 258-65) 
Thus it would be wrong to confine non-discursive thinking to merely possession of a 
knowledge and contemplation of it. Discursive thinking as searching (kitzesi. s) is 
incomplete. Its aim is to contact, to know reality. Contemplation of a mathematical 
truth which one knows and one's ability to go over the same mathematical proof is an 
indirect relation to reality. This was a view shared by some members of Plato's 
Academy. They considered knowing reality as superior to the process of searching. 
(1153 a 8-g; for example Speusippus; 1177 a 25-7) 
It is also important to remember that there is a possibility that one may not be 
able to think of the same mathematical proof that one knows for some external and 
internal reasons. However, contacting reality as in the case of non-discursive thinking 
is all or nothing affair. One simply cannot chose to know or not to know reality. One 
either knows it or does not know it. But one may not be able to exercise his/her 
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capacity for some reason. 
It is this distinction that is missing from Sorabji's account of thinking, and I 
believe also that for the same reason he comes to bless the kinetic nature of seeking and 
dismisses non-discursive thinking on the ground that it does not produce any excitement. 
I am not saying here that the human noetic subject can eliminate the necessity of the 
laborious searching process to understand, because we are not God, but it is wrong to 
identify the telos of our intellectual activity with the process of searching. In other 
words, it is against the Aristotelian spirit to conceive the human noetic activity in this 
way. The means is not and cannot be the end. 25 
I have already said that there are different applications of the term energeia and 
Aristotle employs them in several different contexts, which is why it is possible to talk 
about divine energeia and human energeiai. In Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9, divine nous is 
described that of which ousia is energeia. Aristotle also applies the term energeia to 
perception, to ethical matters and the human thinking. There are many questions about 
how to understand divine thinking and human thinking as energeia. For example; is 
there a genetic relation between the human nous and divine nous ? Is human noetic 
activity the same in kind as divine noetic activity? What Aristotle says in Metaphysics 
about the nature of divine noun and its noetic activity can help to clarify the difference 
between the human sort of energeiai and divine energeia in which any sort of poten- 
tiality is absolutely excluded. Aristotle says there that it seems to be the case that there 
is no distinction between activity and potentiality without reference to motion. 26 In the 
case of the human sort of energeiai the reality of potentiality cannot be completely dis- 
missed. On the contrary, there is no place for motion in divine energeia. Returning to 
Aristotle's question of the distinction between activity and potentiality, it is interesting to 
see that this poses a very important question for first philosophy and it is included in the 
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list of aporiai. `' Aristotle answers the question by saying that "activity is above all 
motion". 
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The superiority of energeia to kinesis is obvious. The root of such a view could 
perhaps be traced back to Ancient Greek philosophical tradition. Note that energeia as 
activity is contrary to passivity. This might prove that the Greek philosophers were 
inclined greatly to perceive reality in terms of activity rather than in terms of passivity. 19 
Reality as activity is demotionalised, not because reality becomes inactive but it 
becomes its own end. It is freed from the threat of destructive kinesis. It is what it is to 
be something. That is why, although Aristotle did not question the reality of change, he 
nevertheless did not perceive beings as always changing for no purpose or that beings 
are in flux for ever. In other words, in Aristotle's view the world is not chaotic. For 
him, there are individual beings which yearn to realise their nature and manifest their 
identity in the world as becoming their own end. That is why circular motion, of which 
each is part, is as much the end as any other, is conceived as being the most proximate 
analogue to divine being. Non-discursive thinking is also of the same nature. There is 
nothing incomplete to be completed later. In virtue of this, it excludes any sort of 
change. It is the only way to contact reality. For this reason it cannot be contemplation 
of some truths because contemplation of some truths are of reality but it is not to contact 
reality. For example, one can produce propositions of reality but one may never know 
what reality is. 3o 
I believe that the misconception of reality as energeia by Aristotle has led some 
scholars to bless kineticism. Children love colourful and moving things but when they 
grow up they consider their past actions as some sort of laughing matter, for when we 
are children we conceive everything in relation to one big motion that we never want to 
stop, for example playing, dancing, running. It appears that those who find the 
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unchanging yet active perception of reality as something distasteful or boring, rather 
resemble children who hate growing up and give up the deceiving, unreal pleasure of 
change. 
For Aristotle, reality is unmoved yet not inactive. What lies at the centre of the 
universe is that which is complete, perfect and fully active. That is substance or ousia 
or being as an activity. It manifests what it is to be such and such a being. For 
example, it is for an individual to shine forth with humanity, in other words to realise 
what it is to be a human being. Aristotle states that of things which are actual, some are 
"as motion to potentiality", others as "ousia to some matter". " 
Now we have reached a point which requires caution. I have argued that 
Aristotle conceived reality as activity. However, this does not mean that all beings are 
activity in the same sense. Divine being as energeia is not identical with anything else, 
thus other beings are not divine and do not yearn to be a part of God but to be what they 
are. Beings imitate divinity through realising their nature. Therefore imitatio dei does 
not mean to strive to be a part of God but to be one's self. In other words, beings do 
not yearn to be God but to emulate God, what is totally active is what it is to be forever. 
Aristotle speaks of the being the nature of which is energeia in Metaphysics at 
1071b, 20. I believe that this has more than metaphysical force in Aristotle's whole 
thought. It enables us to differentiate what it is to be absolute activity from what it is to 
yearn to be activity. Things can only partake of divinity in accordance with their 
nature. As human beings, we can realise the divine element in us through our noetic 
activities which are not of a kinetic nature. Although we are composite beings and 
kinetic activities are part of our reality, nevertheless we are not defined in terms of 
kinetic activities but in terms of our active noetic activities. Being so, they are not 
destined to be destroyed but to be enriched and preserved. Such kinds of activities have 
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no limit and no end outside themselves. It is precisely this nature of noetic activities that 
frees us from the slavery of motion, for motion is necessarily self-annihilating. Its 
nature is nothing but self-destruction. It has to cease. Only divine-like activities save 
motion from the vanity of infinite regress. Energeia is the aim of kinesis, therefore the 
end of motion necessarily exists outside itself. That is why the aim of searching is to 
understand reality. Searching, like kinesis, cannot be its own aim. It cannot go on for 
ever. Desire to know is satisfied when one comes into contact with reality which is non- 
discursive. Understanding as non-discursive noetic activity has no end beyond itself and 
it certainly saves searching from being self-destructive. 
7. On Perception as Energeia and the Sense Object 
Aristotle tries to explain changeable realities by investigating their activities which are 
conceived to be essential for understanding what they are. Among them, perception is 
of particular importance from the point of Artistotle's theory of knowledge. 
Aristotle characterizes sensation as a movement (De Anima, 416 b 33-34,415 b 24-25; 
410 b 25-26; De Generatione et Corruptione 324 b 25-32). He distinguishes three 
aspects of sensation which are: 
1) the faculty of sensation 
2) sensation 
3) the object of sensation 
A movement takes place between the faculty of sensation and the object of 
sensation. There are two sides in every movement which are 
a) the cause of affection (paschein) 
b) the thing which is being affected. 
However, there is only one single activity during the actual sensation. For example, 
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the activity of one who hears and the activity of a resounding object in arousing one's 
hearing is a single activity. (De Anima 111.2,425 b 26 - 426 a 26). But where the 
movement takes place one pole is only potentially what the other one is in actuality. 
There is, however, distinction between them in actuality so long as movement is 
completed. During the movement one pole gains that which the other already has. It 
undergoes the effect which proceeds from the other. (De Generatione et Corruptione I 
7- here Aristotle describes the general theory of movement and alteration. ) 
Now it is important to consider how the two sides of movement as 
distinguished by Aristotle are divided between the faculty of sensation and the object. 
The object of sensation is the cause of sensation. In virtue of the object of sensation 
the existing potentiality of having sensation is actualized. The percipient's role in 
sensation is passive. For the percipient undergoes the action proceeding from the 
object. However, during the actual sensation there is only one single activity though 
the distinction between sensation and its object remains. For in Aristotle as in the case 
of thinking, perceiving is identified with that which is perceived. 
That is why it does not seem to be wrong to say that energeia is always active 
in the light of what has been said. However, it is also true that movement is caused by 
the sense-object. The sense-object is the cause of sensation. That is why even the 
intellect cannot be said completely active in relation to the object of thought. For the 
object of thought is essential to bring the intellect into actuality in the first place and then 
the intellect can think itself. 
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8. The Distribution of the term Energeia / Entelecheia in Aristotle's Works32 


















































































Treatise Energeia Entelecheia 
De Sensu et Sensibili 20 0 
De Memoria et Reminiscentia 6 0 
De Somno et Vigilis 6 0 
De Divinatione per Somnum 0 0 
De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae 1 0 
De luventute et Senectute, de Vita 
et Morte 2 0 
De Respiratione 1 0 
History of Animals 1 0 
Parts of Animals 12 1 
Motion of Animals 6 0 
De Incessu Animalium 0 0 
De Generatione Animalium I 3 0 
II 19 2 
III 0 0 
IV 4 0 
V 0 0 
Total 26 2 
Metaphysics A 0 0 
a 0 0 
ß 1 1 
F 0 0 
A 12 6 
E 1 0 
Z 0 8 
H 18 2 
0 60 6 
I 0 0 
K 23 10 
A 32 2 
M 2 2 
N 5 0 
Total 154 36 
Nicomachean Ethics I 19 0 
II 5 0 
III 2 0 
IV 0 0 
V 1 0 
VI 1 0 
VII 11 0 
VIII 3 0 
IX 13 0 
X 58 0 
Treatise 
Total 113 0 
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Eudemian Ethics 10 0 
II 14 0 
III 0 0 
VII 7 0 
Total 21 0 
Politics 2 0 
Constitution of Athens 0 0 
Rhetoric 12 0 
Poetics 1 0 
33 
Table 2: Distribution According to Page 
(Post H) 21 22 23 
(Pr. An. ) 67 
(Post. An. ) 86 186 
(Top. ) 105 106 117 124 125 146 154 
(Phys. ) 193 200 201 202 204 206 191 195 201 202 
204 206 207 208 211 212 213 251 257 213 
217 223 224 225 228 244 247 248 255 257 
258 263 283 260 262 
(Cael. )281 282 283 286 302 307 311 316 317 320 
322 326 334 
(G. & C. ) 318 327 334 381 402 412 413 
(Meteor. ) (391-401 De Mundo) 
(An. ) 412 415 417 418 419 422 415 416 417 418 
419 420 422 423 425 426 427 428 429 431 
429 430 431 433 
(Sens. ) 438 439 441 445 446 447 448 449 
(Mem. ) 450 452 
(Somno) 454 455 458 
(Somniis) 459 461 
(Long. ) 465 468 
(Resp. ) 479 
(H. A. ) 503 
(P. A. ) 642 647 649 656 667 668 682 
(M. A. ) 698 701 734 702 717 726 730 734 735 736 
737 739 740 741 742 743 744 768 769 
(791-980 spurious works) 
(Metaph. ) 996 1009 1015 1017 1019 1014 1020 1021 1022 
1023 
1026 1034 1036 1038 1039 1044 1045 1047 1042 
1043 
1045 1046 1047 1050 1065 1066 1071 1048 1049 
1050 
1051 1060 1063 1065 1066 1069 1071 1074 1078 
1084 
1072 1087 1088 1089 1092 
(N. E. ) 1094 1096 1098 1099 1100 1101 1103 1105 1113 1114 
1120 1144 1147 1152 1153 1154 1157 1168 1169 
1170 
1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 
1180 
(1181-1213 Magna Moralia) 
(E. E. ) 1218 1219 1220 1228 1237 1238 1241 1242 
(1249- 1251 De Virtut ibus et Vitiis) 
(Pol. ) 1328 1332 
(1343-1353 Oeconom ica) 
(Rhet. ) 1361 1378 1410 1411 1412 
(1420-1447 Rhetorica ad Alexandrum) 
(Poet. ) 1448 
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Only nous stands above the flux. (Stephen R. L. Clark) 
The activity (energeia) of the intellect (noes) is life, and God is that activity 
(energeia). (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1072b 26-27) 
The activity (energeia) of intellect (nous) has its end in itself and its own 
intrinsic pleasure is self sufficient, leisured. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1177,19- 
25) 
It is the activity of the intellect (nous) that constitutes complete (teleia) human 
happiness. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b 19-26) 
It is foolish not to recognise what one should seek to demonstrate and what not. 
There cannot be demonstration of everything alike: the process would go on to infinity, 
so that there would still be no demonstration. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1006a 6) 
It must be the case that we are capable of knowing at least one proposition to be 
true, without knowing any other proposition whatever from which it follows. (G. E. 
Moore) 
There need not be, are not, and could not be, any ultimate archai of definition, 
explanation and demonstration. (R. Bambrough) 
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11 ON THE CONCEPT OF NOUS IN ARISTOTLE 
I have argued in the previous chapter that Aristotle describes reality in terms of 
energeia and the term energeia has many different applications in Aristotle. Now it 
is 
time to take a close look at the concept of noes. 
1. The Different Meanings of Nous 
It has been generally thought that Aristotle's remarks on nous commit him to a 
conception of nous as intuition. ' But what do we mean by intuition? Further, what 
might Aristotle have meant by noun? 
Richard Rorty speaks of the four senses of intuition. It appears that the closest 
to the general view of nous in Aristotle is: 
knowledge of the truth of a proposition, but not preceded by inference2 
Concerning 'intuition' as a translation of Anschauung in the first Critique, 
Ewing writes: 
'Anschauung' has no connection with the sense in which this word is most 
commonly employed in English today as meaning a priori insight not based on 
reasoning ... 
3 
In the light of these remarks on intuition how do we construe nous in Aristotle? 
It seems that there are essentially two types of understanding: 
I Realising the truth of some proposition. For example, "the same thing cannot at 
one and the same time and in the same respect both be and not be" (Metaphysics, 
1005b, 5-34; 101 lb, 13-14). In this case nous will be intuitive and noesis will be an act 
of intuition. 
II A faculty which produces knowledge of things in an a priori and non-empirical 
manner. If this is so it is hard to think that Aristotle in many of his writings speaks of 
nous in either of the ways we have just described. The main difference between two 
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types of intuition is that the former does not omit the reference to empirical reality. 
However, the second type of intuition assumes no role of perception in producing 
knowledge. Perhaps this type of intuition has nothing to do with sensible things, such 
that its objects are of some different nature than sensible reality. 
If Aristotle had thought that one could gain knowledge by the faculty of 
intuition, he would not have felt the need to write the Analytics let alone his other 
logical works, because he states that there are two thinking states which produce 
knowledge; epistente and nous. All episterne is discursive, namely, based on reasoning 
whereas nous is the source of all knowledge, the arche of the archai. But this does not 
mean that Aristotle did not consider knowledge by intuition no more than a myth. 4 As 
Kahn says, the: 
... process of 
learning and exercising science ... must 
be achieved in our own 
experience by ordinary process of induction and hard work: there is no epistemic button 
we can push in order to tune in on the infallible contemplation of noetic forms by the 
active intellect. ' 
Therefore I believe that it is useless to deal with the term nous, particularly in the 
Analytics, in terms of intuition. To do so just leads one astray; for Aristotle perceived 
the function and the nature of nous in a completely different way. And this is what I 
hope to disclose throughout this study. 
2. On the Origin of the term Nous 
The origins of the term nous have been subject to a great deal of examination. 
Frame even wrote a doctoral thesis on the origins of the Greek word nous. 6 
There are innumerable competing views of the origin of the term noes. 
According to Von Fritz the term nous is derived from an original stem 'snu' which 
means 'to smell' or 'sniff'. Referring back to the root 'snu' thus he comes to defend 
the view that the term nous conveys a perceptual orientation from the outset. ' 
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Some others derive it from neein meaning 'to swim' and neuein meaning 'to 
nod'. But Frame argues against this by claiming that nous is to be linked with neomai 
and nostos which mean to return or the return. According to him the term notes is 
derived ultimately from the Indo-European stem nes which conveys the meaning of a 
return from death and darkness. Thus he comes to assert that nous is connected with the 
conception of the return to conscious life. However, by the time of Homer nous and 
neomai were used divergently. As a result nous came to mean simply 'consciousness' 
or 'mind'. But neoniai lost its religious connotations and came to mean 'return'. Frei 
also makes the notes and neomai connection on a different basis. He grounds his view 
on the appearance of the stem neo which is discovered on Pylos tablets and the traces of 
the original sense of nous in the Iliad. ' 
Von Fritz discusses nous in reference to noein meaning 'to see' or 'to realise'. 
Thus he finds in Homer the basic meaning of nous which is a realisation through 
perception. ' 
Von Fritz treats the development of the meaning of nous as temporal and 
logical. It is also true that in Homer the term nous is used to signify the realisation of a 
situation of great emotional impact and importance. It is through this sense that noes 
also came to mean 'order' or 'ordering' . 
'o 
The developmental account of nous is rejected by Boehme. According to him 
nous always refers to something purely intellectual (rein intellektuell). So he rejects the 
view that noein is to ever be related to any realisation through any sort of perception. 
However, the view particularly defended by Von Fritz appears to be right. But 
nevertheless to confine the meaning of nous to 'realisation through perception' cannot 
be right. For even in Homer nous has different senses which are also present in the 
writings of the classical period. " 
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It is almost impossible to deny the continued and close relation between noun 
and perception. Although the philosophical use of the term nous could signify reasoning 
and inference but not relate it to perception, this only proves the divergent uses of the 
term nous. '2 But in essence it emerges in the writings of pre-Socratic philosophers that 
noes is understood as being in close cooperation with perception and functioning 
through it. Nous and perception did not oppose each other, in their views. ' For 
example, the apposition of seeing and hearing nous in Xenophanes (Fragment B24). 
The same is also present in non-philosophical literature. In Oedipus Rex, for example, 
Oedipus' curse of Teiresias is to be blinded in ear, nous, eye, everything. Teiresias says 
that what Oedipus uttered will keep haunting him since, being a man, Oedipus does not 
realise the significance of the situation, therefore he is blind in nous. 'a 
It is also possible to infer that this sense of noun is related to the other senses of 
nous. In that case, nous could denote a sign of a person's wisdom or intelligence. It is 
suggested by Burnet that a person who has practical wisdom (phronesis) can also be 
thought to possess noes because a person who sees what is right and acts accordingly is 
also the one who is said to have nous. JS 
What this little survey has shown us is that it is impossible to use nous or noein 
in isolation from sensible contexts. Historically these two terms have always come to 
refer to apprehension of things which are perceptible and realisation through perception. 
3. On the Meaning of Nous in Plato 
First I would like to say that it would be wrong to think that nous has precisely 
the same meaning in Aristotle as in Plato. The term nous has had a long history of use 
in Greek literature and philosophical writings. So it would be natural to think that 
Aristotle used the term to suit his philosophical position. But nevertheless one needs to 
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be familiar with its previous uses in order to see how Aristotle has come to understand 
and use the term nous in his writings. Therefore I will briefly give an account of nous 
in Plato in order to detect the similarity and dissimilarity between Platonic and 
Aristotelian uses of the term nous. 
Let us begin with book VI of the Republic. Here noun and perception are almost 
conceived as opposed to each other. A sharp distinction between nous and perception is 
indicated. In spite of being conceived as analogous in some respects, nous and 
perception are nevertheless said to have different objects. The objects of noun 
correspond to nous as the objects of sight do to the faculty of sight (508a, 1). 
The reason for driving a wedge between perception and nous is to prove that 
things in the world of flux are not perceived by thought. And Plato states that the form 
of things constitutes the object of thought. ' 
However, Plato goes much deeper and he firstly comes to understand nous as having 
nothing to do with any information that senses provide. He promotes dialectic as 
proximate form of the exercise of nous. As such it signifies the highest level of 
knowledge (511b-e). In the Republic at line 511c 1-2, we are also told that in this sort 
of activity no information provided by senses is required. There is only activity of pure 
ideas which move through ideas to ideas and end with ideas. " 
As we have just indicated though, Plato himself drives a wedge between nous 
and perception; it is nevertheless possible to infer that the term nous has more than a 
single meaning in his writings. In order to prove this fact we could turn to noein. In 
general it is right to say that noein is contrasted with verbs of perception, for example 
horan. But Plato appears to use noein to mean perceptual realisation. The example for 
the use of noein in this sense comes from Phaedrus 229c 4 and Timaeus 37c 6. In the 
former Phaedrus speaks of the altar to Boreas by the side of the stream that he did not 
notice previously. In the case of Timaeus at 37c 6, the father and creator realises that 
what he had made was alive and moving. It is also possible to find the use of noein in 
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relation to perceptual cases. Instances of the uses of nous in perceptual contexts are also 
to be found in Philebus (24a) and Laws (738a 1,952b 9). Here, though, one could say 
that Plato is writing colloquially. The contrast of horan and noein, which is present in 
the Republic, is also absent in the Parmenides "that which appears to be one thing when 
seen from a distance and dimly will (horon u) turn out to be unlimited in number when 
seen close at hand and keen vision (nountl)". 'g 
Parmenides suggests to Socrates that he got his notion of forms in the following 
way: 
When it seems to you that a number of things are large, there seems I suppose, 
to be a single character which is the same when you look at all of them; hence you think 
that largeness a single thing ... some one thing which thought observes to cover the 
cases, as being a single character. 19 
It is obvious that the account of nein in the Republic which is confined to 
Forms and relations among Forms is radically different than the account of it in the 
Parmenides. Thus, as far as the account of noein is concerned it is hard to claim that 
Plato uses it in a single sense. But could the same be said of nous? 
In fact it seems that although nein exhibits different meanings in Plato's 
writings the same thing is not true of nous. In the Philebus nous is described as the 
purest, most exact and truest kind of knowledge. For it does not deal with things which 
are in constant flux but its objects are true beings, which are changeless, eternal and the 
most precious. 2° 
Thus noein has a range of different uses in Plato. It could signify a perfect 
intellectual activity as well as the realisation of something in relation to perception. The 
latter meaning is also to be found from Homer onwards. And this meaning is 
commonly found in pre-Aristotelian writings. In the light of this survey one should not 
expect to find a single meaning of the term nous in Aristotle. Therefore it would also be 
misleading to restrict Aristotle's use of noes to the one of its previous meanings. But 
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nevertheless it appears to be possible to speak of a particularly Platonic conception of 
nous, since it is closely related to a special conception of dialectic and a dualistic 
metaphysics. However, Aristotle did not follow Plato with regard to dialectic and 
metaphysics. So there should be no reason to think that the Aristotelian conception of 
nous is necessarily Platonic. `' 
4. The Different Meanings of Notts in Aristotle 
I am convinced that elucidation of the terms noun, energeia, entelechia and 
theoria are crucial to understanding what Aristotle says in De Anima, Metaphysics and 
Ethics. For these terms are employed in those works with different meanings. There 
are the different applications of each term mentioned above (see for example Chapter I 
on the term energeia). Thus, in order to eliminate confusions one is bound to elucidate 
each application in the context that they are used. Moreover, since the aim of this 
project is primarily to discuss human thinking and divine thinking in relation to 
discursive thinking and non discursive thinking, the clarification of the terms nous, 
energeia, entelechia and theoria is fundamental to the present subject-matter too. 
But first is nous. The last chapter of Posterior Analytics is one of the most 
important in all Aristotle's works. It conveys Aristotle's views on sense and noun. 
After describing the various processes of acquiring knowledge he comes to the 
conclusion that there must be archai of knowledge which are anapodeicta, not subject to 
demonstration. According to Aristotle without these archai knowledge is impossible. 
Without them there would be either an infinite regress or a vicious circle which would 
make knowledge impossible. He concludes that not all knowledge is by demonstration. 
Therefore in the case of the archai of knowledge one should not ask for further 
demonstration. They are self-evident and anapodeicta. 22 
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If the archai are not based on prior knowledge how do we know them? What is 
the source from which we derive them? Aristotle does not believe that knowledge is 
innate in us in a determinate form. Although knowledge originates from sensation the 
ultimate source of it is noun. The argument Aristotle produces is the following: there 
are episteme and noun which produce knowledge. All episteme is discursive 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1140b 33) in which first principles must be known before the 
conclusion. Nous is like a hand with which one does something else; without noes there 
is no knowledge at all. Nous infallibly gives truth; nous only is the source of all 
knowledge, the archai of the archai. 
Aristotle's description of nous in Posterior Analytics is an answer to both 
Scepticism and Platonism. Nous as such is the principle of certainty against Scepticism 
and Platonic dogmatism. But it is not without difficulties. 
Aristotle's views on the archai are open to many objections. First of all he 
appears to seek for certainty and demands necessary truths. According to him 
philosophic and scientific knowledge can only be built on valid reasoning from first 
premises which are beyond any doubt and are necessary. Today, however, the scientist 
thinks that science is composed of tentative hypotheses and subject to continuous 
revision. It is also thought that there is no need to seek for principles which are 
themselves beyond argument. So there is no knowledge to be gained through intuition. 
In simple terms, knowledge by intuition is a myth. 2; 
There is an account of knowledge given in the Phaedo which is based on the 
assumption that we acquire knowledge through sensation even though it is rejected by 
Socrates at the end. The important point here is that recognition of the forms is realised 
by perception (74b). The activity of this recognition is dianoia which is ranked below 
nous. But it is the nous that grasps the arche and sees the forms. The eyes of nous are 
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turned above. Once the philosopher has grasped the arche of all things he/she could 
start the reasoning process from the ultimate premises. 
Aristotle is dissatisfied with such a transcendent form of goodness. 24 For 
Aristotle nous is conceived to think the forms which were immanent. But nevertheless 
nous for both Plato and Aristotle remained as something divine. Nous never appears to 
be a purely human faculty in Aristotle. He seems to consider it as a link between the 
human being and divinity, for only God is considered to be pure nous. 25 It is right to 
infer from what has been said earlier that in Posterior Analytics Aristotle perceives noun 
as the principle of knowledge, without which epagoge, demonstration and deduction are 
impossible. However, notes has a wider sense which denotes all the operations of 
reason. 26 
When one turns to the Politics, one witnesses other meanings of nous. Aristotle 
divides psyche into two parts and identifies the rational part with nous. (1334b 17-20). 
Nous as it is used in Politics cannot denote something infallible as in Analytics where 
nous is said to be always right. The latter meaning of nous is also found in De Anima 
433a 26 and 428a 17-18. However we also find Aristotle saying at 427b 8-9 that nous 
consists of all sorts of judgements. 
To deal with all the applications meanings of nous in Aristotle is a big enough 
task to constitute a work of its own. My aim here, however, is just to point out how 
Aristotle employs the term nous in different contexts. Why it is important to remember 
this is that one should not expect a single meaning of nous in Aristotle will be clear 
when I discuss the divine and individual noetic activity in Chapter V. A way to gain 
insight into the different applications of noun lies, I believe, in returning to Metaphysics 
where Aristotle discloses the perfect use of the term noes in relation to the discussion of 
the nature of God. 27 
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5. Conclusion 
The term 'intuition' does not convey the single meaning of nous in Aristotle. It 
is unacceptable to presume there is a single meaning of nous in the writings of Aristotle, 
let alone to confine its meaning merely to intuition or to claim that only intuition enables 
us to be in contact with the perpetually recurring, eternal principles, forms, since this is 
what intuition does. 28 
The conception of nous as intuition in Aristotle is based on the interpretation of 
nous in Posterior Analytics. It is also assumed that its use can be understood in the light 
of other uses of the term elsewhere in Aristotle's writings, and in the writings of other 
philosophers. But it is obvious that the nous of Posterior Analytics is not identical with 
the nous of De Anima nor is it the nous of Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. In fact, 
Aristotle's use of nous differs in his ethical, psychological and scientific writings. And I 
believe that Metaphysics has a special place amongst other works of Aristotle; here for 
the first time he fully discusses the nature of God as being nous. 29 
I also believe that the other uses of nous in Aristotle can be understood in the 
light of Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9. In my view Aristotle tells us here of the perfect 
meaning of nous (this will be clear when I discuss Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9 in Chapter 
V). So it is not right to think that there is only a single meaning of the term nous in 
Aristotle. For example, in Analytics we are faced with a special sort of difficulty, for 
the nous is for the first time understood as a state (hexis) of psyche which seems to be 
contrasted with episteme and this is clearly different from the conception of nous in De 
Anima where Aristotle says that it is the part of the soul. 3o 
Now we are also forced to speak of the Platonic conception of notes and its 
relation (if there is any) to Aristotelian conception of nous, since there are some who 
simply reject the idea of a unique use of the word nous by Aristotle; for example Jaeger 
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regards it as a holdover from Plato3' and Le Blond also claims that nous is of knowledge 
that cannot be reconciled with an empiricist epistemology. He says that "depuis 
Anaxagore, le nous etait considere comme essentiellement actif, impassible". Thus he 
write that since nous has "une saveur Platonicienne" it is almost impossible to relate 
noes to my perceptual experience except by "un veritable saut qui demeure injustifie 
02 
But this assumption is not justifiable. It will become clear in the following 
chapters that Aristotle employs the term nous in different contexts. This is also true of 
terms like ousia, eidos and sullogismos. Although it is possible to find a similarity 
between them, 33 this does not mean that there are no important differences. If it is 
possible to speak of a non-Platonic conception of ousia in Aristotle then, it is equally 
possible to think that the Aristotelian conception of nous is not Platonic. That is why I 
am inclined to think it is perfectly possible for Aristotle to have a non-Platonic 
conception of nous as he does of ousia, sullogismos and eidos. This is also true for 
Anaxagoras and for any of Aristotle's predecessors who employed the term noun. But 
this does not preclude him from choosing to employ the term to suit his philosophical 
needs. For it is Aristotle's habit to employ a term in a distinctive manner that serves his 
aims. He also goes further, and if there is not a convenient term to explain his thought, 
Aristotle does not hesitate to invent one as in the case of energeia and entelecheia. 
Although he is aware of the past use of a word he does not appear to be beholden to it in 
essence. 
But one also should be mindful of the previous uses of nous. This is absolutely 
vital for understanding Aristotle, for it would be unlikely for Aristotle's use of a term to 
be totally artificial. Therefore the history of the term noun needs to be investigated in 
order to keep in perspective its different meanings and the contexts in which the term is 
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used. But it would be wrong to presume from the beginning that there is a single 
meaning of the term nous in Posterior Analytics, Metaphysics, Ethics, let alone in De 
Anima 
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III. THE CONCEPT OF NODS IN DE ANIMA 
I have argued so far that the elucidation of certain terms, namely energeia / 
entelecheia, noes and theoria are indispensable to the subject of thinking in Aristotle. I 
have already shown that the terms energeia / entelecheia and nous have several different 
uses in Aristotle's writings. However, the conception of nous in De Anima has been 
considered particularly difficult, which is why I will discuss De Anima 111.4 and 5 in 
some detail here. 
1. Introductory Remarks: the Concept of Nous in De Anima 111.4 and 5 
Wilkes concludes her article under the title of 'Final Embarrassed Postscript' by 
saying 
What to do with De Anima 3.5? Here Aristotle - whom I have acclaimed so far 
as every physicalist's ideal role-model - seems to put himself very resoundingly in the 
dualist camp. I cannot understand this chapter, and none of the secondary literature has 
so far helped me to do so. Thus I will end this paper with one or two comments which 
may help to mitigate the difficulty; all the same I have to say that I wish he had never 
written this chapter. ' 
At 430a 25 we get the reading "without nous poietikos the passive intellect does not 
think". It is obvious that one cannot discuss what Aristotle says in De Anima 111.4 in 
isolation. However, De Anima 111.5 is itself full of difficulties, without reading it with 
De Aninia 111.4. Therefore the best strategy appears to be to examine De Aninta 111.4 
and 111.5 in turn. 
One of the most vexing problems in Aristotle's philosophy is the meaning of 
nous. One cannot avoid perplexity without analysing nous and its different applications 
in Aristotle. That is why I have felt that it is essential to deal with the concept of nous 
in Aristotle before discussing discursive and non-discursive thinking. It is also 
unanimously held that De Anima's account of nous is driven in opposite and irreconcil- 
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able directions, so that Aristotle's tendencies towards naturalistic and transcendentalistic 
accounts of nous surface in De Anima 111.4 and 111.5. Noetic activity as energeia 
defines the human being whose soul is the entelecheia of its body (412a, 16-22). It also 
describes the activity of a deity which has neither body nor soul, but human thought 
requires images yet divine nous thinks itself. ' The concept of nous in Aristotle is 
genuinely difficult to comprehend and its elusiveness has been compounded by the 
failure to take account of the different meanings of noes as employed by Aristotle. 
One of the great mistakes is, I believe, to equate Plato's concept of noesis with 
Aristotle's concept of nous. In Plato, Noesis means the intuition of the highest forms. ' 
According to Lee, ` Aristotelian nous is the same as Platonic noesis so that there is no 
difference whatsoever between them. So, in virtue of importing Plato's concept of 
noesis into Aristotle, many of his statements on nous have been glossed over, and as a 
result of this approach he is found to be guilty of either being puzzling or inconsistent. 
For example, Jaeger accepts the tension between the Platonic interpretation of nous and 
the employment of nous by Aristotle and concludes that Aristotle's theory of nous was 
merely carried over from an earlier Platonic period. 5 
Although there have been so many recent attempts to re-examine Aristotle's 
treatment of nous, many of these attempts have been confined to Posterior Analytics and 
little work has been done on Aristotle's employment of notes in De Anima, Metaphysics 
and Ethics. ' 
This chapter is therefore particularly concerned with the concept of nous in the 
context of De Anima, Nicomachean Ethics (especially book X) and Metaphysics, book 
XII, where divine thinking and being is considered. 
It is generally held that Aristotle's transcendentalistic tendency is expressed in 
De Anima 111.5 in the form of nous poietikos. There are five lines of interpretation 
which can be expressed as follows: 
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1. According to some noes poietikos is essentially of the individual mind and as 
such it secures the individual immortality. ' 
2. Some commentators consider nous poietikos in relation to the individual noetic 
activity but they do not think that it forms part of the individual mind. ' 
3. Although each interpretation has had its proponents from antiquity through the 
Middle Ages until the present day, the idea that Aristotle refers to the divine nous in De 
Anima 111.5 has been almost universally discarded. However, Anscombe defends this as 
at least the more likely interpretation, therefore she writes: 
Aquinas took 'the productive' intellect to be a concept-forming part or 
aspect of the human mind, but from Aristotle's brief and obscure text it seems to me 
more likely to be the divine mind that Aristotle intends, unless, which is possible, he 
thought that human minds actually had a divine part; the one thing that comes into the 
world, as he puts it, 'from outside'. ' 
Wilkes also agrees that in De Anima 111.5 Aristotle gestures towards the divine 
nous of Metaphysics XII and he has no intention of seeing it as a part of an individual 
human mind. " 
4. Some other commentators, for example During and Jaeger, come to conclude 
that Aristotle's account of nous in De Aninta 111.5 is inconsistent with general accounts 
and it is merely a hangover from Aristotle's early Platonistic period. " 
5. Finally, some recent commentators have attempted to give a naturalistic account 
of nous in De Anima or they have tried to prove that the discussion of nous in De Anirna 
111.5 is essentially irrelevant to Aristotle's account of the soul. 12 
I believe that none of these interpretations have captured what Aristotle really 
wants to say and therefore they have not been successful in understanding the account of 
nous in De Anima 111.4 and 111.5. The reason for their failure, I believe, can be put 
down to the following: 
a) None of these interpretations takes into account the various different uses of nous 
in the Aristotelian corpus. 
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b) Commentators have also neglected to include other very important terms, 
energeia and entelecheia, which are coined by Aristotle in his discussion of thinking, for 
Aristotle describes thinking in terms of energeia as opposed to kinesis. 
Here I am not mainly concerned with the immortality of the human being, nor trying to 
justify one interpretation over others. First, I would like to provide an interpretation of 
De Anima 111.4 and 111.5 which would remove any obstacles on the way to 
understanding discursive and non-discursive thinking in Aristotle. Then, I will continue 
with my interpretation of Aristotle's account of nous in De Anima, Nicomachean Ethics 
and Metaphysics XII in Chapter V. Finally, I will discuss the prominent views on 
Aristotle's theory of thinking in the light of my understanding of the concept of noun in 
Aristotle. By doing this, I hope to show how Aristotle's concept of noun provides us 
with a profound understanding of human noetic activity and why it might be different 
from divine noetic activity. However, first let us proceed with De Anima 111.4 and then 
continue with De Aninia 111.5. But before doing this something needs to be said about 
perceiving and thinking, since Aristotle says that thinking is something different like 
this, (he ti toiouton heteron), namely perception. 
2. Some Remarks on De Anima 11.5 
In De Anima III. 4 Aristotle is mainly considered with the problem of sensation and 
thinking. 
He begins drawing a parallel between sensation and thinking. We also find that 
Aristotle earlier drew attention to this parallel too. Sensation and thinking are similar 
processes. The object of knowledge affects the intelligent which comes to know. The 
intelligent is moved by the object of thinking, as a faculty of sensation is moved by the 
object of sensation. (De Anima 11.4,429-, a 13-14; 410 a 25-26; 429_; a 14-15; 
Metaphysics 1072 a 30) 
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If we follow the parallel between sensation and thinking, it is true that the 
intellect must receive form without matter. Prior to knowing the intellect must be 
potentially identical with this form. However, there is also a difference between 
sensation and thinking. Although the intellect is not limited about what it can know, 
sensation is always a particular sensation such as colour or sound. At first it appears 
that the analogy about sensation and thinking holds rather well. However as we have 
just pointed out thinking is not limited, it is able to know everything whereas sensation 
is determined, for the intellect is unmixed with matter. Being not materially 
determined, the intellect is potentially the same as with its objects. Prior to thinking, 
the thinking has not been activated by the object of thinking. In this respect the 
intellect does not appear to be joined to body like the soul. For this reason thinking 
seems to be different from sensation. (De Anima 111.4,429 a 15-16; 429 a 18; 429 20- 
24; 429 a 24-27; 429 a 29-30; 429 31-b4) 
Until now what has been said about sensation and thinking appears to be easy 
to understand. However, when we look at De Anima I and II, it is not easy to 
conceive the relation between the soul and the intellect. Aristotle describes the 
intellect as to be unmixed with the body, pure potentiality and impassable. He also 
says that it exists independently. As described above the intellect must be different 
from the soul, for the soul is described as being entelecheia of a living body as such. 
(De Anima 429 a 21-22; 429 a 22-24,429 b 5,413 a 31-32 and b 26-28; 415 a 2-3) 
In virtue of the object of knowledge the capacity of the individual to know 
becomes actual. The potential however becomes somebody who has knowledge. We 
are told in De Anima 111.4 that even then the knower is still a potential knower. It is 
true that the individual knower, knows and can think of what the individual knower 
knows of his/her own feel, even though the object of knowledge is no longer present. 
the individual knower knows in the full sense of the word if the individual knower 
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actually contemplates something (De Anima 42J b 5-9; Physics --VIII. 4,255 a 33; 
Metaphysics 104 8a 32; Prior Analytics 11.21, b7 a 33-65; 1087 a 15 and further) 
An example of the subject comes from De Anima 11.5. Aristotle tells us that 
there are three different ways in which a person can be said to know. 
1. A person who is capable of acquiring science. 
2. A person who has a science of grammar. 
3. A person who is actually exercising his/her knowledge. 
Aristotle argues that in the first and in the second case are not in the same sense a 
person who potentially knows. He says that in the first case the person who knows is 
like matter which is in the need of to be brought to actuality by something else. 
However, in the second case the person can think at his/her will. In the first case one 
learns science for the first time. In the second case one actually thinks of something. 
In the first case the person moves from a state of privation to a positive state. (De 
Anima 11.5,417 a2 1-62; 417 a 26-28) 
The difference is between gaining knowledge and exercising this knowledge. 
De Anima 11.5 shows that the terms potentiality and actuality (activity) have different 
meanings. It also explains something about sensation. The transition from the 
possession of knowledge to the actual thinking of it that one knows also as a model for 
the transition from possession of the faculty of sensation to sensation. (De Anima 11.5, 
412 a 21; De Sensu 4,441b 22-23; 412 a 10-11; 412 a 22-27) 
Aristotle makes distinction between two senses ofpaschein which are: 
1. Paschein can mean the destruction of something by its opposite. 
2. Paschein which signifies presentation. 
If the possessor of science engages in thinking paschein as destruction is out of the 
question. Second sense of paschein as presentation that which is affected attains its 
proper nature. The person who already possesses science can think at his/her will and 
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no longer is in need of to be then taught to do this. Aristotle also explains the 
transition from its possession of the faculty to active sensation in the same way. (De 
Anima I. 1,412 a 10-11; a 22-27; 417 b 5-7; 417 b13; 417 b 16-19) 
In De Anima Aristotle speaks of two kinds of change in one of which the 
change which results in knowledge and in the second of which the change brings about 
active thinking of the known object. In De Anima 111.4 Aristotle compares thinking 
with sensation. He also refers to the distinction between the possession of science and 
the actual experience of it. One might suspect some sort of discrepancy between Dc 
Anima 111.4 and De Anima 11.5. However, this can be explained by noting that the 
transition from possession of science to actual thinking of it indicates the various 
degrees in which a thing can be said to be potential and actual. the model in which 
sensation and thinking explained how its origin in Plato (Theaetetus, 158 d; Euthyd , 
277 b) 
In De Anima 11.5 Aristotle contrasts sensation with thinking by saying that the 
intellect thinks itself wherever it wishes whereas sensation cannot. The latter is 
dependent on presence of the object of sensation. However, it becomes clear that in 
Dc Anima 111.4 that both sensation and thinking cannot occur without an object. Only 
acquiring science or knowledge one can proceed by oneself to think the known object. 
Therefore we are faced with more complex conception of sensation and thinking in De 
Anima 111.4 than in De Anima 11.5. 
It is also important to bear in mind what Aristotle says in De Anima 11.5 one 
can exercise one's knowledge whenever one likes, provided that external causes do not 
prevent him. Although Aristotle says that actual sensation corresponds to the exercise 
of knowledge there still remains some differences between two which are: 
I. The objects of sensation which produce the actuality of sensation are external 
2. Actual sensation is of particulars, whereas knowledge is of universal . 
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3. Universals are in a sense exist in the soul itself. 
4. One can think whenever one wishes. 
5. One cannot experience sensation whenever one chooses. For the presence of 
the objects of sensation is essential. 
(De Anima 11.5,417 b 24-25; De Anima 111.4,429 b 5-9; Metaphysics; 104 8a 34-35) 
However, it is difficult to see that one can think whenever one wishes. 
Aristotle says himself in De Anima that one is capable of exercising one's knowledge 
whenever he wishes if something does not present him to do so. In a sense even if it is 
not possible to claim that one can think whenever wishes. (De Anima 11.5,417 a 25- 
30) 
In the model in which Aristotle explains sensation and thinking it is possible to 
speak of 
a) Passive sensation and passive thinking. 
b) Active sensation and active thinking. 
In the first case the movement originates from the object of knowledge which produces 
impressions. In the second case the knower initiated the movement. This establishes a 
two way relation with reality. "In one case the relation to reality is direct, in the other 
it is indirect. " (Kal, 1988,80) It is this relation that explains why sensation and active 
thinking cannot be wrong, whereas imagination and thought may be false. 
In Posterior Analytics 11.19 Aristotle speaks of a possibility of knowing without in any 
respect already possessing the knowledge which is to be acquired. It is also interesting 
to see that Aristotle does not bring the question of memory in these chapters of De 
Anima Imagination plays no role in connection with the process that leads knowing. 
Only through non-discursive activity of intellect the direct relation between reality and 
the intellect can be established in the direct way that sensation has. Imagination and 
discursive thought cannot produce the universal which is the object of non-discursive 
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thinking. It is already present in sensible reality and already the object of sensation. 
A Note: 
It is true that every case of actual thinking requires prior learning for humans. 
However, it is not easy to argue that the quality of the second actuality thinking does 
not differ from that of somebody who does not need to learn. Let us imagine two 
cases in which a subject knows or thinks: 
1. A is not in need of learning. A already knows B. A can think whenever A 
wishes. 
2. A is already thinking of B and its intellect is identical with B. 
There is no real difference between the case of 1 and 2. For in both cases the knower 
has the power to initiate the act of thinking. But the important point is that in the 
cases of I and 2 the knower can realize his/her potentiality unless something external 
prevents him/her to do so. It is possible that in the sense of IA can lose his/her 
memory or A can lose its ability to play a piano in virtue of a physical accident. This 
will automatically prevent A from passing to the actual exercise of what A wishes to 
do. Could we still claim that there is no difference between the second actuality 
thinking and that of somebody who does not need to learn? 
In cases of 1 and 2 the knower can do otherwise in virtue of a number of reasons. 
However, in the case of the knower (say God) it thinks necessarily. It is impossible to 
think of God that it can be prevented from thinking by something else. (See chapter 6. ) 
Sensation is the ability to take on sensible forms without matter. Although the 
faculty of sense and its organ are the same their essence is different. A hearing ear is 
one thing but as a thing it is a syntheton. Sensation takes place in a material organ 
which is formed to be capable of being affected in this way by the object sensed. The 
conclusion is that what is sensed in the act of sensation is form. 
It is not difficult to relate what Aristotle says here to his theory of knowledge. 
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Although what is sensed in the act of sensation is sensible forms how could one 
distinguish it from intelligible forms? The difference between the two can be stated as 
follows 
Sensation requires material organ as mediator between sensible forms and the soul. 
The example comes from Metaphysics 1025 b 32-34 where Aristotle considers the 
difference between snubness and concavity. The sensible form is closely connected 
with matter. It is confined to special sort of matter, for instance, flesh. The sensible 
form is received in sensation, but to acquire the knowledge of concavity the soul must 
proceed further. 
Although we perceive the individual, says Aristotle in Posterior Analytics, sense 
perception is of the universal. (100 a 16-61) 
However, it gives the universal in a rudimentary way. The example comes 
from the Analytics and is of 'man'. In order to have knowledge we must go beyond 
sensation. 
It seems to be difficult to distinguish sensation from thought and is less cut and 
dried than we might think. It is also important to note that the phrase toiouton heteron 
is very important. Although Aristotle says that thinking is analogous to perception the 
former is something different like this. Hence he appears to have very serious 
reservations about the analogy itself. 
3. Sensation and Thought 
As opposed to Posterior Analytics we find little about the truth and untruth of 
cognition, knowledge of the particular and the universal and the separation and 
combination of concepts in De Anima. 
Aristotle criticises Democritus for not making distinction between the intellect 
and soul. According to him Democritus conceives the intellect in the way which 
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excludes any possibility of reaching the truth. (De Anima, 404 a 27-3 1; 405 a 8-13; 
404 a 30-31). Aristotle also discusses Plato's view in which thinking is conceived in 
relation to circular movement. These passages indicate that Aristotle is dissatisfied 
with the explanation of thinking in Democritus and in Plato. He asserts 
straightforwardly that a single contact is sufficient for knowing which is like the 
attaining of a state of rest then a movement. (De Anima 407 a 14-17 and Plato, 
Timeaus 37 a 6). 
The theory of truth presented in De Anima appears to correspond to the theory 
of truth in Metaphysics (408 a 32-33; IX. 10). It should also be noted that in Posterior 
Analytics 11.9 Aristotle argues that the universal is gained through memory and 
experience (see also Physics 247 b 10). 
The subject of sensation is discussed in detail in De Anima 11.5 and 111.2. The 
theory of truth with regard to sensation also appears to run parallel to the theory of 
truth in Metaphysics IX. 10. he says that if there is sensation of the object that belongs 
to each sense organ there is no possibility of error. In other words the sensation of the 
particular object proper to a special sensation cannot err. In this case there is or there 
is not sensation. (De Anima 425 a 30; 425 b 4; 418 a 20-24,425 a 21-27; 428 b 9-22). 
Error here can only mean the absence of sensation. The possibility of error arises 
when a single faculty of sense uniting particular sensations combines or associates the 
particular sensation with one another. Here the faculty of sense fails to make simple 
contact with reality. On the contrary, it connects and separates the data supplied by 
particular sensation. 
It is not difficult to see that perception of special sense-object (for example, 
colour, sound, taste) runs parallel to the theory of truth (thinking of indivisibles) in 
Metaphysics IX. 10. It is also true that we find this parallel in De Anima 111.6 where 
Aristotle says that thinking of the indivisible is always true; mistakes occur only when 
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the indivisible is combined with something else (430 a 26-28). 
Aristotle goes on to consider thinking of the indivisible with predication in 
which one thing is stated about something (Posterior Analytics 11.1; De Anima 430 b 
26-29; 431 a 8). thinking of indivisible is related to the simple statement of a thing's 
essence and in this respect resembles particular sensation. (De Anima, 431 a 8; 
Physics, 252 a 22-29; Metaphysics 1051 b22). 
We are reminded in De Anima 11.5 that the object of sensation is particular, 
whereas science is concerned with the universal (417 b 22-23). However, we find 
nothing how we arrive at the universal in Dc Anima. He also does not say much of the 
role of memory in reaching the universal from particular sensation. Although he 
discusses the question of memory at length in Dc Memoria we find almost nothing 
about the subject familiar from Posterior Anralytics 11.9. There is also nothing about 
experience nor its relation to knowing the indivisible. In general Aristotle does not say 
anything about the transition from knowledge of the particular to the knowledge of the 
universal. This is also true of Dc Anima. Nevertheless it appears that Aristotle's views 
on sensation and sensory association correspond to the theory of truth in Metaphysics. 
4. Thinking in DeAnima 11.4 
Aristotle starts De Anima by saying: 
Concerning that part of the soul (whether it is separable in extended space, or only 
in thought) with which the soul knows and thinks, we have to consider what is its 
distinguishing characteristic, and how thinking comes about. If it is analogous to perceiving 
it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is thinkable, or 
something else of a similar kind. This part, then, must (although impassive) be receptive of 
the form of an object, i. e. must be potentially the same as its object, although not identical 
with it: as the sensitive is to the sensible, so must mind be to the thinkable. 13 
I would first like to argue that one should not take the analogy between perceiving and 
thinking literally, for the analogy is profoundly imperfect. If woos is acted on by something 
(paschei) it is difficult to see how it can be unaffected (al)athes). The word apatheia 
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signifies freedom from change, decay or destruction by anything else. We are told at 417b 
2-5 that the concept of being acted upon (paschein) is not simple. So, Aristotle 
distinguishes two senses of it by saying that (a) it can mean the destruction of something by 
the contrary, (b) being acted upon may also describe a progress from potentiality to 
actuality by an agent which is already actual. As far as the latter sense of paschein is 
concerned, thinking and perceiving are similar but, in the case of thinking, what produces 
the activity of thinking is somehow in the soul while 417b 19-21 makes it clear that in the 
case of perceiving, what produces the activity is external. For this reason, only when it is in 
a state of first actuality can one think of what one wishes, which is impossible in the case of 
perceiving. In this respect, then, the analogy does not work but on the other hand it 
certainly has an important role in understanding the causal role of the object of thought. 
When Aristotle says that thinking is something like being affected by the object of thought 
(429a 14-15), he merely restates the necessity for an object both in thinking and perceiving. 
Therefore, 429a 17-18 simply refers to the relation between noes and objects of thought 
(noeta) as in the case of perceiving and objects of perception. Aristotle also speaks in the 
same way in Metaphysics at 1072a 30. He remarks here that notes is to be moved by the 
object of thought. That is why Aristotle says that thinking is like being affected, as in the 
case of perceiving, because it requires the object of thought. In sum, as it is the object of 
perception which causes perceiving, so it is the object of thought that produces actual 
thinking. '4 
1 would now like to discuss why the analogy between perceiving and thinking is 
crucially important. Aristotle himself has very serious reservations concerning the analogy 
between perceiving and thinking. We have already indicated that the analogy produces two 
alternatives which are either that thinking will be being affected (paschein) or that it will be 
a process different from but analogous to that Aristotle opts for the second 
alternative. He also says that perceiving is not an instance of paschein in the true sense of 
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the word, because it does not require the destruction of something by its contrary. 
'6 
Perception brings something potential into actuality. The latter is called paschein for 
convenience, for he says that there is no name for the difference. 
" However, there remains 
a very crucial difference between perceiving and thinking: 
But that the perceptive and thinking faculties are not alike in their impassivity is 
obvious if we consider the sense organs and sensation. For the sense loses sensation under 
the stimulus of a too violent sensible object, e. g. of sound immediately after loud sound, 
and neither seeing nor smelling is possible just after strong colours and scents; but when 
mind (noes) thinks the highly intelligible, it is not less able to think of slighter things, but 
even more able; for the faculty of sense is not apart from the body, whereas the mind is 
separable. ' 8 
It is obvious from the above that the analogy between thinking and perceiving is not meant 
to be understood literally. The analogy indicates that in both cases (thinking and 
perceiving) the objects of perceiving and thinking have a causal role to play. In other 
words, perceiving and thinking are produced by their objects. However, the nature of the 
object of thought is different from the object of perception, for, as Aristotle says: 
This is because actual sensation is of particulars, whereas knowledge is of 
universals; these in a sense exist in the soul itself So it lies in man's power to use his mind 
wherever he chooses, but it is not in his power to experience sensation; for the presence of 
the sensible object is essential. The same thing is true of our knowledge of sensible objects, 
and for the same reason, viz. that sensible objects are particular and external. '9 
It should be noted that Anaxagoras' concept of izous has enormous influence on 
Aristotle's conception of izous. He perceived Anaxagoras "like a sober man among 
babblers" among the Presocratics. 20 The words amiges and apaches are borrowed from 
Anaxagoras, who had conceived noes as a universal principle which rules and gives 
order to everything in the universe. '' 
Aristotle reports that according to Anaxagoras nous understands everything and 
it is unmixed with anything so that it can dominate (in the sense of knowing). 22 
Whether this means that nous is unmixed with its objects or unmixed with body has 
been the major source of controversy among Aristotelian commentators. 23 Aristotle 
writes at 429a 29 that: 
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... the soul 
is the place of forms [topos eidon], except that this does not apply to 
the soul as a whole, but only in its thinking capacity, and the forms occupy it not 
actually but only potentially. 
In the light of what Aristotle says, it appears that nous is meant to be unmixed 
with its objects, namely the intelligible forms. For nous has no other nature than to be a 
capacity to think. In other words, the intrusion of anything foreign obstructs it from 
knowing and being in control, therefore nous has no characteristic except its capacity to 
think. 
A picture of nous has also started to emerge - that it is also a principle of activity 
in the sense of being able to think itself, whereas perceiving is absolutely determined by 
its objects. Aristotle draws us a picture in which nous appears to be in control, and in 
this respect the analogy between thinking and perceiving does not seem to hold very 
well. However, the necessity of the object of thought for thinking remains to be 
essential in understanding human and divine thinking, which will be dealt with 
separately (see Chapter V in general). 
5. Notes on De Anima 1111.5 
The general meaning of nous in De Anima 111.4 is a capacity for thinking, but in 
the chapter 5 of De Anima Aristotle speaks of the distinction between active and passive 
nous. Aristotle does not mention this distinction within nous elsewhere. Although the 
chapter contains short notes on the concept of noes, the explanation of it has proved to 
be very difficult. I have already dealt with the meanings of the concept of nous in 
Aristotle in general. Here, I shall restrict myself to discussing the views on the subject- 
matter in essence since my understanding of the concept of noun in Aristotle in general, 
as well as my interpretation of De Anima 111.5, are fundamentally different from most. 
I believe that it is useful to note at the beginning that the phrase nous poietikos is 
not to be found in Aristotle. However, he speaks of nous pathetikos at 430a 24 and of 
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panta poiein at 430 14-15, which in a sense justifies the phrase noun poietikos. 24 
In De Anima III. 4 Aristotle is concerned with particular questions which can be 
stated as follows: 
1. How does thinking differ from perceiving? 
2. Is nous different from the rest of the psyche? 
3. Is nous an actually separate thing or is it just the activity of the whole divine 
human being? 
Aristotle has already said that psyche is the activity (entelecheia) of a living body and 
cannot exist apart from it, but there are some remarks to be recalled. For example, we 
are told that nous alone is divine and immortal. ' In addition to this, in De Generatione 
Animalium at 736b 27-29 Aristotle says that the remaining possibility appears to be that 
nous comes from outside and is alone divine, for it involves no bodily activity. 
Aristotle also writes at 430a 22-23 that noun poietikos is what it is in separation and is 
alone immortal and eternal. First of all, Aristotle does not say that the distinction 
between noes poietikos and noes pathetikos exists in the human soul, nor does he make 
any specific references to divine nous in Metaphysics XII. However, we know that 
divine nous is ex hypothesi immortal and eternal (I shall look at Metaphysics XII. 7-9 in 
Chapter V). 
Some Aristotelian commentators have come to conclude that there must be a 
connection between 430a 22-23 and the mention of nous thurathen in De Generatione 
Animalium at 736b 27-29.26 In De Generatione Animalium 11.3 Aristotle discusses the 
question of how a human foetus develops by mentioning the arrival of noes from 
outside. Although what Aristotle says there can be construed as referring to a divine 
nous in the human being, it is also perfectly possible to understand his saying on nous as 
capacity to think, in other words, to read the lines of 736b 27-29 into 430a 24, for this 
faculty has no organ and requires developed perceptual organs and capacities. In virtue 
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of this it cannot be present at the outset but it comes from the outside as long as it could 
not always have been present at the beginning. " 
Aristotle also states in Metaphysics that the form of anything comes into being 
simultaneously with the whole. For example, the form of a bronze ball comes into 
being together with the ball itself. We can speak of health when there is a healthy 
person, but whether anything is left when a person has lost his/her health and the ball 
has been melted away, should be considered. He says that not all soul is eternal but 
nous is perhaps eternal. At 408b 29 the same possibility is mentioned again by stating 
that "nous is presumably something more divine and is imperishable". 2' 
One should however be very careful about the language of divinity in Aristotle 
as well as his somehow tentative statements of the divinity of human nous. What we 
have quoted or referred to from Aristotle so far indicates that Aristotle does not use a 
precise language to assert that human nous is immortal, nor does he ever assert a 
definite identity between divine nous and the human nous. However, in De Aninia 111.5 
Aristotle no longer deals with the question of noes in imprecise terms, it is time for him 
to deal with it seriously. 
Aristotle describes nous in De Anima 111.4 as unmixed and incorruptible. 29 
When one compares the description of nous in De Anima 111.4 one would find that the 
same epithets are also applied to divine noes, for example Aristotle describes the 
Unmoved mover as apathes at Metaphysics 1073a 11, but it should not be forgotten that 
the human intellect is described to be pure potentiality in De Anima at 429a 21-29, and 
this cannot be true of divine nous. Potentiality always implies change, imperfection. It 
also comes at the bottom of the scale of being in Aristotle whereas form and actuality 
are at the top of the scale of being. 
The substance of the human intellect is a potentiality. It is hard to see how the 
characterization of the human notes as such prohibits any change against the human 
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i: oetic activity. It is a fact that it shifts even in theoretic thought, from one to another 
object. The only way one could avoid this possibility is to claim that we are sometimes 
thinking all things that the Unmoved Mover always thinks. And this would require a 
strict isomorphism between intellect of which orisia is pure energeia and the intellect 
of which ousia is a potentiality. The latter certainly has a measure of potentiality. But 
this still leaves open a possibility that human iroetic activity may not be different from 
divine poetic activity. Simply because they engage in the same activity the one 
continuously and the other temporarily. 
The human intellect as pure potentiality has no character of its own, it is potentially 
all the objects of thought but none of them actually. The human intellect, therefore, is of 
itself pure potentiality, like the rest of the soul (429b 30-31). It also cannot be involved 
continuously in the act of thinking (107sb 25; 1072b 15-31). Aristotle compares divine 
activity with human activity and says that we cannot think continuously whereas divine 
noes does. He also states in Nicomachean Ethics that abstract thinking can be harmful for 
one's health. 30 It is also important to point out that potentiality and matter are considered 
to be the same thing for Aristotle. They are contrasted with entelecheia. 31 
Activity is prior and superior to potentiality in Aristotle. 32 Now he has to explain 
how thinking comes out, i. e. how the potential nous is brought into actuality. From 
Metaphysics, Physics and De Anima, we are already familiar with Aristotelian principles 
that change requires matter and an agent to cause the change. In other words, there should 
be an agent to bring potentiality into actuality. The cause of change must be in actuality, 
for example man produces man. In the case of art the form must be in the mind of the 
artist. At 430a 10 Aristotle writes that: 
Since in every class of objects, just as in the whole of nature, there is something 
which is their matter, i. e. which is potentially all the individuals, and something else which is 
their cause or agent in that it makes them all - the two being related as an art to 
its material 
- these distinct elements must be present in the soul also. Mind 
(nous) in the passive sense 
is such because it becomes all things; but mind has another aspect in that it makes all things; 
this is a kind of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential into actual col- 
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ours. 
What is it then which will bring the potential sous into actuality? We know that in the case 
of physical change 'nature' is the inner principle of change, for example the parent and 
plant. In the case of art it is the craftsman and in sensation the object of sensation which 
brings about change. What is it, then, in the case of thinking? 
Aristotle says that light is necessary to see colours just as active Brous is required for 
the actualisation of intelligible objects (430a 14-17). Light and Horts poietikos are both said 
to be activity and as such they are opposed to dunamis. 33 
Plato argues in the Republic that the form of the good is needed to make the 
objects of knowledge available to the intellect (507e - 508e). Aristotle appears to apply 
the analogy of light and vision to nous poietikos. However, he does not appeal to the 
form of the good to explain thinking but turns to his very much cherished principle of 
activity. Nous poietikos makes everything. It is the principle of activity which brings 
latent human potential intellect into activity. Nous poietikos does not apprehend the 
object of thoughts, it is already pure activity and as such it has no potentiality. " 
Although Aristotle speaks of individual agents which cause change in nature, he 
also says that there must be a First Cause of everything. 
What is the starting-point of motion in the spirit? The answer then is clear: as 
in the universe, so there, everything is moved by God; for in a manner the divine 
element in us is the cause of all our motions. And the starting-point of reason is not 
reason but something superior to reason. What, then, could be superior even to 
knowledge and to intellect, except God? 31 
It is impossible to progress from potentiality to actuality unless there is an ultimate as 
well as an immediate telos. That is why the potential intellect, which shares some of 
divine attributes, cannot be identified with nous poietikos and it is almost nothing 
without nous poietikos. Only nous poietikos can call this latent capacity, namely the 
human intellect, into activity and then it can think for itself. But the so-called autonomy 
of the human intellect cannot be continuous since it has to cease at some time. Some 
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Aristotelian scholars argue that Aristotle describes some sort of autonomous intellect in 
De Anima at 429b 5-9. They go further and identify it with the nous poietikos. 
36 
However, I agree with Modrak that the passage in question describes merely the state of 
passive nous after it acquires intelligible objects. Although the final line, namely 429b 
9, has caused a lot of controversy, it is generally agreed that, having taken on the 
intelligible form, nous becomes able to think the form. In other words, nous thinks for 
itself. 
I would now like to look in some detail at the attributes of nous poietikos as it is 
described in De Anima 111.5. 
1. Nous poietikos is separate (choristos), impassive (apathes), unmixed (amiges) 
and its essence (ousia) is activity (energeia). " 
2. The active is superior to the passive. 
3. Actual knowledge is identical (energeia episteme) with its object. 38 
4. Nous poietikos does not think intermittently. 39 
5. When isolated, it is just what it is. Nous poietikos is undying (athanaton) and 
incapable of being acted upon (apathes). ao 
6. We do not remember, for the nous in this sense cannot be acted upon. 
7. Nous pathetikos is corruptible. 
8. Without noes poietikos nothing thinks, or nous pathetikos thinks nothing. 41 
I would first like to point out that the wording at 430a 17-19 indicates a very striking 
parallel with the description of Unmoved Mover in Metaphysics at 1071b 20. Secondly, 
Aristotle does not say anything about it belonging to the human being. How can noun 
poietikos, as pure activity, belong to the human being who is after all composed of 
matter and form? How could we think of infinite numbers of potential human beings as 
having nous poietikos of which ousia is energeia`t2 The honourable epithets can only be 
attributed to nous poietikos and nous pathetikos is really just matter with potentiality. 
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Aristotle says that the intellect which is affected by noes poielikos is perishable. 
(De Anima 111.5 430 a 24-25). It is obvious that Aristotle draws very sharp 
distinction between the absolute active nature of sous poietikos and the state of being 
bound to the body which describes the human soul. It should be noted that Aristotle 
defines the human soul as the entelecheia of a living body as such. The human soul is 
joined to the body itself. Although the activity of the soul occurs in a body its activity 
cannot be merely reduced to the body. In this context the separate existence of the 
potential intellect can be understood in relation to noes poietikos. 
The actualization of the potential intellect occurs within a soul which is bound 
to the body, and this in a form which no longer has the purity of the cause of 
actualization. Nuyens sees a contradiction latente' with De Anima 111.4, where the 
potential and receptive intellect is said to be apathes (429 a 15) and choristor (429 b 
5). Brentano identifies noes pathetikos with phantasia. Hicks says that 'the man 
cannot think without mental images, which imply sense and imagination, and these 
powers of the soul are conditioned by the body. The dissolution of the compound 
substance, the man himself, puts an end to the processes of sensation and imagination, 
and to the thinking of the man in so far as mental images are necessary thereto. (Hicks 
508-509) 
The potential intellect is activated by nous poietikos. The human soul having intellect 
does not know anything itself without at the same time possessing an image of the 
known object. The human intellect itself is not independent of corporality and 
corporeal magnitude. (On the question of thinking with images see: De Anima, 432 a 3- 
6 and 403 a 5-10). 
In the physical world the poetic cannot exist separately from the sensible. This 
is true for the object of knowledge and for the subject. This also explains why the 
human intellect cannot know pure immateriality directly. (De Anima 431 b 18 - 19; 
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429 b 5; 432 a- 34). 
It can know the eternal only as it exists in sensible reality. The human intellect 
knows it by means of the universal which can be gatten from sense experience. This is 
how the human intellect becomes an actually knowing intellect. (Metaphysics XII. 6; 
De Anima III. 4 and 5) The human intellect is corruptible but not as a potential 
intellect. On the contrary the human intellect is perishable in as much as it is actual. 
When it is being affected by noris poietikos it becomes actual. It is itself nothing. It 
knows nothing without noes poietikos. 
For Aristotle the active is always superior and prior to the passive. Noras poietikos, 
whose ousia is energeia, is naturally considered to be superior to noris pathetikos. Nous 
poietikos does represent a perfect sense of nous, since we know that nous has different 
meanings in Aristotle, thus it is important to note that we face here a perfect sense of 
noun in De Anima 111.5. 
In coming to discuss the statement in which Aristotle identifies actual knowledge 
with its object, it is very interesting to see that Aristotle states the same thing of divine 
noun. Any sort of change is excluded from divine thinking, and it is the same for nous 
poietikos. We have to be very careful here, however. The sameness thesis cannot be 
confined to thinking. It has different applications in Aristotle's philosophy. According 
to him, in the case of perceiving, what is perceived and perceiving are one and the same 
thing. 43 However, in the case of perceiving the object is external and perceiving is of 
the individual. ` When it comes to human thinking, the sameness thesis cannot be 
understood as in the case of perceiving. First of all, the object of thinking does not have 
to be present at the time of actual thinking. Secondly, once the intellect acquires 
knowledge it can think by itself. 45 Nevertheless, human thinking cannot be the same as 
divine thinking, for human thinking has to progress from potentiality to actuality. What 
brings the potential intellect into actuality in the first place? Aristotle states, at 430a 22, 
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that nous poietikos is not at one time thinking and at another not thinking. Its activity of 
thinking is uninterrupted whereas the individual noetic activity cannot be continuous. 
This can only mean that nous poietikos must exist before any human thinking occurs. 
The uninterrupted activity of nous poietikos follows from its being which is to be 
activity in its own essence. It is obvious that the description of nous poietikos is 
identical with the description of Unmoved mover in Metaphysics. Its thinking activity is 
eternal because its essence is energeia. Therefore, I would like to conclude that the 
sameness thesis has different applications in Aristotle. " 
At 430a 22 Aristotle makes it much more clear that nous poietikos is not part of 
the human soul: "It is what it is in separation and is alone immortal and eternal". It is 
crucial to recall that noun has many different uses in Aristotle. Here, perhaps, we 
should bear in mind that Aristotle is not concerned with human immortality at all but he 
merely describes the perfect nature of perfect nous as he does in Metaphysics XII. 7 and 
9. 
Aristotle goes on to describe noes poietikos by stating that it is athanatos 
whereas nous pathetikos is phthartos (perishable). It is useful to recall the analogy 
between perceiving and thinking here, again. The point is that Aristotle considers 
human thinking a sort being acted upon, namely a type of paschein. When he says that 
noes pathetikos or passive noun is perishable the analogy between perceiving and 
thinking appears to be holding up well. Although there is a distinction between 
perceiving and thinking, nevertheless human thinking is a sort of paschein. The 
individual human being does not possess nous poietikos. Whatever sort of nous the 
human being has is not divine nous, namely not nous poietikos. The last sentence can 
be read in more than one way. Since there is no noun in the sentence but only a 
pronoun, one can interpret it as follows: 
a) without nous poietikos nothing can think; 
74 
b) nous pathetikos thinks nothing. 
c) without nous pathetikos nothing thinks; or 
d) without nous pathetikos nous poietikos thinks nothing. 
The last reading appears to be impossible as well as absurd, for it amounts to 
saying that that of which essence is energeia cannot think without that which is potential 
and perishable. It is equal to subordinate activity (energeia) to potentiality, which is, in 
other words, a negation of Aristotle's most cherished principle. However, (b) and (c) 
can be related to human thinking and be understood that the human being is not capable 
of thinking without nous pathetikos, for if an individual does not have any sense organs 
he/she is not capable of hearing, seeing or tasting. It would be the same if an individual 
is deprived of nous pathetikos. The agent which causes thinking in the individual might 
be there but if an individual lacks nous pathetikos he/she will not be able to think. 
When (b) is considered, it is obvious why it thinks nothing, for it is just a capacity to 
think and even being as a capacity it is perishable. 47 
6. Some Problems in De Anima 111.5 430 a 10-14. 
Is nouspoietikos an internal part of the individual human being or is it external 
to it or is it identical with divine nrous of Metaphysics XII? Let us quote the passage in 
question before proceeding further. 
"Since in every class of objects, just as in the whole of nature, there is something which 
is their matter, i. e. which is potentially all the individuals, and something else which is 
their cause or agent in that it makes them all the time being related as an art to its 
material - these distinct elements must be present in the soul also. " (De Anima, 430 a 
10-14) 
Comments on the passage begins with Aristotle's disciples Theophrastus. However, it 
was Alexander, at the end, in the second century AD, who explicitly argued that irons 
poietikos was not a part of the human soul but the divine nous. Themistius went 
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against Alexander in the next century and claimed that this kind of Brous is in the soul 
and is the most valuable part of the human soul. (De Anima 111.5,430a 23; Themistius 
103,9 - 13) As a result he became the first representative of a 
long line of 
commentators, particularly strongly defended today, who even does not hesitate to 
insert the word 'human' into the sentence. Aquinas agreed with Themistius as has 
modern scholarship. Ross says that 'The active reason is distinctly presented there as 
existing in the human soul'. Allan goes further and adds italics: mind is the most 
ivahiable' of those faculties which are present in the human soul; he says that an active 
and a potential mind must be distinguished 'in the soul'. (Ross, Metaphysics, 1, cxlviii, 
1924; Allan, 82,1952) 
It appears that this is rather an unusual way to construe the sentence 'just as in the 
whole of nature ...... 
These distinct elements must be present in the soul also'. If we 
remember that the ultimate moving cause in nature is the Unmoved Mover the motive 
cause in things psychical, bringing the thought of individuals into activity, is something 
transcendent. This is a rimes which is eternally active. The source of movement in the 
universe is the Unmoved Mover which nature emulates as far as it can. The Unmoved 
Mover moves everything as object of desire. (Guthrie 324-325,1981) 
However, the fact is that the phrase 'in the soul' has been the major difficulty in 
the way of proving that nous poietikos is the divine Brous of Metaphysics XII. In 
addition to this there is another difficulty, that is, the words at 430 a 22-23 where 
Aristotle says that 'when isolated it is its true self and nothing more'. It has been 
argued that the use of the aorist participle (choristheis) implies a time when it was not 
separated. Thus the adjective in line 17. ' (choristos) means 'separable' but not 
'separate'. (Ross, Metaphysics I, cxliii. n. 2,1924; Brentano 139,1977; Rist, 1966) 
However, it is difficult to see how this 'immortal and eternal' noun can be an 
integral part of the mortal individual human soul. In general Islamic Aristotelian 
Commentators believed that Woos poietikos is a transcendent noes. However, they 
differ from Aristotle in explicitly distinguishing this transcendent noris from divine 
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notes. According to them notes poietikos is one of the intellects subordinate to God. It 
acts, in a way, as a vicar of God on earth as I have presented their views in chapter 7. 
Averroes argues that the potential intellect of De Anima 111.4 which is present in the 
individual human soul does not multiply with the plurality of human beings. (Brentano, 
16-17) According to him there is one potential intellect for all people, just as there is 
only one causative intellect for all people. It should be accepted that there are good 
grounds for defending the view of the singleness of the potential intellect. For in De 
Anima Aristotle describes the potential intellect as unmixed, impassive and existing 
independently of the body. (De Anima III. 4,429 a 24-25; 429 a 29; 429 b 4-5) 
It is clear that the honourable epithets which are assigned to the potential 
intellect directly corresponds to the properties which are attributed to izous poielikos. 
In De Anima (430 a 17-18) Averroes seems to be right in identifying the potential 
intellect with tious poietikos. For otherwise the former could not be in potentiality 
what causative intellect already is in actuality. They both exclude plurality, for in 
Aristotle matter is the principle of plurality (Metaphysics XII. 8). 
Aquinas strongly opposed Averroes and he follows a quite different path from 
Alexander, the Neoplatonic and Islamic Aristotelian interpreters. According to him 
noun poietikos forms an integral part of the human soul. In his view, noes poietikos is 
not acquired during life, nor the individual human being can possess it in a fluctuating 
relationship with a divine nouns. He argues that the individual human being posseses 
this principle from the outset. (Kal, 102-103-104) It should be noted that at the end 
of De Anima 111.4 Aristotle is confronted by the problem of how intellect and an object 
of thinking can exist in a material world. It is shown in De Anima 111.5 that this is only 
possible in virtue of an intellect which is in actuality. Aquinas holds that notes 
poielikos in De Anima 111.5 is wholly immanent in the human soul. In this respect irons 
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poietikos is an ontological fact of an individual human being. 
7. Final Thoughts on the Concept of Nous in De Anima 
The question of whether Aristotle believes in human immortality or not does not 
constitute my main concern. Therefore, I do not look into De Anima III. 5 particularly to 
prove or disprove the immortality of the human soul. My reference to Metaphysics XII. 7 
and 9 in my discussion of the conception of sous in Dc Anima is not simply to prove that 
sous poietikos is identical with divine rots in Metaphysics. What interests me in Aristotle's 
theory of thinking is how he describes human thinking and divine thinking. Furthermore, 
why does Aristotle describe divine thinking in the way he does in Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9 
which represents climax and culmination of Aristotle's thought on the subject? 
Transcendental and naturalistic accounts of the concept of noes in Aristotle have 
had their champions from antiquity through the Middle Ages until the present day, but what 
is peculiar as far as transcendental and naturalistic accounts of the concept of intellect are 
concerned, is that almost no attention is given to the term energeia in which Aristotle 
describes human and divine thinking in De Anima, Metaphysics and Ethics. In virtue of 
this, Aristotle's account of thinking in general has not, I believe, been uncovered at all. I 
hope to achieve this by changing direction and concentrating on the nature of divine (non- 
discursive) and human thinking. By doing so I hope to reach a new understanding of the 
nature of thinking in Aristotle. This is what I will do after making some final remarks on 
De Anima 111.5. 
The analysis of De Anima III. 4 and 111.5 has raised serious doubts whether sous 
poietikos can be an internal part of the human psyche. It appears that Aristotle is describing 
the divine sous of Metaphysics here. In fact, when Aristotle describes irons poietikos he 
does not use indefinite terms or imprecise language, he also does not explicitly state that it 
belongs to the human soul. On the contrary, noes poietikos appears to have the same 
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attributes as the Unmoved Mover or divine Brous. They are both described as identical with 
themselves. The two are also principles of activity. Aristotle also attributes to both of 
them the uninterrupted thinking activity which they have in virtue of being essentially 
activity 
Each species tries to realise its form and each member of a species has its own 
external principle, namely an already actual member of the same species which has been 
responsible for bringing about an individual development from potentiality to actuality. 
However, Unmoved Mover is the ultimate principle of change, for without the perfect and 
eternal activity of Unmoved Mover, no change would take place whatsoever. 
The principles which direct physical movements or change are of two orders, one 
of which is not itself physical, for it is not in motion, nor has it in itself the principle of 
motion. Such would be anything that should move other things while itself motionless, as 
being absolutely unchanging and primary, and such the essential characteristic or form in its 
capacity of constituting the end and aim to be reached, and therefore, since Nature is 
48 purposeful, demanding to be recognised by the natural philosopher. 
Aristotle elaborates four causes in the physical world and comes to say that in addition to 
these there is that which is first and moves everything. Unmoved Mover moves 
everything without being moved. The universe depends on it. De Anima 111.4 and 111.5 
represent the climax of Aristotle's account of thinking as chapter 6 of Metaphysics XII 
signifies the culmination of the account of motion and changes in nature. He explains in 
Metaphysics why the ultimate principle of change in the universe must be divine being. 
Despite the frightening compression of De Anima 111.5, Aristotle also shows us why the 
ultimate principle of change in the human thinking must be divine being. By doing so, 
Aristotle unifies the universe by the ultimate principle which is supreme Nous, its 
essence is pure activity and as such it is the ultimate principle of all change in 
everything. 
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8. On Understanding the Language of Divinity in Aristotle 
I believe that the source of much confusion of understanding Aristotle's account 
of thinking in De Anima, Metaphysics and Ethics stems from the language he uses when 
he describes noes and thinking. It is true that he has a penchant for describing noun and 
thinking as somehow divine, but that does not mean, for example, that one can 
automatically assume that human thinking is identical with divine thinking, or that the 
human intellect is the same as divine nous. Nevertheless, Aristotle frequently enlists the 
language of divinity in his discussion of nous and thinking. If this is true, how are we 
supposed to understand Aristotle's account of nous and thinking? How can we interpret 
the account of nous poietikos in De Anima 111.5 where Aristotle describes it in terms of 
the divinity of the thought? 
It is generally assumed that Aristotle attributes divinity to the human intellect, so 
human thinking is divine. Some go to Metaphysics XII. 7 to claim that divine thinking is 
identical with human thinking, thus taking noes poietikos to be essentially the same as 
divine noes, just to explain how we think necessary truths. 
It should be noted that the identification of nous poietikos with divine nous does 
not depend on Aristotle's use of the language of divinity, for in De Anima 111.5 Aristotle 
does not appeal to the language of divinity to describe it, he simply uses the same 
argument as that used when he describes divine nous in Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9. 
Therefore, the naturalistic interpretation of De Anima 111.5, namely making nous 
poietikos an integral part of the human being, cannot be defended by claiming that 
Aristotle treats the individual nous and its noetic activity as somehow divine since in fact 
this does not entail assuming noes poietikos as divine. The language used in his 
description of it is precise and has nothing to do with the language of divinity in 
Aristotle. 49 
Nicomachean Ethics is also an important source for understanding Aristotle's 
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conception of thinking. It indicates yet another application of nous in book VI where 
nous is considered in relation to practical reasoning. 50 The most important thing here, 
however, is the description of theorein in book X. De Anima provides, in a sense, a 
purely logical description of nous but Nicomachean Ethics X enables us to understand 
the nature of nous in relation to human intellectual activity. What does theorein mean? 
Why should we theorise? How does it differ from other intellectual activity? 
I believe that Aristotle's account of thinking culminates in Nicomachean Ethics, 
for only there can we come to understand the implication of the conception of nous in 
De Anima and only by turning to Metaphysics XIl. 7 and 9 can we realise why we 
should not identify our noes with divine nous and our happiness with the happiness of 
the supreme nous. 
We were told at 1177a 22 -b 25 that theoria is self-sufficient, leisured and 
shares some sort of continuity, but Aristotle identifies the real self with thinking activity 
which constitutes perfect happiness and, in being happy, the human individual resembles 
divine being. Why does Aristotle conceive the real self as noun and why does he think 
that the perfect happiness of the individual depends on thinking activity? It is important 
to note that theoria does not necessitate motion, for it does not conceive any objects in 
terms of kinesis. What I mean by that is that the objects of theoria are not desired or 
repugnant. 5' Theoria does not produce anything. SZ Among the activities of the human 
nous, theoria represents the perfect thinking activity. It is for this reason that theoria is 
described as autarkes and energeia, which means it is complete, perfect and has no need 
of other than itself. That theoria is not for the sake of something follows from its being 
activity. `3 
Here, understanding the term energeia becomes crucial, for it is this term which 
both describes human thinking in Nicomachean Ethics and divine thinking in 
Metaphysics. Thinking as energeia excludes any sort of change: it is perfect and 
81 
complete, and as such thinking as energeia represents the perfect intellectual activity of 
the human being. Does this, however, mean that when the human individual is 
involved in this sort of thinking, he or she engages in something identical with divine 
thinking activity? Again, one should be very careful here. Although we can think at 
our will, we cannot think uninterruptedly like divine beings, we can only engage in 
thinking activity for some time. This is because the term energeia with which Aristotle 
describes human and divine thinking has many applications in Aristotle. The perfect 
instance of being pure energeia can only be thought of divine being, which is why 
human noetic activity cannot go on for ever, whereas divine noetic activity is continuous 
(see Chapter V). 
Aristotle says that the divine noes thinks itself. That is, in other words, to say 
that the divine nous thinks the same thing always. Thus we are told at 1074 b 28-29 
that if divine noes is not the act of thinking (noesis) but potentiality, then it is 
reasonable to think that the continuity of its thinking would be tiring. It can be inferred 
that any intellect that thinks something different from it - intellect's object changes - 
has a measure of potentiality. Aristotle in effect is denying that the ousia of divine 
irons can be potentiality. Thus he appears to reject that even the intellect of which 
ousia is a potentiality thinks the same thing continuously it would be tiring. For 
example, it is possible to think that it would have to move from a potential state to its 
actual exercise. In other words it would perhaps have to keep from switching to 
another object or back to its original potential state. (Wedin, 1988,209-220). If the 
ousia of two intellects, namely divine and human irous, are of different nature then it is 
hard to see how the difference between their nroetic activity could be reduced to a 
difference in degree. 
Aristotle compares human noetic activity with divine noetic activity in Ethics and 
Metaphysics. In both works energeia describes the nature of noetic activity which makes 
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the analogy hold. However, it is difficult to argue this alone is enough to establish an 
absolute identity between divine and human neotic activity. Aristotle says that if divine 
being is living and active then what sort of activity can we attribute to it if we take 
action and production from it (1178b 20-21)? He confesses similar concerns about 
divine activity in Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9, and concludes that it would be theoria in the 
perfect sense of the term, that theoria as energeia is complete, perfect and is an end in 
itself. He is well aware of the fact that any change would signify imperfection and 
incompleteness on the side of divine thinking. That is why Aristotle himself is very 
cautious about attributing a full-blown divine status to human noes. Although we can 
think at will and can contemplate for some extended time, our activity cannot be 
continuous, it has to cease at some time. Aside from this, human thinking progresses 
from potentiality to actuality, in other words human thinking does not exclude poten- 
tiality and change, so it can be said that we resemble divine nous in engaging in thinking 
activity but we do not become gods, nor can we consider our thinking to be identical 
with divine thinking. 
I have already tried to show that the description of nous poietikos is to be 
identical with Unmoved Mover in Metaphysics (1073a 4). At 1073a 4 Aristotle says 
that the divine being is eternal, unmoving and separate. He goes on to assert also at 
1073a 11 that the first mover is apathes. At 1072a 25 the First Mover is described as 
ousia and energeia. It is fascinating to see how Aristotle postulates noetic activity on a 
cosmic level. He tries to explain the eternal source of the eternal movement in the 
universe. He comes to say that an eternal motion can be caused only by an eternal 
principle, so it must move everything without being moved. Finally, he concludes that 
the nature of the Unmoved Mover as being the source of eternal motion is energeia and 
it thinks itself. 54 
In his postulation of Unmoved Mover, Aristotle unifies his thoughts as follows: 
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a) Unmoved Mover is the ultimate principle of the motion in the universe. " 
b) Unmoved Mover is that of which the ousia is energeia and as such Unmoved 
Mover represents the perfect instantiation of being pure activity. It is an end itself, 
complete and perfect. " 
c) The object of thinking determines the nature of thinking. " 
d) Unmoved Mover moves everything as an object of desire without itself being 
moved. 
e) It thinks itself, since it is the best thing. 
Aristotle is well aware that the identity of thinking with its objects contains many 
difficulties. Although it is true to say that thinking is identical with its object, as in the 
case of perceiving, nevertheless thinking must be more than just the actualisation of its 
objects. If one insists on the analogy between perceiving and thinking, there is nothing 
to prevent the intellect from being identical with immortal thoughts. That is why 
Aristotle says that divine nous thinks itself and its object of thinking is itself. Some have 
come to believe that such thinking is vacuous and amounts to no thinking whatsoever. 
However, this does not seem to be right. First of all, when they consider the divine nous 
as thinking itself, they do not take into account that Aristotle describes the divine noetic 
activity as energeia. When we contemplate what happiness is, we still think of it in 
propositional terms, for example we can think that it could be X, Y or Z. However, 
when we are happy there is no thinking in propositional terms. However,, our life 
cannot be energeia as a whole, for we consist of matter and form. There are some 
things we do, like cooking and working, which are kinetic and there are other things in 
our lives which are energeiai, for example thinking and being happy. So, in thinking 
and being happy we are one with ourselves, but as soon as one starts to think what 
happiness is, even "without its matter", one is involved in propositional thinking. " This 
is why Aristotle appeals to the analogy of touching. Thinking in the sense of energeia is 
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like touching: you cannot be wrong about it. You might be wrong in judging what you 
are touching, but you cannot be wrong in judging that you are touching. 
A neo-Platonic interpretation of non-propositional thinking is of a completely 
different nature. On this view, God thinks everything in totality whereas this is 
impossible for us. However, the neo-Platonic reading has no textual support in 
identifying the human nous and its noetic activity with divine nous. Noesis noesos does 
not resemble human thinking in any sense, since the object of divine nous and the object 
of the human intellect are not identical in their nature. Perhaps it is time to identify two 
different sorts of human thinking: 
i) thinking an intelligible object without its matter at our will: in doing so our 
intellect becomes identical with its object but thinking is still propositional; 
ii) thinking as energeia in which our thinking is not a thinking on what we think, 
but it is identical with what we think, what we live; for example happiness. In these 
sort of activities there is no gap between what is thought and thinking, what happiness is 
and being happy. However, as I have repeatedly said, this sort of thinking is limited in 
the case of human thinking, whereas in the case of divine being the last trace of 
distinction between thought and its object disappears; their essence is for ever one. 
The description of the divine nous given in Metaphysics is identical with that of noes 
poietikos. They are pure energeia and have no objects for thinking, apart from 
themselves. The sense of any potentiality is also excluded from both of them. 
The Unmoved mover, the principle of the eternal motion in the universe is 
identified with divine nous and goodness, and is also included among the attributes. 
Although theoria is the best type of thinking activity that the individual human being can 
attain, noesis noesos does not characterise human thinking. We are able to know things. 
After acquiring knowledge of things, we can then go on to apprehend and reflect on 
what we know at our disposal. However, this type of thinking necessitates objects for 
85 
thinking and the second type of thinking as energeia in the case of human thought does 
not absolutely eliminate the risk of change, whereas God represents the perfect 
instantiation of being pure activity. 
So far I have argued that it seems to be hard to establish an absolute identity 
between human and divine thought. I have also claimed that Aristotle does not describe 
noes poietikos in terms of 'as-if divinity. However, he explains human thought by 
using the as-if language of divinity. Aristotle asserts the divinity of human thinking in 
several places, but the locus classicus is Nicomachean Ethics X .7 and 
X. 8.1177a 13-16 
refers to the sort of activity that constitutes happiness. According to Aristotle, perfect 
happiness will be the best activity of notes. Whether this is itself divine or the most 
divine thing in us is not decided. The activity he refers to is theoretical activity. 
Although theoria is to define divine thinking, this does not entail that human theoria is 
fully divine, so the formulation at 1177a 13-14 is asserted in a very cautious way and 
does not allow us to treat the most divine element in us, nous, as something to be ipso 
facto mention of God. It certainly requires qualifications" 
At 1177a 20b 26, Aristotle praises theoria as a precious activity but he does not 
mention that it is divine. Finally, he proclaims at 1177b 26 - 1178a 2 that the life of 
theoria in its perfect sense would be beyond the human level. The life of theoria in its 
perfect sense can only be of God. Human individuals can engage in theoria not qua 
being composite thing but qua having something divine in them. Nous is the best thing 
in us but the ultimate sense of nous does belong to divine being. 1177a 20-21 
establishes that the best thing in us is relatively divine. That is why we can only speak 
of as-if divinity and as-if immortality in Aristotle, and that is why it is important to read 
De Anima 111.4 and 111.5 in the light of what Aristotle says of nous in Ethics and 
Metaphysics. If someone insists on human immortality, he/she must turn to somewhere 
other than Aristotle to establish it. 
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Aristotle concludes his discussion of theoria by identifying it with the activity of 
God. What he says at 1178b 7-23 is far from establishing human theoretical activity as 
fully divine. Divine nous is not in need of resorting to action or production, the perfect 
sense of the activity of theoria is identified with God, which is why Aristotle asserts that 
"... the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be 
contemplative (theoretike). iG° What we can infer from this sentence is that the activity 
of God surpasses everything and this activity is theoretike. Aristotle does not say that 
theoretical activity is above all other activities, in virtue of which it can only belong to 
God. It is important to make the distinction, for it allows divine theoretical activity to 
differ from its human counterpart. In other words, it indicates that divine theoretic 
activitymay not be the same in kind as human theoretic activity after all. 
Aristotle tells us in Nicomachean Ethics X that we do some things sometimes 
which God always does. Again, this does not establish that human nous is similar in 
kind to divine nous and that the activity of God is identical with human theoretical 
activity. I believe that if we pay enough attention to the use of the language of divinity 
in describing human nous and its activity, we may be able to gain a deeper insight into 
Aristotle's conception of nous and thinking. He attributes divinity even to bees in De 
Generatione Animalium at 761a 4-5, but one cannot think seriously that bees are 
immortal, so when Aristotle says that nous is something more divine than the corruptible 
composite, that does not automatically suggest that human nous is immortal and eternal, 
which is why Aristotle says that: 
... choice cannot relate to impossibles, and 
if anyone said he chose them he 
would be thought silly; but there may be a wish even for impossibles, e. g. for 
immortality. 61 
9. An Additional Note on Homoiosis Theoi Argument 
Kahn suggests in his article called 'The Role of Nous in the Cognition of First 
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Principles in Posterior Analytics 11.9' (1981,414) that it is difficult to see how our 
divine poetic activity could be a likeness (homoioma) of the divine energeia 
(Nicomachean Ethics X. 8,1178 627) if the individual human rrous is not the same in 
kind with divine rlozis. Furthermore we are said to be at our best moments but God is 
always in that state (Metaphysics 1072 b 25). 
Kahn can be objected by pointing out that according to Aristotle things that are 
different in kind may be essentially activity (enrergeia). Aristotle describes eudaimonia 
and light as activity but they cannot be seriously taken to be as God. For example, 
certain animals imitate human behaviours. Can we say just because of that they are the 
same in kind? What, Aristotle says in Metaphysics is that 'our wonder is compelled if 
god is always in the best state we sometimes are in, all the more if it is in a better state 
than it is'. Kahn glosses over this phrase in his article. But it seems that what Aristotle 
wants to say is that God must be always in a state better than the best state we are ever 
in. (Wedin, 1988, chapter VI) 
Kahn's argument is primarily based on his analysis of De Aninia 111.5 where 
)Ious poietikos is conceived to reveal the mysteries of divine nous. However, the 
relation between divine sous and irons poictikos cannot be automatically presumed for 
human and divine Woos. (See Chapter V). It can, therefore, be argued that sameness 
in kind does not necessarily show that human and divine nous are the same. It is 
important to note that human thought is sequential and moves from thought to thought 
whereas divine thought does not. Nevertheless one could suppose that the Unmoved 
Mover always thinks of sets of objects that we sometimes think. Is this enough to 
claim that the human and divine irons are the same in kind? It must be difficult to 
answer the question affirmatively. It appears that the sameness in kind argument must 
correspond to sameness in content. However, it is very well known that Aristotle says 
that we never think without images but this is not required for divine hors. 
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IV ON DISCURSIVE AND NON-DISCURSIVE THINKING 
1. Some Preliminaries on Discursive and Non-Discursive Thinking 
The word 'discursive' is commonly contrasted with the word 'intuitive'. There 
are thirteen words in English which are derived from the Latin stem of the word discurr- 
ere. All the uses of the word indicate that it implies change either in relation to time, 
space or a passage from concepts to concepts. In essence the word `discurrere' contains 
the idea of change. It is also important to note that the word 'discursive' means 
' propositional' in philosophical contexts. So it has come to define the type of thought 
which is expressed propositionally. But the phrase 'non-discursive thinking' has been 
used to describe the type of thought which differs fundamentally from discursive 
thinking. The concept of non-discursive thinking excludes any change or process either 
in reaching knowledge or in thinking. It is generally associated with the word intuition. 
However, it would be very difficult and also controversial to think about the Greek 
counterparts of 'non-discursive' and 'discursive' in Aristotle. Although dianoia 
describes discursive activity of intellect, nous is far from describing intuitive activity of 
intellect in Aristotle. At least this is not the case for the individual human nous. It 
should also be noted that the individual human nous is not infallible in all its operations 
in Aristotle (see the section on nous and the notes to Introduction). 
Of course it is true that izous is considered to be infallible in so far as it thinks 
about an essence. However, the point here is that nous is not conceived to be infallible 
with respect to all its operations (nous is heteros logos; 415 a 11; of dianatikon, see: 
414 b 18-19) In the Politics Aristotle divides the soul into two, irrational and rational. 
He equates noes with the rational (13 34 b 17-20). It describes practical as much as 
theoretical (433 a 14-18). Thus it is right to say that Woos cannot be infallible in all its 
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capacities, however, nous is said to be infallible as the principle of knowledge (10 b 7- 
8; 433 a 26; 428 a 17-18). But it is also true that it is used to include judgements of all 
sorts (De Anima 427 b 8-9). Thus it appears that one has to be cautious about 
confining Aristotle's uses of noes to a single meaning. 
Let us now look into these two concepts in some detail. There are two notions in 
Greek philosophy which are covered by 'non-discursive thinking'. It has been held that 
there are two kinds of thinking, one of which is called immediate thinking and the other of 
which is demonstrative or inferred. Immediate thinking is contrasted with demonstrative 
thinking as non-discursive thinking is contrasted with discursive thinking. It seems to me 
that these two notions can be traced back to the word noes. And in Aristotle also two 
notions are to be associated with the different uses of nous. For in Posterior Analytics he is 
fundamentally concerned with demonstrative thinking. However, in Metaphysics he tries to 
explain how God can escape discursive thinking. ' 
I believe that we can talk about two types of non-discursive thinking in Aristotle. I 
call one of the two 'imperfect non-discursive thinking' (human noetic activity) and the other 
one 'perfect discursive' (divine noetic activity). There are some interpreters for whom 
Aristotle believed only in intuitive non-discursive thinking, for example Jaeger. 2 Intuitive 
non-discursive thinking involves a lot of difficulties which are connected with the nature of 
intuition and intuitive knowledge. Although non-propositional thinking is also linked with 
the term intuition, the main emphasis is on the feature of non-propositionality. 
Furthermore, it is of the nature of thinking which does not involve any change. Language 
is denied. Aristotle's God can speak but in order not to be less than perfect it must be 
silent. It is a god which does not use language and need not say anything. It is completely 
immersed in its thought. However, I should make clear that philosophers have not 
accepted that there are two types of non-discursive thinking. Some have held that there 
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is only intuitive non-discursive thinking in Aristotle. ' 
In the case of non-propositional thinking, one is said to think of concepts in 
isolation, such as goodness, beauty and truth. However, AC Lloyd has come to 
construe this from a different angle. He claims that non-propositional thinking is 
thinking without thinking something about, say, beauty. In saying that "beauty is truth" 
you think of beauty in isolation. ' 
Some more clarification is needed before we proceed further. Although two 
views of non-discursive thinking differ from each other, nevertheless they agree that the 
words 'discursive' or 'propositional' always contain the idea of change and 'non- 
discursive' or 'non-propositional' absolutely excludes any sort of change. In the case of 
'demonstrative' or 'inferred' the transition is taken to be from premise to conclusion. 
However, in the case of 'propositional' the passage or the transition is understood to be 
between concepts. 
In saying that truth is goodness or beauty is truth, the transition is from subject 
to predicate of a proposition but the subject and the predicate of a proposition are 
themselves thoughts. 
2. Non-Discursive Thinking as Energeia 
It is obvious that that the term 'discursive' signifies transition or process. On 
the contrary, the phrase non-discursive has come to mean 'completeness', directness 
and perfection and I argue in Chapter V that the conception of non-discursive thinking 
as 'being complete' and 'perfect' is closely connected with the very Aristotelian term 
energeia. 
It is true that the process of gaining knowledge requires a lot of laborious 
processes such as making observations, comparing, testing etc. The search for 
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knowledge seems to be of a kinetic nature and I call this type of thinking kinetic 
thinking. However, when we have solved a problem or have discovered a truth, our 
minds are no longer engaged in a process. What we have now as knowledge is 
complete and we can think of reality via it whenever we like. However, we still think 
of reality but we are not in touch with reality. Therefore, even contemplation appears to 
be still in some way discursive. Nevertheless, it could be said that we reach knowledge 
of things through the process of searching so that searching remains essential. Although 
Aristotle says in the first phrase of Metaphysics that "we all desire to know by nature" 
by the end of Metaphysics 'desire to know' is not what is important any longer. What 
must be achieved now is 'to touch', 'to contact' reality. ' 
Aristotle tries to explain the most perfect type of thinking (in other words, 
perfect non-discursive thinking) in his conception of God in Metaphysics XII. 9. In 
God's thinking there are no premises used to reach conclusions or to enable the thinker 
to think of concepts (essences) in isolation. And naturally there is no passage or change 
whatsoever, and I call this type of thinking active thinking or divine non-discursive 
thinking and I shall deal with this in Chapter V. 
I would now like to consider some of the main features of discursive and non- 
discursive thinking in detail. It appears that the idea of non-discursive thinking is driven 
by psycho-epistemological and ethical concerns in general. Further, I believe that the 
reason behind it is very much our human worries. Things which are in flux or in 
constant change were and have been puzzling, terrifying for human beings. At the 
intellectual level, these feelings cause the belief that it is impossible to know anything 
which is in flux all the time. Thus this scepticism is necessarily followed by intellectual 
pessimism which offers nothing and solves nothing. By contrast, intellectual optimism 
produces or tries to provide solutions to many puzzles with which we are faced as 
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human beings. Of such puzzles and questions we could mention some out of hundreds 
such as: What is happiness? What is truth? What is knowledge? In general intellectual 
optimism is followed by those who believe in the possibility of non-discursive thinking. 
Of course there are many divergent views of the nature of non-discursive thinking but 
any version of it is essentially and intellectually optimistic. ' 
The main features of non-discursive thinking correspond to real knowledge. Real 
knowledge is perceived to be eternal, immaterial and unchangeable. Non-discursive 
thinking has nothing to do with any sort of change, so it avoids any problems that 
discursive thinking encounters. But I should make it clear that I do not definitely reduce 
the formulation of non-discursive thinking to some sort of psychological need, nor do I 
do it in explaining discursive thinking. I only wish to place some emphasis on the 
question of how the problem of knowledge cannot be separated from our very human 
concerns. 
In Vermischte Bemerkungen Wittgenstein writes thus: 
I am by no means sure that I should prefer a continuation of my work by others 
to change in the way people live which would make all these questions superfluous. 
(For this reason I could never found a school. (Winch, P. trans. Culture and Value, 
Oxford, 1980). 
Wittgenstein sounds here as if it would have been better, like Aristotle's God in 
Metaphysics, never to have suffered philosophical perplexity at all. In other words, it 
would be wonderful if we could live a life of God in which everything is complete, 
perfect and free from any type of change. But, if some of us, like Aristotle, yearn to 
have it both ways it means we cannot avoid the battles at our door. 
According to Kal `to know' and `to think' are two different types of intellectual 
activities. Knowing, in his view, does not imply that there is any kind of process, as 
opposed to that thinking which contains some reference to change. So he comes to 
associate knowing with intuition and thinking with discursive activity. The point of 
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making a distinction between knowing and thinking is that the former enables us to 
make contact with reality whereas the latter just prepares the way to make this contact. 
However, thinking does not lead us to truth itself. ' 
While some identify intuition with knowing, like Kal, some identify it with 
contemplation, as Kahn does. ' Kahn arrives at the conclusion that non-discursive 
thinking is not a possible form of thinking. Why he says what he says will be explained 
later on in Chapter V. According to him contemplation can take place after we grasp 
so-called knowledge of essences. Those who identify intuition with contemplation have 
enormous difficulty in explaining the relation between thinking and objects of thought. 
At this point I only wish to point out that neither the proponents nor the opponents of 
non-discursive thinking take account the fact that Aristotle describes human and divine 
thinking in terms of energeia. 
Aristotle clearly states that thinking is energeia as opposed to kinesis. 9 If we 
follow Kal, then it seems to be possible to identify knowing with energeia. For 
knowing is not like cooking or building a house, a process which is incomplete. 10 
However, Sorabji is also right in pointing out that this is said to be true only of certain 
kinds of thinking. For example, he says the process of proving a theorem surely does 
remain incomplete until the end but he also accepts that contemplating of a premise does 
not. " 
3. Non-Discursive Thinking versus Seeking 
Aristotle describes the happiest and most pleasant life as one of knowing truths 
rather than seeking (zetein) them. ' The reason, I believe, is obvious. For seeking is 
defined by reference to the aim of seeking. Seeking has no end or aim in itself. In 
other words, it is not intelligible without any aim. Until it reaches the aim, it is 
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incomplete and as such it is a sort of imperfect thinking activity (kinetic thinking 
activity). And this view was shared by some members at Plato's Academy, that 
contemplating knowledge is superior to seeking it. 13 
However, seeking cannot just be understood in terms of possessing truth. There 
is nothing to possess at the end of seeking. It leads us to understand, to contact reality. 
Is it true to say that Professor Hawking possesses knowledge of black holes at the end of 
his search? Sorabji also despises the idea of contemplating truth. Although it may be 
true that part of the pleasure of intellectual activity could be emerging from the state of 
perplexity as Aristotle says in Metaphysics, 14 it cannot be taken to mean that it is this 
process that should be praised or alone is to be enjoyed. For emerging from the state of 
perplexity means that we are nearer to the truth. Our excitement is not due to the 
process itself. And Sorabji is completely wrong in saying that Aristotle's God, who has 
always known and contemplated the truth, has missed this 'wonderful excitement' 
which we only enjoy. 15 God does not solve problems or puzzles; it is not in any need 
to experience the 'wonderful excitement' that we sometimes do. It is in eternal bliss. 
In a sense he praises the destructive nature of kinesis or he is unable to see the 
destructive aspect of kinesis. Our life cannot be seen as a very long motion. Actually 
his view on the subject is very popular and underlies today's attitude towards human life 
in general. For we are no longer interested merely in living or being happy but are 
always seeking it. So we do not see so many happy human individuals and happiness 
around us but a lot of human misery everywhere. 
Aristotle, of course, is aware of the destructive nature of kinesis so he defines 
God in terms of nous and energeia. Thus it is essential to discover the relation between 
noes and energeia in Aristotle's thinking. 16 
I also believe that Aristotle would have been in agreement with Wittgenstein 
98 
rather than Sorabji who thinks that if we had been born in such a way, or been so 
educated that we never would have got into a state of perplexity, we would have missed 
the intellectual excitement. Sorabji suggests that we should perhaps distinguish three 
stages instead of two which could be stated as follows: (1) searching for truth; (2) 
finding it; (3) contemplating it. " 
It is true that some philosophers find it (perplexity or searching) exciting and 
some others find it agonising. And for some the process of finding truth could provide 
a great satisfaction or the greatest pleasure of all. So when they have found a truth they 
want to tackle a new problem. Contemplation of what is known may become tedious. 
And in order not to become immensely bored they leave the result of their most 
rewarding activity behind. Plotinus was also very well aware of the last point. On his 
view this difficulty could only be obviated if we think of knowing as timeless. 18 But in 
Aristotle's view this is not the case, at least in the case of God. For God is that whose 
ousia is activity. It is what it is and does not suffer from the destructiveness of kinesis 
in any way. Its life is a life of energeia. Whereas for human beings, we are supposed 
to actualise our potential. It is this that saves kinetic thinking from being destructive, 
Aristotle's conception of non-discursive thinking or divine thinking as energeia. It is 
not worth much to have the capacity to lead a good life, but it is important to live a 
good life. So a person who has or is living the truth is superior to the one who mostly 
seeks for truth. 
4. On the Sameness of Intellect with Its Object 
Although it seems wrong, as well as somewhat misleading, to say that "the act 
of thinking is identical with its object" I do not have an alternative expression for it. 
Why I think that it is not appropriate is that it implies that there are two things, possibly 
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two different things. 19 And in any case this Aristotelian idea has proved hard for us to 
understand. Some philosophers have come to say that since it is such an obscure idea 
we should completely abandon it. Worse than this, some others have attempted to 
combat this somewhat notorious Aristotelian idea but have ended up in failure too. The 
reason for their failure is that they did not or could not give up the difference between 
thinking of A and A itself. They have always kept the propositional expression of A 
and the reality of A distinct from each other. The other reason for their failure is that 
they have not succeeded in understanding what Aristotle says of divine thinking which is 
described as eternal, unchangeable and matterless. Aristotle also argues that it thinks 
itself so there is no distinction between knowing and known. Although Aristotle states 
that human thinking has autonomy to think, it cannot be equated with the kind of 
thinking which does not depend on any objects of thoughts to think except itself. The 
reason for this seems to be that human thinking requires objects only for its first 
actualisation. It is autonomous with respect to its second actualisation. Since in God 
there is no unactualised potentiality, the question of actualisation does not arise. 
However, whether this is enough to establish a fundamental difference between human 
noetic activity and divine noetic activity remains to be seen. 2° 
It has been argued that the idea of the identity of nous with its object comes from 
a discussion in Physics 111.3 where Aristotle speaks of the relation between an agent and 
patient (by using the analogy of doctor and patient). He says that when a doctor tries to 
cure his patient, the activity of the doctor is identical with the activity of the patient. 
Although there are two parts, namely doctor and patient and curing and being cured, we 
can speak of the one single activity and this activity is located in the patient. We can 
look at another example, that of teacher and pupil, in the same way. According to 
Sorabji, in some sense Aristotle has an ulterior motive here because at the end of 
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Physics he aims to reach a conception of God which excludes any sort of change. I 
object to this by saying that the commonly held examples do not express Aristotle's 
theory of identity in thinking. Furthermore, they do not help in understanding the 
identity between knowing and known. For curing, learning or searching have nothing 
to do with thinking. With them, Aristotle simply describes a set of actions. So I 
believe that to concentrate on these examples cannot lead us to understand why he says 
what he says of God in terms of being identical with itself. In all other cases there are 
two things involved, but in the case of God there is only one. 
Aristotle himself points out already that the identity spoken about here is not the 
identity of essence. He is very well aware that the essence of learning and teaching are 
quite different. '' What he means by these examples is that there is one single activity. 22 
In the business of treatment the doctor is involved in the process as someone curing and 
the patient as someone being cured. However, curing itself constitutes a single activity. 
In sum, there are not two different activities to be counted. Curing and being cured are 
predicated of a single activity. The identity is like that of the road from Thebes to 
Athens and the road from Athens to Thebes. 23 
When we turn to De Anima, we find the example of hearing. There Aristotle 
says that hearing and being heard can be thought as a single activity. 24 We are also told 
that the activity of thinking is identical with the object of thought. He explains it by 
saying that if you are thinking of a stone it is not that there is a stone in the soul but your 
thinking is identical with the intelligible form of the stone. 2' But we must remember 
that we think of a stone by the form of it. We do not touch on a stone or the reality of a 
stone. 
It is very well known that the theory of identity in thinking presents us with a lot 
of difficulties, some of which can be expressed thus: 
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1 What kind of identity is it as far as thinking is concerned? 
2 What are intelligible forms? 
3 What are the objects of thought? 
According to Aristotle when we think of something, the intelligible form of it 
must be present in the soul. For the soul is the place of forms. What we infer from this 
is that the act of thinking and the form that we think are one and the same thing. 
However, does this not prove a bit problematic? For example, if I think of a tree and if 
I call this tree X would I be able to claim that when I think of X something in my soul is 
identical with X? Or do I have any other way to think, perhaps, to intuit directly the 
intelligible form of the tree? Anscombe, in her attempt to explain the identity of the 
activity of thinking with its object, argues that there are not two distinct things here 
because if we wish to know whether a person understands a theorem, it is the theorem 
which we ask him/her to explain. According to her there is not such thing as the 
understanding of the understanding of the theorem. 26 
But I believe that we should not take all examples given by Aristotle in the sane 
way. As far as the problem of thinking is concerned, it should be noted that Aristotle is 
essentially concerned to overcome the bridge between reality and the intellection of it by 
mind. I do not believe that Aristotle here talks of the kind of identity in thinking in 
terms of formal or representational identity or, as Anscombe claims, understanding of a 
theorem. I doubt whether understanding has anything to do with the theory. Aristotle 
probably would say that we should distinguish understanding a theorem from touching, 
knowing reality. For there is no such thing as the reality of a theorem. If my mind 
cannot be identical with realities in the world, does that mean that it can be identical 
with whatever it thinks? 
I believe that because a form must be of something else either it must be 
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expressed propositionally or we must intuit it directly. As far as I know Aristotle 
nowhere ascribes to the human mind such a direct access to realities. 
" Thus the 
question arises once again about how we are supposed to understand the claim that when 
the mind thinks it is identical with its object. Although it has been said that the objects 
of human thinking can be essences or the intelligible forms of things and some have 
claimed that they are identity statements, none of these claims explains Aristotle's 
concern about the subject. For he says that either we can touch it or not. However, the 
metaphor of touch, I believe, itself expresses the difficulty with which the theory is 
faced. 
Anscombe and Sorabji completely overlook what Aristotle says in Metaphysics, 
XII. 7 and particularly 9. The examples they examine are not meant to explain the 
identity of thinking with its object. So they are wrong in relating the examples to the 
subject of thinking in Aristotle. They also do not take into account Aristotle's 
characterisation of thinking as energeia. Although they both recognise that Aristotle 
defines thinking in terms of energeia they make no attempt to examine the subject with 
this fact in mind. 
Sorabji also treats Aristotle's conception of God no differently from his 
conception of human noes as if they were of the same nature. So he cannot say much 
about the statement that "God is what it is, because it thinks itself". 28 1 believe that 
when Aristotle defines God in terms of noes and energeia he illuminates what he means 
by saying that "the nous is identical with its object". 29 Therefore book XII. 9 of 
Metaphysics does not only serve our theological concern on the whole but explains what 
Aristotle's view is of the identity of nous with its objects of thought. What I claim here 
is that the theory of thinking cannot merely be confined to the Aristotle's account of 
thinking in De Anima. 
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The thesis which postulates the identity of intellect with its object is central to 
Aristotle's account of thinking. It is not put forward just as an alternative to Plato's 
theory of ideas as it is claimed by some philosophers. 30 After all Aristotle is not 
interested in making the object of thought eternally unchangeable concepts. For in 
Aristotle the objects of thought are not placed within the intellect except as the forms of 
things. In De Anima Aristotle is interested in explaining how human intellect works. 
He does not speak there in Platonic or Neo-Platonic ways. 
Now let us have a close look at what we are told in De Anima. When the mind 
has become each thing it is then in a position to think at its disposal. But it is still in a 
state of potentiality in some way but not in the same way as before it learned or 
discovered. And then it can think by itself (autos di auton). 31 The identity cannot be 
between a thinker and his/her thought but between his/her mind and what he/she thinks. 
One also has to identify his/her being only in terms of his/her sole intellect or just being 
an intellect. For a thinker is more than what he thinks with. There is nothing to prevent 
an individual human nous thinking of the worst things and being identical with them. 
However, divine nous thinks itself, which is the highest thing. Another point is that 
what a thinker may be thinking of does not require a complete thought. Let me try to 
explain what I mean by this: suppose that there is a scientist who works or has been 
working on something. Until he/she solves the problem with which he/she is 
concerned, he/she cannot be said to have a thought with which his/her mind is said to be 
identical. This also shows that kinetic thinking forms a part of human noetic activity 
too. The identity of mind with its object is possible if and only if the object of thought 
is complete. 32 Williams says that: "Surely the point is that what a thinker thinks with", 
i. e. noun, is, in the human case, a dynamis, a capacity. The thinker is that whose 
capacity it is. In God's case, since nous here is never unactualised, it exists as energeia 
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at all times, and can thus be identified with itself. He goes further by pointing out that: 
there is no such thing as an incomplete thought. Surely the scientist has 
(complete) thoughts all the time while he is solving the problem: the thoughts may be 
embodied in questions, hypotheses, dilemmas etc., but will always be propositions or 
complexes of propositions. 33 
However, one cannot identify one's mind with something which is developing, 
changing, or in constant flux. For example, X might have been concerned with the 
question of Y for a long time but as soon as X solved the puzzle, X had a thought which 
was complete and perfect. But the thought X had also explains the physical world, it 
reflects the physical world. But it is doubtful whether we could say that X's thought of 
Y could be described as energeia in the primary sense of the term. This also requires 
the discussion of essences in Aristotle. Whatever we say about the nature of beings in 
Aristotle, one thing is indisputable, that the objects of thought in human thinking do not 
and cannot enjoy the privilege of the object of divine thought. Aristotle strongly 
believes that there is internal and essential relationship between the object of thought and 
thinking. The status of object of thought determines the quality of thinking itself. " 
So human noetic activity may appear to be identical with divine noetic activity 
but it is hard to conceive human noun to be identical with divine nous. For, although we 
are granted autonomy in thinking, this autonomy in thinking is somewhat dependent on 
things which are external to our mind. Suppose that I discovered the essential nature of 
Venus. But one day it has just disappeared. Would I be able to say that I can think of 
Venus at my will and have autonomy for thinking of Venus at my disposal? In addition 
to this, there are serious problems with seeing human nous as incorruptible substance. 
God is identical with itself necessarily because it thinks itself. Its being is 
eternal. There is direct and necessary correspondence between the ontological status of 
God and what he thinks. Thus Aristotle cannot find any other thing to be thought by 
God, so he makes God think itself. So Aristotle's conception of divine noetic activity 
105 
may not essentially be the same as human noetic activity. A is the same as B only when 
A thinks B. The distinction is important, for it only applies to the human mind and not 
to the divine mind. I believe Aristotle is profoundly aware of this fact that a scientist 
cannot put the knowledge of the world into his/her mind. What he/she discovers or 
possesses as knowledge is and must be incomplete in two senses: 
1. What we have as a piece of knowledge, say B, does not give us reality as a 
whole. 
2. Our knowledge of reality is incomplete. 
This is why we cannot be identified with what we think but just our mind with 
what it thinks. And as such it is not necessarily of the highest things. 35 
Norman argues, in his article called 'Aristotle's Philosopher - God', that the 
identity of intellect with its object is possible if and only if it is taken to hold between 
the noetikon and noema. Professor C. F. Williams says that the intellect (nous, 
noetikon) is a dynamis. The actualisation of this dynamis is a noema. It is the noema 
which is said to be identical with the actualisation of the noeton. 36 Norman appears to 
be right at first glance. For Aristotle says that the object of thought is in the mind and it 
seems to be perfectly plausible to say that noemata are in the intellect. But Wedin 
objects to this by pointing out that the identity of mind with its object is a relation 
between intellect and its object. More importantly it is the fact that Aristotle is 
concerned with how one is able to think of a thing outside oneself. And the object of 
thought is not itself a thought. To claim the opposite is to reduce Aristotle's theory of 
thinking to a bad copy of Plato's theory of Ideas. For mind thinks external reality only 
through the forms of them. And the form of a thing in our soul does not represent 
anything except the thing itself. It might be made clearer if we look at what Aristotle 
says about perception. For Aristotle also applies "the identity thesis" to perception. He 
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says in De Anima at 431b 26 - 432a 1 that: 
In the soul that which can perceive and that which can know are potentially 
those: on the one hand, the object of knowledge (to episteton), on the other, the object 
of perception (to aistheton). These must be either the things themselves or their forms 
(ta eide). But clearly they are not the things because it is not the stone but its form that 
is in the soul. 
What we understand from the passage just quoted is that the things in perception 
are external. So it is true to say that it is the form of an object that is in the soul when 
perception takes place but not the thing itself. And it is also true for objects of thought 
in so far as they are without matter. Aristotle tells us in De Anima 111.4,430a 6-8 that 
objects of thought (ta noeta) exist potentially in things with matter. For nous is just the 
potentiality to become actualised with such things without matter. So it is the task of 
nous to grasp the form of things without their matter. But what are the matterless 
forms? He says that they are essences and energeia. 37 
What seems to be certain, at least, is that thinking and perception differ very 
little from the point of view just discussed above. And this brings back the question, do 
perception and thinking differ from each other fundamentally? 38 Aristotle speaks of the 
objects of thought as being matterless. So the identity theory applies to things which do 
not have matter. As I have pointed out before Aristotle's thesis on the identity of nous 
with its object cannot be confined to the version of De Anima, namely, human thinking. 
What we see in De Anima is the application of Aristotle's theory of identity to human 
thinking. 
When Aristotle, however, speaks of the objects of thought he means the objects 
of thought as existing in some material (sensible) objects. And that would be in 
agreement with De Anima 111.8 that the objects of thought are given by the forms of 
sensible things. Although they are in the soul, they are not themselves the objects of 
perception but they are the objects of thought. 
Thus, when Aristotle says that nous is a capacity for being such objects without 
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their matter, we can draw the conclusion that nous is the potentiality which becomes 
identical with the form of things in the soul without the matter. But how does that differ 
from perception? 
It appears that in perception the form which is placed in the mind requires 
mentioning matter. For it is essential to mention the aistheton. However, it is not 
necessary for thinking. According to Aristotle, perception has also a limited range of 
objects whereas nous can think everything. But I believe the last clause requires our 
attention. What does everything mean? If it means essences, what are essences? 
The mind becomes identical with its object without matter. So the mention of 
matter becomes unnecessary. Since what activated or brings the mind into activity, the 
noeton is itself without matter. So matter has no role to play in the activity of mind 
itself. In other words, matter does not have any function in explaining how the intellect 
thinks 
5. On Perceptibles and Thinkables 
We must understand as true generally of every sense (1) that sense is that which is 
receptive of the form of sensible objects without the matter, just as the wax receives 
the impression of the signet ring without the iron or the gold, and receives the 
impression of the gold or bronze, but not as gold or bronze; so in every case sense is 
affected by that which has colour, or flavour, or sound, but by it, not qua having a 
particular identity, but qua having a certain quality, and in virtue of its formula; (2) the 
sense organ in its primary meaning is that in which this potentiality lies. The organ and 
the potentiality are identified as one thing but their essential nature is not the same. 
The sentient subject must be extended; they are a kind of ratio and potentiality of the 
said subject. From this it is also clear why excess in the perceptibility of objects 
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destroys the sense organs; for if the excitement of the sense organ is too strong, the 
ratio of its adjustment (which, as we saw, constitutes the sense) is destroyed; just as 
the adjustment and pitch of a lyre is destroyed when the strings are struck hard. It is 
also clear why plants do not feel, though they have one part of the soul, and are 
affected to some extent by objects touched, for they show both cold and heat; the 
reason is that they have no mean, i. e. no first principle such as to receive the form of 
sensible objects, but are affected by the matter at the same time as the form. (De 
Anima 11.12 424 a 17-b 3) 
It seems that Aristotle has made it difficult to draw a very sharp distinction 
between sensation and thinking. It is also true of sensible forms and intelligible forms. 
According to Aristotle sensation is the power to receive sensible forms, for example 
colour, sound, without matter. The faculty of sense and its organs the same but their 
essence remains to be different. Although an eye is a synthelon, a seeing eye is one 
thing. Sensation requires a material organ which is constructed to be acted on in this 
way by the object perceived. And this potentiality is activated in and during the actual 
sensation. 
However, the simile of wax and the metal seal appears to herald a materialistic 
theory for Aristotle. Nevertheless the real issue here is to show the possibility of 
receiving a form of something without its matter. To understand the simile otherwise 
is to import a crude materialism into his psychology. The imprinting of the seal on the 
wax is an event which requires a direct contact between the two objects. That is why 
this cannot be conceived as a complete parallel to what happens in sensation. The 
faculty of sight does not become red in perceiving redness. The organ of sight 
becomes informed in this material way. However, Aristotle keeps the difference 
between the physical alteration of the sense-organ, which is necessary precondition of 
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sensation, and sensation itself. This also explains why plants do not have sensation 
(424 a 32 b-3 and compare 438 a5 ff) 
The conclusion to be drawn here is that what is perceived in the act of 
sensation is form, something non-material. However, in the case of sensation, the 
object of sensation must be present. Explaining how, in sensation, the form gets into 
A's soul requires mention of matter because the aistheton is essential to the causal 
story. However this is not so for thinking. Here the intellect is able to be the same as 
its object independently of matter. For what brings the intellect to activity, the froeton, 
is itself without matter. Although the object of thought is always the form of a 
material object, matter will play no role in explaining how the intellect is able to think 
the object on a given occasion. 
Perception and thought are alike in a number of ways. They are both faculties 
that have active exercises. The objects of thought and sensation have causal role in 
explaining how thinking and sensation happen. However, there are differences 
between intelligible and sensible forms which can be stated as the following: 
1. There is the necessity of bodily organs as mediators between sensible forms and 
the soul whereas this is not true of intelligible form. He says that the sensible form 
is more intimately connected with matter in that it is confined to a particular kind of 
matter. Aristotle says in Metaphysics that there is, for example, differences 
between snubness and concavity. For what is snub is a concave nose but concavity 
has an element of sensible matter. The snub is conjoined with matter, in this 
instance flesh. it is perceived by the soul in sensation, but to have knowledge of 
concavity the soul must proceed by itself to higher levels of generalisation. 
2. When the organ of sight becomes coloured, the soul becomes aware of colour. 
Thus the awareness signifies reception of form, an immaterial essence. Aristotle 
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says in Posterior Analytics that although what is perceived is an individual, sense- 
perception is of the universal (100 a 16-b 1). However, sensation does not 
necessarily provide the universal. This time the example comes from Analytics too 
and is of'man'. Nevertheless this does not mean that we can have knowledge of the 
species without going beyond the perception of individual men. Episteme enables 
us to define and in order to acquire that the soul must go beyond sensation. (87 b 
8) 
6. The Objects of Thought 
It is obvious that the discussion of the objects of thought is indispensable to the 
thesis which claims the identity of intellect with its object. As I have said on several 
occasions the discussion of the subject cannot be confined to either De Anima or 
Metaphysics. To do this, will only enable one to show how Aristotle is inconsistent in 
one place with what he says on the subject in another. Instead of this, I propose that we 
should consider the application of the thesis with regard to both human and divine 
thinking. Then, perhaps we might be in a position to say whether Aristotle grants 
human beings non-discursive thinking or not. For, while everyone appears to be content 
to attribute it to divine being, there is vast disagreement among scholars today of the 
possibility of non-discursive thinking for humans. But I just would like to mention 
briefly that both opponents and proponents of non-discursive thinking overlook the fact 
that Aristotle did not have the conception of intuition. Thus there might be some other 
explanation of his theory of thinking in addition to discursive and non-discursive ones. 
If to think is not the same as to be thought, in respect of which does goodness 
belong to thought? For being is not the same for the act of thinking and the object of 
thinking. It is one thing to be the act of thinking and another to be what is thought. 
The answer is that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In productive sciences, if 
we disregard the matter, the substance, ie, the essence, is the object; but in the 
speculative sciences the formula or the act of thinking is the object. Therefore, since 
thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things which contain no 
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matter, they will be the same, and the act of thinking will be one with the object of 
thought. 39 
It is very dubious in what sense we can say that A's intellect is identical with B 
and B is without matter. Sorabji and Wedin avoid saying what 'B' refers to and they do 
not get into trouble, but at the same time they do not say anything about the theory of 
the identity of the intellect with its object. 40 
First of all Aristotle nowhere states that identity but even thinking and thought is 
of formal identity. We must describe what B is. Aristotle does not think of formal 
identity. It is therefore important to explain what we mean by B or C or D as object of 
thought. 
In order to overcome the difference between the intellect and the object of 
thought, the latter one must be changeless. For, nothing in the process of change can be 
a candidate for being object of thought. Can anyone identify his/her mind with 
something in motion? I do not believe they can. For, the identity of intellect with its 
object is possible only so long as the object of intellect is motionless. 
So we are forced to speak of the essence of B or whatever else we think with. 
So it is just not enough to say that A's intellect is identical with B which is without 
matter. So to take the identity of the intellect with its object formal identity is to 
completely undermine what Aristotle says on the subject (See section on Plotinus). 
But when we say that A's mind is identical with B which is without matter, at 
least one thing is made clear, namely that the identity thesis cannot be extended to 
something which includes matter. And that amounts to this: the object of thought 
cannot be understood in terms of kinesis but energeia, since Aristotle identifies thinking 
with energeia as opposed to motion. But how are we supposed to understand die 
discussion of incomposite objects? What is the nature of incomposite objects? 
Aristotle appears to be extending his theory of thinking to incomposite objects. 
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So the subject of De Anima 111.6 is of indivisible or undivided objects. According to 
him the indivisible object does not involve combination or separation. It appears to be 
quite plausible to say that indivisible objects are incomposite objects. Because they are 
meant to be motionless. Thus, if the identity thesis applies to indivisible objects it must 
be so for incomposite objects too (see Chapter V, section 5). 
It is interesting to see that the concept of an indivisible object is introduced after 
De Anima 111.5 where Aristotle states that thinking is impossible without noes poietikos. 
Further, it makes everything actual. But what are these things that it makes actual? 
In Aristotle's view if something does not have matter it is also undivided. " This 
also applies to the human mind. We are told in De Anima 111.6 that thinking of an 
undivided object cannot be false. He ends the chapter by saying that the kind of thought 
which does not affirm one thing of another is always true. For the knowledge of 
undivided objects is the knowledge of the essence and it is without matter. The object 
of thought as such is complete and we are told that forms are energeia. Therefore 
thinking of undivided objects cannot be expressed propositionally. Aristotle intends to 
overcome the gap between reality and intellect, so the undivided objects of thought are 
meant to be reflecting reality. For matter means potentiality, imperfection, 
incompleteness, change. What Aristotle tries to achieve by claiming that the undivided 
objects of thought are matterless is to be able to define the identity of intellect with its 
object in terms of energeia. So we are here to see the identity of thinking (energeia) 
with its object which is defined in terms of energeia as well. 
Therefore we cannot talk here of formal identity or reduce the object of thought 
merely to a thought. Aristotle says that those born blind are to be said to have some sort 
of discursive reasoning about colours. However, they lack the capacity to come into 
contact with colour. So they cannot experience the reality of colours whatever sort of 
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reasoning they might have. 42 
7. On the Possibility of Non-Discursive Thought 
I have raised my doubts about the sameness of divine poetic activity with human noetic 
activity. It is true that they are both described to be energeia. However, is that 
enough to claim that they are both identical? If not should we give up any possibility 
of non-discursive thinking of human thinking? Sorabji and Lloyd question any 
conception of non-discursive thinking in Aristotle and ask why we should presume that 
Aristotle had in mind the non-propositional contemplation of isolated concepts in the 
first place. (Sorabji, 1982,296 ff and Lloyd 1981) 
Aristotle speaks of to prota noemala in De Anima 111.8 (432 a 10-14). What 
are they? How are we supposed to understand them? Nisbaum related to prota 
noemata to Metaphysics IX. 10 and regard them to be the discussion of the simplest 
and most basic things (asuntheta). However, in particular, we need to clarify what 
counts as an instance of such a thought. We are told in Metaphysics at 1051 b 30-32 
that concerning what is strictly being activity, it is impossible to be in error. We simply 
think them or we do not think them. The point is that in both cases thoughts are not 
combined. Thus propositional truth and falsity cannot be applied to these thoughts. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle argues that we can investigate the nature of (Ii esti) of such 
things. He writes that: 
An assertion that says something about something (ti kata linos), as does an 
affirmation, is true or false. But this is not the case for all thought; thought of the 
nature (ti esti) of the essence (of a thing) (kata to ti einai) is true but does not say 
something about something (ozi ti kata tiiios). But just as perceiving a special object is 
true, while perceiving that the white thing is a man or not is not always true, so also 
with what is without matter. (430 b 26-31) 
Is there any conflict between Metaphysics IX. 10 and De Anima 930 b 26-31? 
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The former implies that it is possible to think of aszintheta without thinking of their 
essence or nature. If this is the case how could it be possible to inquire into the nature 
of such things? However, the passage from De Anima argues that it is possible to 
think of the nature of such things but it is wrong to say that one is thinking of 
something about something. Therefore propositional truth and falsity are both 
inapplicable to thought of an object simpliciter and to thought the nature of its 
essence. The first appears to refer Metaphysics 1051 b 24 where Aristotle considers 
thinking under the notion of truth as contact (thigeiti). What guarantees truth here is 
grasping the object in itself. This sense of truth corresponds to perception in which 
perceiving or special object of perception is said to be always true. (De Anima 427 b 
11) The point is that in this kind of thinking there is a direct acquaintance with the 
object as in the case of perceiving a proper object of sense. However, in the case of 
that where propositional truth and falsity is said to be inapplicable appears to 
correspond to Metaphysics 1051 b 24-25 in which Aristotle speaks of the concept of 
truth as assertibility. He distinguishes assertion from affirmation in which one thing is 
predicted of another. It does not seem to be easy to construe the notion of truth in 
terms of assertibility. Nevertheless one cannot be wrong in successful assertion of the 
nature of the essence. It is this that guarantees truth. 
In the light of what has been said so far it seems that thought about essence will 
be considered as thought about an uncombined object (a. s intheta). And it would be 
possible to take the primary thoughts as expressing a thing's essence if truth and falsity 
are equated with combination of thought (432 a 1014). 
The view of primary thoughts as presented above contains two difficulties 
which are: 
a) How do they differ from images? 
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b) Affirmation and denial are not denied to imagination - are they denied to assertion? 
Through meeting these difficulties it seems to be possible to establish that primary 
thoughts are not propositional. The first difficulty can be overcome by saying that 
primary thoughts are to be thought in terms of 'contact'. In Metaphysics IX. 10 
Aristotle contrasts affirmation and denial with assertion of what is not combined 
(asuntheta). He contrasts the same pair with what does not assert something in De 
Anima 420 b 26-3 1. This affirmation and assertion are definitely opposed to each 
other. 
c) Imagination accepts denial and affirmation. However, imagination is contrasted 
with assertion and denial. Through retaining the notion of truth as presented in 
Metaphysics 1051 b 24-25. De Anima passage (432 a 10-14) can be understood 
not only contrasting imagination with thoughts corresponding to affirmation and 
denial but also with these corresponding to assertion of a thing's essence. Thus it 
becomes plausible to say that there are thoughts which are to be known as truth 
through the notion of contact. The primary thoughts do not involve propositions. 
The question to be answered now is this: what is primary about these primary 
thoughts? It might be said that 'primary' refers to 'logically' primary. If we look at De 
Interpretatione we find that it is possible to restrict assertion and denial to single 
assertions and denials in which one thing is asserted or denied of another thing. In 
other words a single assertion is one in which one thing is said of one thing (18 a 13 
ff). For instance, being a man is one thing while this implies being a two-footed 
animal. However, being a tall man is not one but two things. There are two assertions 
in saying that David is a tall man which are: a) David is tall; b) David is a man. The 
account of primary thoughts as presented here allows that thoughts can be combined in 
a single assertion. The primary thoughts are the elements of such assertions. 
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It appears that AC Lloyd and Sarabji do not agree with any non-propositional 
interpretation of primary thought. For them this is equal to saddling Aristotle with an 
enigma of Greek philosophy, namely, with non-discursive thinking. They are both 
concerned with any thought that involves contemplating something without thinking 
anything about it. 
Aristotle's account of non-discursive thinking is mainly contained in 
(Metaphysics IX. 10,1051 b 27-1052 a4 and De Anima 111.6,430 b 26-31). It is 
usually rendered that non-discursive thinking requires contemplating things in isolation. 
On the contrary in discursive thinking one's intellect shifts from A to B. In this type of 
thinking shifting from A to B indicates that there is change in discursive thinking. It 
has also been argued that it necessitates something to be contemplated in isolation. 
Sorabji argues against any possibility of non-discursive thinking not only in 
Aristotle but in Plotinus with which I will be concerned in the Chapter VII. He says 
that it is impossible to claim that one thinks of something in isolation without thinking 
anything of it. Let us take a sentence in which one says that 'beauty is truth'. 
According to Sorabji it is hard to argue that a person can think of 'beauty' without 
thinking anything about it before one connects the concept of 'beauty' to truth. In 
addition to that he rejects any possibility of interrupted thinking in Aristotle. However, 
it is well known that Aristotle conceives non-discursive h oetic activity as one of the 
loftiest achievements of a person and the continuous activity of divine »ous. 
(Metaphysics XII. 7,1072 b 14-26; Nicomachean Ethics X. 8). And non-discursive 
noelic activity is compared with touching (Metaphysics IX. 10,1051 b 24-25; XII 1072 
b 21). 
What is so lofty about interrupted thinking? Why do we have to regard 
contemplation as one of the loftiest achievements of human nloetic activity? How 
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could it lead us to truth as Aristotle says? It should be remembered that non-discursive 
noetic activity is the only way to contact reality and truth is nothing more than 
knowing reality. That is why Aristotle argues that there is no truth nor falsity in non- 
discursive noetic activity. If this is the case Sorabji is right in saying that there is no 
question of truth and error unless one combines concepts (De Anima, 11.6,430 a 22-b 
6; Categories 2a 7-10; De Interpretatione 16 a 9-18). He is also right in asking 
whether non-discursive noetic activity is to be called thinking or something else. This 
is also the question I will consider in the section on Plotinus. But here it can briefly be 
noted that Islamic Aristotelians appear to have followed Plotinus in their conception of 
non-discursive activity of the individual human being rather than Aristotle. In their 
views achieving the non-discursive state of knowing required a long discursive 
preparation. For instance, non-discursive understanding of beauty is contained in the 
discursive thinking that 'beauty is truth'. 
It is not easy to understand how one could relate the analogy of non-discursive 
thinking to the contemplation of isolated concepts. Aristotle states that in this kind of 
thinking nothing is predicted of another thing (ti kata linos; De Anima 111.6,430 b 28) 
nor-asserted (kataphasi. s; Metaphysics IX. 10,1051624). It would be useful if one 
bears in mind that Aristotle as well as Plotinus describes sous as life. It seems that this 
crucial point has been completely overlooked. It is possible that after all Aristotle and 
Plotinus may not have had in their mind non-discursive noetic activity as something 
thinking in the ordinary sense of the term as we are today. It is also possible that non- 
discursive noetic activity does not necessarily correspond to contemplation in Aristotle 
as well as in Plotinus. 
With this view in mind let us once again return to the discussion of non-discursive 
noetic activity as one of the loftiest achievements of the individual. Engaging in non- 
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discursive rloetic activity involves knowing the essence. However one should be 
careful here about identifying the essences with the defining characteristic of things. 
The account of science given in Posterior Analytics is that one knows the definitions of 
things and by which one can explain the things concerned further. But in De Anima 
430 a 25. b 9. %'he form of a thing is defined in relation to the function of a thing. It 
might be suggested that in this case the aim of the individual human being as a poetic 
subject to realize his/her poetic potential, since this is what it is to be a human being. 
Aristotle speaks of asunthela at 1051 b 17 and adiaireta at 430 a 26. It seems 
that these things do not involve matter nor form. Now one needs to be careful here. If 
the identity of the intellect is taken to be between intellect and reality it is not difficult 
to understand the analogy of touch. Aristotle says that in the case of sensation of 
special sense objects there is no error. In sensation sensing and sensed are identical. 
This is also true of non-discursive thinking. For in this type of thinking knowing and 
known are the same thing. That is why either you perceive or not or you think or not. 
But there arises a problem if one takes Aristotle to be speaking of definitions of these 
subjects (ti esi, 1051 b 26; b 32; 430 b 28) 
For then non-discursive poetic activity seems to involve contemplating the 
definitions of incomposite subjects. As it is rightly pointed out by Sorabji then thinking 
is bound to be propositional. For it will involve thinking that such and such an essence 
belongs to such and such a subject. And this will be equal to saying that there is 
assertion and predication of something else. The close relation which according to 
Aristotle exists between logic and reality is a theme in itself. 
The objection has been put forward against any possibility of non-discursive 
noetic activity by Sorabji and Lloyd. It can be met by saying that Aristotle considers 
definitions as statements of identity. What this means is that in these sorts of 
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statements one thing is not predicated of another. This identity statements are neither 
assertions nor predications.. The view is based on what 
Aristotle says in Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics (73 b 5-10; 83-32; 1087 a 35; 
1088 a 28). Aristotle says that it is by being something other than a white thing that a 
man is white. However, it is not by being something other than animal that he is an 
animal. Although being white is predicated of an individual man as one thing or 
another but man is not predicated of an individual man as one thing of another (1030 a 
2-6; 10-14). Aristotle also speaks of subject which has neither matter nor form (sz, neJI 
emmenon tei hulei, 1037 a 33-b 7). And he says that in this case the subject is 
identical with its essence. On the question of how they are thought Aristotle says that 
in thinking of them we cannot be mistaken. Either we know them or we do not know 
them (thigeiti, Ihinga)1ein, 1051 b 24-33). The analogy of contact in relation to 
incomposite objects is interesting in a number of ways. Firstly of all it is an all or 
nothing relation. Secondly, it requires a direct relation with the things that one knows. 
In this respect it is important to remember the comparison between perception of 
special sense objects and incomposite things. In both cases there are no falsity or 
truth. 
Now we have seen that accounts given on non-discursive poetic activity are not 
without difficulties including the one given by Sorabji. However, the interpretation of 
primary thoughts presented at the beginning appears to eliminate the difficulties that 
previous views carry with them. After all it is argued that one can speak of non- 
discursive thoughts in Aristotle. Sorabji, however, argues that the thought of 
asumheta and adiaireta of De Anima 111.6 must be propositional after all. 
Although Sorabji's view might appeal to many who deny any sensible conception 
of non-discursive thinking in Aristotle nevertheless his account is not without 
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difficulties. Sorabji's view on non-discursive thinking is based on the passages from 
Posterior Analytics (73 6 5-10 and 736 9-10). In the first passage Aristotle says that 
what is not predicated of a subject is to be described essential and what is so 
predicated to be called as incidental. It might appear at first that his is enough to think 
that Sorabji is right in maintaining his view on the subject that non-propositional 
thinking is propositional. However, the line refers back to 73 b5 where it is said that 
'what is not predicated of some other subject'. It is not clear that Aristotle has in his 
mind identity statements. For instance think that A stands for a plane figure and B for 
a triangle. The corresponding essential statement would be this: 'A triangle is a plane 
figure'. It is obvious that this can hardly be construed as referring to the same thing 
twice. The second passage used by Sorabji comes from Posterior Analylics 1.22 in 
which he sees support for the identity statements. The important lines are translated by 
Mure as follows: "Predicates which signify substance signify that the subject is 
identical with the predicate or on species of the predicate" (Mure, 1932, Posterior 
Analytics 83 a 24-25). 
However, Wedin objects his translation of the passage and argues that the 
passage yields something different. 33 a 30' exemplifies that 'Man is precisely animal' 
and, bearing in mind that this is contrasted with what is said at 83 a3 1-32 with 
analogies, for the case of incidental predication. He claims that 'Man is precisely 
animal' is not the same as 'Man is precisely a sort of animal'. The point is that the 
sentences like 'Man is precisely animal' do not yield to identity statements, but at most, 
statements such as 'Man is animal' or 'Triangle is a plane figure'. In addition to this 83 
a 21-23 states that accidental and essential predications are cases where one thing is 
predicated of another. Of course this is in conflict with De Anima 111.6 where 
Aristotle insists that thought of incompsites in composites is not 1i kata linos. Thus 
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Sorabji might be right in maintaining that statements of definitions are identities, this 
cannot be holding to be true in the cases of thinking an incomposite (Wedin, 1988,129 
ff). 
It is also difficult to argue that Aristotle considers definition as involving 
predication. These do not involve statements which express that a such and such is. 
In these cases Aristotle refers to definiens. We are told in Posterior- Anralytics that in 
definition (en ton horismou) one thing is not predicated of another. For instance, not 
animal of being two-footed nor it of animal; nor even figure of plane. For plane is not 
figure nor figure plane. (Posterior Analytics 11.3,90 6 34-38). We find the same thing 
in De Interpretatione at 17 a 11-15. What this indicates that is that it is after all 
possible to speak of non-propositional sense of definition in Aristotle. This also 
appears to be the case in De Anima 111.6 where Aristotle discusses undifferentiated 
objects of thought. 
In De Anima 111.6 Aristotle considers a certain type of object of thought. We 
are told in De Anima II1.8 that thoughts must be combinable in judgements which yield 
truth and falsity. There are two things to be clarified here: a) combinability, b) denial 
of falsity to the incomposite objects (1051361). Let us consider an example given by 
Wedin. 
d) The flower in the vase is a daffodil. 
e) Daffodils are bulbous herbs. (Wedin 1988,131). 
The point is that since thoughts are combinable in essence, incomposite objects can be 
thought of only in combination with others. What this means is that one can only think 
of daffodils so long as the noema daffodil occurs in a proposition. Now the question 
that arises is this: why does Aristotle deny truth and falsity to such thoughts? Sorabji 
suggests that the solution to the question may lie in a special type of combining, 
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namely, in identity statements. 
However, this is not without difficulties. For in order to combine the thoughts 
in the case of a) we must know or be acquainted with the thoughts themselves. 
Knowing is an all-or-nothing affair with the noema in question. However, now the 
question to be considered how could we eliminate the risk of error from thought of the 
incomposites? Let us think that somebody wrongly identifies daffodil with tulip. After 
taking all possible measures to eliminate any deficiency on the side of knower, we told 
him/her that it was daffodil. In a sense this would be connecting an error in judgement. 
However, suppose that after taking all possible measures the knower insists that 
daffodil is tulip. In this case it is not right to say that the knower made a mistake in 
judgement. For mistakes in judgements require that one knows the concepts or 
thoughts which are contained in the judgement. The oly explanation one can give is 
that the knower does not know what daffodils are. Thus the possibiilty of making any 
mistake does not arise on the side of the knower. For the knower is not even able to 
make a mistake. Aristotle would say that the knower has failed to hit the object at all. 
This will allow to accommodate the immunity of incomposite thoughts from error 
while they are stated in a propositional context. In other words one does not have to 
construe incomposite thoughts as propositional. And this has nothing to do with 
contemplation of concepts in isolation. In other words non-discursive poetic activity 
does not necessarily need to be restricted to contemplation. This is what Aristotle 
appears to suggest in Metaphysics at 1051618 - 21.. " " 
8. Conclusion 
The discussion of non-discursive thinking comes mainly from two chapters, one is 
from Metaphysics IX. 1043 and one is from De Anima 111.6 . 
44 It has been generally held 
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that non-discursive thinking involves thinking things without thinking anything about them. 
In thinking, for example, that beauty is truth, my intellect switches from beauty to truth, so 
this would be one example of discursive thinking. However, even in this case of discursive 
thinking transition is from concept to concept and that implies contemplation of something 
in isolation. It could be objected to this that there can be a stage at which my intellect is 
thinking beauty without yet having passed to truth. However, this seems to be impossible 
for I promptly relate it to the concept of truth. But if I was put in an unconscious state by 
something else before I had done so, I might have thought of beauty in isolation. But then I 
am not in a position to know that I am thinking of anything. 
Is it possible to think of beauty without going on to think something of beauty? I 
might only desire to know, for example, what the attributes of beauty are. I do not think 
that Aristotle is concerned with interrupted thinking. He regards non-discursive thinking as 
one of the supreme achievements of the human being in its happiest moments. But God is 
always in this state and does not suffer from any slight distraction. 45 And non-discursive 
thinking is compared with touching. 46 And as such it also excludes any sort of 
contemplation. Contemplation is always contemplation of reality but not reality itself. That 
is why Aristotle finds no way but to say that non-discursive thinking is like touching. 
Touching is always to touch something, to contact something. What could there be to 
touch apart from the thing that one touches? 
Sorabji argues that it is difficult to see how thinking something in isolation, i. e. 
without thinking anything about it could be thought as leading us to truth. But in De 
Anima 111.6 and (430b 28) in Metaphysics IX. 10 (105 lb 24) Aristotle does in fact try to 
prove that this kind of thinking, namely non-discursive thinking, leads us to truth. He also 
says that there is no falsehood if we do not combine concepts. `' 
In the case of human thinking it might be said against the notion of being knocked 
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unconscious that, although the non-discursive thinking of beauty is contained in the 
discursive thinking that beauty is truth, nevertheless it does not occur on its own. But in 
Plotinus and in Aristotle as well, this has importance in the definition of the thinking of God 
(God's thinking). They both believe that non-discursive thinking can occur without 
discursive thinking. In Aristotle it is especially true in the case of God. Nevertheless 
Sorabji does not think that this new suggestion enables us to make any improvement on the 
side of non-discursive thinking. He goes further and asks why only having the concept of 
beauty in mind is to be thought as a very supreme achievement or a case of having truth. 
'Supremeness' and 'truth' could have any meaning if and only if non-discursive thinking 
provides us with a full understanding of beauty. But according to him understanding must 
be propositional since understanding entails appreciating that so-and-so is the case. 
Perhaps we should think of two kinds of non-discursive activity, namely human non- 
discursive noetic activity and divine non-discursive activity. For, in the case of God, 
Aristotle never states that it thinks of concepts or anything else in isolation. But in the case 
of human thinking he says that in non-discursive thinking we do not predicate anything of 
anything (De Anima 111.6,430b 28). He also says in Metaphysics that there is no assertion 
of anything else in non-discursive thinking. 48 However, I reject any conception of non- 
discursive thinking in the way that I have just discussed above (see Chapter V). 
Aristotle claims that one of the loftiest achievements for a human being is to be 
engaged in theoretical science which involves discovering the essences. In the two chapters 
mentioned at the beginning, Aristotle speaks of objects which are incomposite (asuntheta) 
(Metaphysics 1051b 17) and adiaireta (De Anima 430 a 26). And we have said that they 
do not involve any matter whatsoever. The reference here is to 'what it is' (ti esti, 1051 b 
26; b 32) and to 'what it is in respect of essence' (ti esti kata to ti ear eiircri, 430b 28). 
However, thinking means here having in one's thought the definitions of incomposite 
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objects. However, this is impossible because in that case the thinking must be 
propositional. For it involves thinking that such-and-such an essence belongs to such-and- 
such a subject. Some definitely reject the view that definitions can be stated in a non- 
discursive way. 49 
It is claimed that Aristotle occasionally views definitions as being statements of 
identity. In these statements we do not predicate one thing of another. Aristotle sometimes 
speaks of statements such as these, which give the essence of something, or part of its 
essence. He says in Posterior Analytics that it is by being something other than a pale thing 
that a man is pale. However, it is not by being something other than an animal that he is an 
animal. Although pale is here predicated of an individual human being as one thing of 
another, being human is not predicated of a human being as one thing of another. " 
And Aristotle also says in Metaphysics VII. 11,1037a 33-67 that an object which is 
incomposite and does not have matter is identical with its essence. But most importantly, 
Aristotle claims that in non discursive thinking we cannot be mistaken; either we can touch 
or not. 5 ' Aristotle means that if we try to state what the essence of an incomposite object is 
and fail, we are not in any error. For, in that case we have not succeeded in talking about 
the object at all. We have not been in any contact with it, because contact or touching is an 
all-or-nothing affair. Plato also claims that one cannot be mistaken about some certain 
identity statements. According to him no-one has ever said to himself that a horse is an 
ox. 52 Plato and Aristotle both use a tactual metaphor which is that of grasping. 53 
Thus discursive interpretation of De Anima 111.6 cannot be maintained. He there 
distinguishes the operations of the noes which are intellection of 'indivisibles' from the 
combination of concepts produced by intellection. Aristotle says that the former is free 
from errors. In other words, it is always true while the latter can be either true or false. 54 
And in the case of the 'indivisibles', Aristotle states that not only realities that are potentially 
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indivisible for example, those which cannot be divided at all can be perceived as such, but 
also realities that are indivisible only in actuality for example, those which in fact are not 
divided. We are then provided with a series of examples of indivisible realities. Among the 
examples there is length which is said to be indivisible according to quantity; the indivisible 
according to species; realities such as the point and such like, called 'divisions', for example 
limits; 'privations' such as evil and black; and consequently realities which have no contrary 
are defined as existing in actuality and separate. They are generally understood by 
interpretations as divine intelligence or the Unmoved mover. 55 
Aristotle also claims that the first operation of nous, which is the intellection of 
indivisibles takes place in an indivisible time. It means that it does not involve succession. 
It has its object 'the what it is according to the what is was to be'. In other words, its object 
is what we call the 'essence'. Thus, intellect concerns realities 'without matter'. 56 
What Aristotle says in De Anima seems to tally with what he says in Metaphysics 
where he asks what truth and falsity are in the case of "incomposite realities" (TX. 10). He 
replies that truth lies in "touching them", and falsity does not exist. The alternative to truth 
is established by not touching them as well as in ignoring them. 57 The same is also true of 
'incomposite substances' which are in actuality and are 'what it is to be something. 
So in the case of thinking of incomposite substances, it is true also that it is 
impossible to be mistaken. There is no falsity - one can only be or not be thinking of them. 
Thus one could say that thought of them is true, whereas falsity simply does not exist, but 
there is just ignorance. 58 
Aristotle's talk in De Anima 111.6 of the divisibility or indivisibility of the time in 
which intellection of indivisibles occurs, together with the metaphor of touching, 
repeated in Metaphysics59 confirms that Aristotle considers the intellection of indivisibles 
to be immediate knowledge. And if one also goes on to say that the object of non- 
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discursive thinking is also immaterial substance, for example, separated, divine kinds, 
we find ourselves in a position similar to that of Jaeger. According to him, Aristotle 
accepts a direct intuition of the pure forms so this idea is an obvious remnant of Platonic 
intuitionism. He says that: 
The truth of metaphysical statements expressing a being that is not an object of 
experience rests, according to Aristotle, on a special intuitive form of apprehension, 
which ... 
is a sort of intellectual vision, a pure 'contact and assertion'. This is the only 
remnant of Plato's contemplation of the ideas, that has survived in Aristotle's 
metaphysics. 6o 
There is an alternative to this version. It could be claimed that the object of such 
non-discursive thinking is being. One could make Aristotle a fore-runner of Heidegger 
by ascribing to him a conception of truth as the original revelation of being, which 
precedes all discursive thinking. In that case the nein must be interpreted as a sort of 
mystical contact with being. And in the next chapter I shall attempt to prove that 
Aristotle's conception non-discursive thinking is not Platonic nor Heideggerian; I also 
hope to free Aristotle's conception of non-discursive thinking from being enigmatic and 
mysterious while I argue against proponents of two contemporary views. 
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V ON THE HUMAN AND DIVINE NOETIC ACTIVITY 
1. On the Isomorphism between Human and Divine Nous 
The analysis of noes in De Anima III. 4 and 111.5 in Chapter 3 argues that it is 
hard to establish that nous poietikos is of the human individual. Furthermore, I 
discussed that there is a strong parallel between the description of nous poietikos in De 
Anima and the nous of Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9 where Aristotle also describes the 
nature of divine noun and its thinking activity. The conception of divine thinking 
activity in Metaphysics XII. 9, I take it, constitutes Aristotle's conception of divine or 
perfect non-discursive thinking. The reason for this is that only the essence (ousia) of 
divine nous is pure energeia. As I have previously argued, the analysis of the different 
applications of the term energeia therefore remain essential to understanding non-discur- 
sive thinking in Aristotle. Otherwise, the conception of non-discursive thinking or 
divine thinking activity is bound to remain obscure, mysterious, if not completely 
futile. 
It is obvious that Metaphysics XII in general, but particularly chapters 7 and 9, 
has a central place in my account of discursive and non-discursive thinking. The view 
of divine noes and its thinking activity that I am proposing diverges from traditional 
views in many ways. The attempt to give a non-traditional account of Aristotle's 
remarks on the divine noun will be particularly unpopular with those who want to forge 
a close link between human and divine thought. 
I also intend to argue that the conception of divine nous and its noetic activity in 
terms of energeia provides us with a radical understanding of the human noetic activity 
that is also described by Aristotle as energeia. One should, however, be cautious here 
whether the human noetic activity is to be considered identical with the perfect divine 
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noetic activity which is described as energeia too. The reason for raising this doubt is 
that the ontological status of the human nous may prevent human thinking from being 
the same as divine thinking of which ousia is said to be pure energeia, whereas there is 
nothing to prevent human nous from falling into the state of potentiality. 
I have already discussed that the language of Aristotle's attribution of divinity to 
human thought does not call for full-blown divine status for the human noes, however 
there are two major contending views against much of what I say on the subject, which I 
call the 'ontological theory of noun' and the 'non-ontological theory of nous'. 
According to the former theory, divine nous in Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9 is essentially 
the same as human thought and nous poietikos must therefore be fully divine, if not 
identical with god. According to the latter theory, divine and human thinking activity 
are not different from each other, they are the same sort of activity in essence. The 
ontological theory of nous presumes the identity between divine nous and human noes 
but the non-ontological theory of noun is mainly concerned with the similarity between 
divine and human noetic activity. In the course of this chapter I shall discuss these two 
theories along with developing my own account on the subject matter. 
I shall be particularly cautious against the weakness of these two theories which 
heavily rely on the conception of human nous as something divine. However, I have 
already argued that this not necessarily so. We do not have to be dependent on some 
sort of granted divinity in us in order to realise ourselves, especially our morality. If we 
remember the first opening sentence of Metaphysics, which asserts that all people have 
desire to know or to understand, then we will be in a position on the way to understand 
the nature of the human being who is to be an animal which has noun. Having desire to 
know forms a kinetic aspect of our intellectual life. It is of searching: we are bound to 
search in order to know. These two sides of human noetic activity constitute what I call 
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kinetic and active aspects of human nous. A divine individual is one who has desire to 
know and for that purpose also one who searches. That is why Aristotle says that 
knowing is superior to seeking. Having desire to know surely cannot be attributed to 
God but it is the reality of the human nous. Our aim as individual human beings cannot 
be conceived as sustaining kinetic aspects of our noetic activity, but reaching the state of 
thinking as energeia. In other words, we should aim to turn our intellectual life into 
energeia. Then we may become somehow divine, feel divine or, more correctly, 
perhaps just then we can bring our nous into the state of non-discursive reality. 
Now let us proceed with the discussion of the ontological theory of nous which 
presumes a strong isomorphism between divine and human nous. I should restate here 
that in general the interpretations of Aristotle's theory of intellect have been restricted 
fundamentally to ontological concerns, for example whether nous poietikos is of the 
human individual or whether it is identical with the noes of Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9. 
Following the first line of interpretation, Aquinas attributed the noes poietikos to the 
individual and assigned it the work of extracting species and genera from experience. 
Alexander identifies nous poietikos with the nous of Metaphysics and makes the object 
of human and divine objects of thinking common to both. One of the contemporary 
advocates of the ontological theory of nous is Charles Kahn. In his account, the 
difference between divine noes and the individual human nous disappears into thin air 
and the discussion of the term energeia does not receive any attention at all. The 
thinking activity of divine nous as such or as being non-discursive gets no mention at 
all, let alone entering into the discussion of the picture. ' 
According to him there are two stages of thinking, in one of which the intellect 
is to be filled with concepts (noeta) whereas in the other the intellect puts them to use. 
He assigns the task of acquiring concepts to the noes poietikos and sees no problem 
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there. However, he finds employing concepts somewhat troublesome. He also relates 
the problem to the question of nous as hexis. Nevertheless, he argues that De Anima 
111.4,429b-9, provides support in favour of his thesis. The passage in discussion goes 
like this: 
When the intellect has become each thing (hekasta) in the way that one who 
actually knows is said to be so (and this happens when he can exercise his capacity by 
himself), it exists potentially even then in a way, although not in the sort of way as 
before it learned or discovered; and then it can think by itself. (Hamlyn, D. W., 
Aristotle's De Anima, Books II, III, Oxford, 1968) 
First of all, it appears that it is wrong to translate the word hekasta as all things. 
Surely the intellect becomes each thing when it thinks or knows a particular thing, a 
particular theorem or a grammar of a particular language. ` This will also rule out any 
necessity of reading hekasta in relation to concept acquisition. It appears to be 
concerned with somebody knowing a particular thing. Aristotle seems to speak of this 
in light of what he says in De Anima 11.5 where we are given the example of a person of 
knowledge and the actual exercise of it. The intellect, even at this stage, has some sort 
of potentiality. It has become actual when it thinks (here Wedin speaks of the instant 
production of the objects of knowledge by productive intellect tsee Wedin (1988) Ch. 5). 
However, the question of how productive noes produces an already acquired object of 
thought remains completely mysterious for two reasons: (a) if nous poietikos is actual 
(pure energeia) then how could it produce objects of thought required at a time by 
potential intellect? (b) the nous poietikos must store objects of thought like a store house 
but then nous poietikos has the danger of falling into potentiality that is unacceptable. ' 
The real issue here is not concept acquisition but the identity of notes with what it thinks 
with. De Anima 111.4,429b 5-9 is rather concerned with actual thinking. As opposed to 
Kahn, Aristotle tells us nothing about how nous poietikos enables the potential individual 
intellect to acquire concepts. The passages countenance no such relation between the 
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nous poietikos and the individual potential intellect. It is also important to mention the 
analogy of light as given by Aristotle. Light does not illuminate objects of thought, nor 
does it extract the forms. My understanding of the analogy between light and the noun 
poietikos is not a traditional one. I propose to understand the analogy of light in the 
following way. Since I identify nous poietikos with the divine nous of Metaphysics 
XII. 7 and 9, nous poietikos has no function in providing concepts to the potential 
individual intellect. In other words, it has nothing to do with concept acquisition at all. 
Aristotle writes in Metaphysics that the final cause produces motion in the 
universe as being loved whereas all other things move by being moved. The Unmoved 
Mover as final cause is an object of love (eromenon) (1072 6 4-5). It represents the 
ideal of absolute perfection as a result of all the supreme attributes given to it. And in 
virtue of being of that nature beings in the universe turn to the Unmoved Mover as an 
object of love. In this context light does not produce anything. It illuminates by being 
pure activity and beings turn to it in order to be illuminated. 
Since irons poietikos is nothing but divine noes, it brings the potential human 
intellect into actuality by being the object of love. Divine noes is pure energeia, like light. 
Everything that has no light or everything that is in the darkness is brought back to activity 
by the shine of divine norus. After all, light does no more than this in our practical experi- 
ence. Our potential nous is attracted by the light and love of divine Hons. God does not 
intervene in our actual and particular thinking of a thing. It is already there, it shines as 
pure energeia. As having a potential intellect, we have desire to know but this desire is not 
complete in itself. For, as merely having a potential intellect, we are not complete 
ourselves. Being as such, we are in motion, our nous is in motion (kinesis), we can only 
become complete, perfect, more correctly energeia when we turn our potentiality to think 
into active thinking. Non-discursive thinking may then be possible for the human individ- 
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ual. We may then be in contact with reality. However, in Kahn's account the light analogy 
is used to support an abstractionist or acquisitional account, but nothing Aristotle says 
amounts to that. As I have already said, light illuminates but it does not produce objects 
nor put them there. This is also true of the nouspoielikos. 
2. Nous Poietikos and Divine Nous 
Let us continue with Kahn's account of the intellect in more detail. He argues 
that noes poietikos has to be a causal agent and thinks the objects of thought 
continuously. One of the cosmological results of such a view is that nous poietikos and 
the structure of the natural world are one and the same thing. In other words, both are 
of an isomorphic nature. In Kahn's view the structure of the natural world is seen as the 
colour-illustrated intellect of nous poietikos. If one acquires knowledge of the natural 
world then one's intellect becomes identical with noun poictikos. More precisely, he 
identifies the rots poietikos with the totality of scientific truths. Nous poielikos thinks 
scientific truths eternally whereas we can think of them just after we acquire them. One of 
the main problems with his account is the nature of the objects of thought. Are they the 
various principles of all the different sciences? How does uoris poietikos think them at 
once? How is any change excluded from izolis poietikos? Where is the importance of 
experience in gaining knowledge? Kahn himself says that "there is no epistemic button we 
can push in order to tune in on the infallible contemplation of noetic forms by the active 
intellect". ` It is obvious that the role of experience is bound to remain futile if noes 
poietikos is given the task of providing the human potential intellect with knowledge. On 
the contrary, in my view only human intellect is capable of thinking the essential structure 
of the world. It is capable of doing so simply because it reaches truths of the world through 
the process of searching and only at the end of this search does it gain knowledge of these 
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propositions which mirror the structure of the world. There could be many ways of 
acquiring these propositions such as induction and demonstration but none of these require 
any help from sous poietikos. So long as one contemplates or thinks these propositions, 
one's thinking activity is bound to remain discursive. For non-discursive thinking activity is 
a contact with reality, whilst thinking of a proposition is of reality but not reality itself. 
Aristotle argues that the act of thinking is identical with its object. The basis of 
this idea is to be found in Physics, De Anima and Metaphysics (111.3; De Anima 111.2, 
425 b 26-426 a 26; Metaphysics 1074 b 38-1975 a 5). 
Nous is somehow potentially its objects, but now actually until it thinks them 
(429 b 20-31). As in the case of perception, the intellect is capable of receiving the 
intelligible form. It might be said that the process is a sort of assimilation. For in the 
case of what is without matter, thought and its objects are the same. As Aristotle says 
in Dc Anima, perceiving and what is perceived are one and the same thing (111.2,425 b 
26-426 a 26). 
The intellect realizes its own actuality when it is one of its objects which 
constitutes the reality of the intellect. Since this is only achieved in non-discursive 
noetic activity the actualized intellect is nothing but reality. In other words the one 
engages in non-discursive noetic activity becomes the part of reality itself. There is no 
divergence between the intellect and what it thinks with. They are one and the same 
thing. Thus the identity of intellect with its object itself constitutes reality. 
One of the major results of Kahn's view is seeing a strict isomorphism between the 
divine nous and Horts poietikos.. Thus there is no difference between Brous poielikos and 
divine Brous. They are actually the same in essence: if wits poietikos and divine iious are 
the same in kind then the content of these two noes must also be the same. Kahn's 
argument can be shown like this: 
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nous poietikos They are the same in kind divine nous 
nous poietikos is identical 
with the formal structure 
of the natural world 
The formal structure 
of the natural world 
the content of divine nous 
is also identical with 
the formal structure of the 
natural world 
Although I have argued in previous chapters that nous poietikos is identical to 
the divine nous of Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9,1 fail to see how Kahn identifies the objects 
of nous poietikos with the essential and formal structure of the natural world. One thing 
is absolutely clear: Aristotle never speaks of the objects of nous poietikos. He also says 
nothing about the objects of divine nous. How could anyone then claim that divine noes 
is identical with the formal structure of the natural world, let alone identify the content 
of nous poietikos with the formal structure of the world? It simply does not work. 
Kahn is puzzled by how to understand what Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics X. 8 
1178b 19-27: 
... every one supposes that they 
(gods) live and therefore they are active; 
we cannot suppose them to sleep like Endymion. Now if you take away 
from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but 
contemplation? Therefore the activity (energeia) of God, which 
surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of 
human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most 
of the nature of happiness. 
Another text referred to in conjunction with the above comes from Metaphysics. 
Aristotle speaks of divine happiness and goes on to assert that we enjoy happiness 
sometimes whereas God is always in that state of happiness. ' 
Now let us return to Kahn's claim that our noetic activity is the same as divine 
noetic activity. First of all, one thing is clear: Aristotle's language of divinity and its 
attribution does not necessarily mean that our nous is identical with divine nous. In 
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other words, the individual human nous does not share the same ontological status with 
divine nous. If that is the case, then there remains a possibility that human noetic 
activity may not be the same as divine noetic activity. It should be remembered that 
Aristotle nowhere speaks of the objects of divine thought. The sole purpose of 
Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9 is to prove that the object of divine nous must be itself, for 
there is nothing higher for it to think than itself. If God thought of other objects, this 
would imply that God would think of things which are of lesser value. Surely this 
cannot be accepted. Secondly, Kahn completely overlooks the different applications of 
the term energeia used by Aristotle. Although the human thinking is also classified as 
energeia, this is itself far from establishing that divine thinking activity as energeia is 
identical with the human thinking activity. One should bear in mind that bringing our 
nous into the state of energeia is the telos of our potential nous, nevertheless the kinetic 
aspect of the individual noetic activity is a reality of the potential nous. Thirdly, Kahn 
does not deal with the question of how God thinks of the formal and essential structure 
of the world. Would it think those propositions in combination or in separation? One 
thing is clear: divine noun will not think of objects that ordinary thinkers think of. 
Divine noes is incomposite and in thinking itself it must think something incomposite. 
In virtue of having no potentiality, it has also no change in it. It can think only one 
particular object. If it were to think of two incomposites, it would have to think them 
either in combination or in separation. If it thinks in combination, it cannot be said that 
it thinks itself. If it thinks separately, it would have to think two objects and thus it 
would not be incomposite. This is why Aristotle insists that it thinks itself and that its 
thinking is a thinking of thinking (noesis noeseos). 
Islamic Aristotelian commentators did not identify nous poietikos with divine 
nous, nor did they attribute it to the individual human being. Nous poietikos was 
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conceived as a deputy prime minister or a vicar to God. The ontological theory of noun 
in general tries to remove any obstacles on the way to establishing a strict isomorphism 
between divine nous and the individual human noes. It does not stop here and continues 
to identify the content of divine nous with the content of nous poietikos. By so doing, it 
makes the essential and formal structure of the natural world as the object of divine 
nous, the nous poietikos and the individual human nous. It mainly relies on what 
Aristotle says in De Anima 111.5 but we have already shown that Aristotle says nothing 
there about the objects of nous poietikos. Aristotle also says nothing to the effect that 
the nous poietikos is of the individual human being. The attraction of the isomorphic 
theory of nous is based on the hope of discovering mystery of divine nous through nous 
poietikos, and I believe that as such it has nothing to do with Aristotle's theory of human 
and divine thinking. 
In the next section I shall be primarily concerned with the non-ontological theory 
of nous, which claims that individual human and divine noetic activity are the same in 
kind, thus there is no essential difference between the two. 
3. On the Sameness of Human Noetic Activity with Divine Noetic Activity 
It is interesting, and somewhat puzzling, that discussion of the term energeia has 
not been of any importance in the interpretation of Aristotle's theory of noetic activity in 
essence, let alone in his conception of human and divine non-discursive activity. I have 
already indicated that the discussion of Aristotle's theory of noetic activity, particularly 
human and divine noetic activity, is bound to remain blind without taking into 
consideration what the term energeia means and how it is applied to different cases. I 
have already suggested that perfect non-discursive thinking is instantiated in Aristotle's 
conception of divine thinking in Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9. Although human thinking is 
141 
classified as energeia by Aristotle, nevertheless the question to be asked now is whether 
this is sufficient for human non-discursive thinking to be considered as something 
identical with divine non-discursive thinking, for the individual human is a composite 
being and it is also true that the notes of the individual human being does not appear to 
enjoy the same ontological status as God. Thus one of the main problems on the way to 
understanding human discursive and non-discursive thinking in Aristotle has been to 
confine noun to discover first principles or identify it with intuition. In the previous 
chapter it has been shown that this is not the sole function that Aristotle ascribes to sous. 
Secondly, it is well known that Aristotle has a penchant for treating nous somehow as 
something divine. Again, it has been argued that this is too far away from granting any 
full-blown divinity to human beings. If what has been said above holds, it seems to be 
hard to claim that human noetic activity corresponds to divine noetic activity. In this 
section I shall argue against one of the modern versions of the neo-Alexandrian view 
given by Norman who claims that the individual noetic activity is not different from 
divine noetic activity. I hope to raise questions in what follows and ask whether this is 
possible at all. 
First of all, the individual human nous is simply not the same as the divine nous 
from the ontological point of view. Norman does not say anything on this point. Instead 
he is concerned with the question of what it means to think itself for the Unmoved 
Mover. He replies by saying that in fact to 'think itself' is nothing but an empty reply 
to the question. Thus, he goes back to De Anima 111.4 particularly in search of seeking 
a real answer to the question of 'to think itself'. He concludes that 'to think itself' for 
the Unmoved Mover is nothing different from when we think an object in 
contemplation, i. e. to think an object without matter. According to him, human and 
divine thinking are the same in kind, so long as the former has objects free of matter in 
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contemplation. However, he does not mention the analogy of touching in relation to the 
question of contemplation. It is important to remember that human non-discursive noetic 
activity may not after all correspond to contemplation but knowing reality in the sense of 
being identical with what is known and knowing. 
Norman's discussion can be divided into three parts, which are as follows. 
1. Aristotle's account of thinking in De Anima 111.4 is the same as the account of 
divine thinking in Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9. 
2. There are no real differences between the human noetic activity and divine 
noetic activity. 
3. The mode of divine thinking is theoretical. 
I will now look at each of these claims in some detail. 
4. On the Account of Thinking in De Anima M. 4 and Metaphysics XII. 7-9 
Firstly, Norman pays no attention to the characterisation of divine noetic activity 
in terms of energeia. As I claimed previously, this turns out to be extremely important. 
For divine nous as pure energeia eliminates any possibility of potentiality and thus any 
threat of change is excluded from it. However, the account of the individual noetic 
activity is discussed in connection with perception and it is argued that human thinking 
is a sort of being affected (heterön toiution). Nevertheless, Aristotle has serious 
reservations about conceiving thinking as perceiving; thinking is not limited in the same 
sense as perceiving by its objects. On the other hand individual noetic activity has two 
aspects, one of which is of a kinetic nature (searching for truths) and the other the 
thinking of what is already known (the state of the nous as energeia). However, 
whatever the individual human nous thinks, it is nothing more than contemplation of 
something and as such the individual human nous is never really in contact with reality 
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unless it is engaged in non-discursive noetic activity. 
Norman turns to De Anima 429b 5-9 and argues that Aristotle provides us with 
two types of thinking, namely taking on the forms and thinking the forms. In the first 
operation, intellect acquires the forms and in the second operation the intellect which is 
already to noeta is able to think itself. ' 
There is no textual justification to interpret the passage in the way that Norman 
does. First of all, the alleged first type of thinking has nothing to do with taking on the 
forms by the intellect. It is rather, a searching activity of the intellect through which the 
intellect later gets what it needs to think of. So, the first operation of intellect cannot be 
called thinking at all. When Aristotle says at 429a 22-24 that until it thinks, the intellect 
is nothing, he is describing the intellect that has already completed the acquisition of 
some concepts. If this had not been the real issue, Aristotle would have spoken along 
the lines of De Anima 11.5. 
There is also no ground on which to attribute the proto-Lockean view to 
Aristotle. This is only possible if one assumes that there are two sorts of thinking at 
429b 5-9 where, in its first stage of thinking, the intellect is already said to be identical 
with its object. However, what Aristotle says in Metaphysics XII. 7 at 1072a 30 seems 
to countenance that thinking is not confined to external objects. Together with De 
Anima 11.5,427c 22-29, Aristotle's claim appears to be holding for episodes of 
thinking. More clearly, it is of a person who is already actively contemplating this 
particular thing as in the case of perceiving. When a person hears sound at a given 
time, what is heard and hearing is the same. When a person thinks of a particular 
object, what is thought and thinking is the same and this is only possible if, and only if, 
knowing is an actual particular thing. 
The point is not that what is thought by the intellect is not universal. But in the 
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case of actual thinking the intellect is identical with that particular universal. Although 
the intellect is potentially identified with all intelligible forms the actual thinking cannot 
be extended to all intelligible forms. 
To sum up, saying that objects of thought are somehow in the soul does not 
make Aristotle Lockean. It is certain that Aristotle commits particularity from an 
ontological point of view, whereas objects of thought are said to be universal. In 
Posterior Analytics Aristotle makes clear that he has no intention to think universals 
which exist independently from particulars. 
5. Of the Relation Between 'to think itself and the Object of Thinking 
without Matter 
The second part of Norman's account of thinking is related to the claim of De 
Anima III. 4 where Aristotle says that one is able to think itself so long as the object of 
thinking is without matter. Norman argues directly against the conception of the divine 
noetic activity as contemplation in Metaphysics XII. 7. According to him, when 
Aristotle says that the Unmoved Mover thinks itself he does not mean that the mode of 
divine noetic activity is self-contemplation. On the contrary, Aristotle means that in the 
case of thinking in which the object of thinking has no matter, knowing and known are 
identical. According to him, Aristotle is merely concerned with the identity of nous and 
the object of thought. ' He also argues that this identity between knowing and known 
describes all abstract thinking. He tries to justify his view by establishing a genetic 
relation between divine noetic activity and the individual noetic activity, and he comes 
to conclude that they are in fact identical with each other. 
It is also argued by Norman that the Unmoved Mover thinks itself simply 
because it is engaged in thinking activity which is continuous. The mode of divine 
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thinking activity is also a theoretical one in which what is known and knowing are 
conceived to be identical. If that is the case, for theoretical thinking in essence there is 
nothing to prevent human thinking from being the same as divine thinking. It is true 
that Aristotle says that human noetic activity is not continuous whereas divine noetic 
activity is. First of all, in order to establish absolute identity between divine and human 
noetic activity one has to prove that human nous is the same as divine nous. For if 
human nous has not got ontological independence to exist, it is possible to think that one 
day it may cease to think. This surely raises the important question about seeing human 
noetic activity as being identical with divine noetic activity. However, Norman does not 
consider the question of noetic activity in relation to ontological questions in Aristotle, 
nor does he take into account the fact that human thinking has kinetic and active aspects, 
whereas divine thinking is simply described as pure of energeia. 
Although it is true that what characterises theoretical thinking is the identity of 
knowing and known, the possibility of change remains a real possibility on the side of 
human theoretical activity. The central passage to the discussion is the following: 
Now thinking in itself is concerned with that which is in itself best, and 
thinking in the highest sense with that which is in the highest sense best. 
And thought thinks itself through participation in the object of thought; 
it becomes an object of thought by the act of apprehension and thinking, 
so that thought and the object of thought are the same, because that 
which is receptive of the object of thought, i. e. essence, is thought. And 
it actually functions when it possesses this object. Hence it is actuality 
rather than potentiality that is held to be the divine possession of rational 
thought, and its active contemplation is that which is most pleasant and 
best. If, then, the happiness which God always enjoys is as great as that 
which we enjoy sometimes, it is marvellous; and if it is greater, this is 
still more marvellous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life belongs to 
God. For the actuality (energeia) of thought is life, and God is that 
actuality and the essential actuality (energeia) of God is life most good 
and eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, most 
good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to 
God; for that is what God is. ' 
One should be cautious here. Of course, it is true that every e»ergeia is perfect 
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as opposed to kinesis. However, we know that Aristotle uses the form efnergeia in 
relation to perception, physical things, ethical and finally poetic activities. In all cases 
except the Unmoved Mover, the term energeia describes activities of things which do 
not exist necessarily. In other words it forms an aspect of beings and can be 
understood in its relation to kinesis. But in the case of the Unmoved Mover any 
possibility of kinesis is absolutely ruled out. For we are told that the Unmoved Mover 
is that whose ousia is energeia. The other important point is that the Unmoved 
Mover exists necessarily. It is eternal and being as such its activity is continuous. 
However, it would be difficult to claim the same thing of the individual human nozis. 
In addition to that Aristotle says that our thinking cannot be continuous as the 
Unmoved Mover is said to be. Perhaps the reason for this lies in that the individual 
human being does not exist in the same way as God does. We might cease to think 
one day but God thinks eternally. It seems to be possible to explain why our noelic 
activity may not be the same as with divine activity in relation to Aristotle's theory of 
ontology. In other words the difference between human and divine ntoetic activity 
might be tied to ontological distinction between the two. 
Aristotle points out clearly that activity rather than potentiality is the aspect of 
divine Brous. It is obvious that De Anima's account of theoretical thinking cannot be 
thought apart from potentiality. It is true also that Aristotle conceives of human thinking 
activity in terms of activity, but divinity in terms of pure activity cannot be thought of the 
individual noetic activity but only of God. So, although the activity of divine irons is to be 
understood as energeia in the absolute sense of the term, the activity of the individual 
human lions is to be conceived in terms of as-if activity. Thus it only appears to be possible 
to think of the individual human noetic activity in terms of as-if divinity, and in terms of as- 
if activity. 
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In the above passage, Aristotle distinguishes thinking what is best from thinking 
what is best in itself. This also raises doubts that divine noun may not be essentially the 
same as the individual human irons. At 1072b 24-26 comes the discussion of the state that 
we are in and the state that God is in. Norman sees that God's state is generically the same 
as we are in. 8 In other words, he reduces the difference between the two sorts of thinking 
to a matter of degree. 
I find his claim hard to accept. First of all, in the case of the individual noetic 
activity the state of activity can be achieved through the searching, that is a kinetic 
process. The potential intellect of the individual human being aims at reaching the state 
of energeia, active thinking. However, even then the individual human nous cannot go 
on thinking or staying in the same state eternally. Why is that? Why cannot we go on 
thinking continuously, whereas divine noun does just that? Norman never takes these 
questions into consideration. However, they are crucial to Aristotle's account of 
thinking in general. My answer is simple: the individual human noes does not share 
the same ontological status with divine nous, therefore it is possible to think that divine 
noetic activity may be different from the individual noetic activity after all. That is why 
the question of divine and human thinking cannot be solved without dealing with the 
concept of nous in Aristotle, particularly the divine nous and the human noes. 
I would now like to turn to Metaphysics XII. 9 to argue that divine and human 
noetic activity may not be of the same nature. This will also provide a partial answer to 
Norman's third claim. 
6. Of the Sameness of Divine Thinking and Human Thinking 
So far, I have tried to argue that Aristotle's account of noetic activity in De 
Anima 111.4 bears no relation to Aristotle's account of divine noetic activity in 
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Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9.1 have also maintained that Norman does not seem to be right 
in reading De Anima 111.4 into Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9. In addition, his account of 
Aristotle's theory of noetic activity does not include the analysis of the conception of 
noes in Aristotle which, I believe, should be dealt with first. In other words, it does not 
appear to be possible to separate the question of noetic activity from the ontological 
concerns in Aristotle. Norman also does not discuss the nature of the object of divine 
nous. Thus, his account of Aristotle's theory of noetic activity seems to raise more 
questions than it answers. 
Metaphysics XII. 7 is not about the nature of divine noetic activity but 
Metaphysics XII. 9 is designed to discuss the nature of divine noetic activity. Thus I 
shall be primarily concerned here with the nature of divine noetic activity as I continue 
to deal with Norman's claim that divine and human thinking are of the same kind. 
At the beginning of Metaphysics XII. 9 we are told that the Unmoved mover is 
the most divine thing (theiotaton). In other words, God is conceived by Aristotle as die 
measure of absolute divinity. It is what is to be God. Aristotle also insists that thinking 
must be of something. If thinking is not of something, one cannot speak of thinking at 
all. Thus he excludes at the outset that the intellect thinks nothing. Thinking must be of 
something. The reason for this is that the intellect which thinks nothing is also nothing. 
It is no better than a sleeping person. Aristotle's insistence that the intellect must think 
of something has a crucial importance to his account of thinking in general. It brings 
out the fact that external reality is essential to the human thinking. Even God cannot 
escape from the fact that it must think of something. It is also consistent with De 
Anima's insistence that activities and faculties are determined by their objects. It also 
turns out to be crucial to explain the real difference between divine noetic activity and 
the individual noetic activity. If one speaks of the sameness of divine nous and the 
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individual human nous, one has to deal with the objects of thought in both cases. God 
cannot have objects of the changeable world as its object of thought because this will 
bring the question of change to it. On the other hand, the individual human noes cannot 
have God as its object of thought for it is simply unable to do so. Human thought is 
bound to be sequential and moves from thought to thought. This is something the divine 
nous does not do. Although it is possible to attribute some form of non-discursive noetic 
activity to the individual, it is hard to think that this will be identical with divine noetic 
activity. For Aristotle emphasises that the ousia of divine nous is energeia. He also 
argues that if the object of divine thought is of a changeable nature, it would be only for 
the worse, for change always signifies imperfection, incompleteness which cannot be 
thought of as divine nous. 9 
It seems to be the case that it is impossible to remove change from human 
theoretical thinking because the individual human nous is in essence a potentiality to 
think. When it is in the state of energeia it could be so for a short period of time, for 
simply, ontological determination of the individual human nous cannot sustain thinking 
continuously and any contemplative activity of the individual human notes is bound to 
change when it shifts from A to B. This surely signifies a change in the individual 
human nous, so that the reality of the changeable nature of the objects of human thought 
remains to be a fact of human thinking (1074b 22-23). The question of continuity and 
discontinuity may after all indicate that human nous and divine nous are not of the same 
nature. Thus human noetic activity may not also correspond to divine noetic activity. 
Let us take a much closer look at the claim that the Unmoved Mover thinks only 
of the most divine, honoured thing (theiotaton and timiotaton) and its thought does not 
change (ou metabollet). Aristotle continues his preoccupation with the nature of the 
Unmoved mover by saying that if it is not pure energeia but is of some sort of 
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potentiality, then it is reasonable to infer that the continuity of its thinking activity would 
be tiresome (1074b 28-29). The real issue here is to show that if the intellect thinks 
something different, it means that it has the potentiality to change. It is also true that if 
the ousia of the intellect is potentiality it would not make any difference to say that it 
thinks the same object continuously. For the thinking activity of such an intellect would 
be still tiring. It still has to move from a potential state to its actual exercise: in other 
words, it would move from one state to another. If it is the case that the noetic activity 
of the Unmoved Mover is not tiring in any sense, it is also true that it does not suffer 
from the slightest change. This also indicates that there is a certain relation between the 
quality of noetic activity and the ontological determination of a being. 
Aristotle also insists that there is an intrinsic relation between the object of 
thought and the intellect. If the object of intellect changes it will again imply change in 
the intellect and the object of the intellect will also determine the nature of the intellect. 
He expresses the point by saying that "... there must be something else which is more 
excellent than Mind (noun), i. e. the object of thought" (1074b 29-30). Aristotle goes on 
to pursue the point by stating that: 
... for both thought and the act of thinking will 
belong even to the 
thinker of the worst thoughts. Therefore, if this is to be avoided (as it is, 
since it is better not to see some things than to see them), thinking cannot 
be the supreme good. 1° 
This brings us to Aristotle's famous and allegedly difficult formulation of the 
divine noetic activity in Metaphysics at 1074b 33-35. Aristotle tells us there that the 
Unmoved Mover is the highest thing and it thinks itself. Its thinking is a thinking of 
thinking. Norman denies that the famous conclusion at 1074b 33-5 has anything to do 
with any self-contemplation. Instead, he claims that the formulation of divine thinking 
"as noeseos noesis" refers to abstract theoretical thinking. Of course this is the result of 
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reading De Anima 111.4 into Metaphysics XII. 7, i. e. that divine and individual human 
noetic activity are the same in kind. However, as I have tried to show, that may not be 
the case and there remains an open possibility that human noetic activity may be 
different from the divine noetic activity. 
Firstly "auton noel"; `the intellect thinks itself', does not automatically refer to 
abstract thinking but, even if it does, there is no reason to think that divine noetic 
activity is therefore identical with the individual noetic activity, for the real issue is not 
that theoretic thought is divine but that divine noun is the highest thing. Aristotle tells us 
in De Anima III. 4 that the intellect which thinks itself has its objects without matter. 
However, Aristotle never says that the objects of thought without matter are of being the 
highest or most divine and honoured things. There is also nothing in De Anima 111.4 to 
say that the objects of thought without matter are common to both the human and divine 
nous. Another important point is that Metaphysics XII. 9 never tells us anything of the 
objects of divine nous. As was said before, the Unmoved Mover is the most divine 
thing and its object is the most divine and honoured thing (1074b 16 and 1074b 26). 
There is direct connection between the ontological status of divine noun and its thinking 
activity. This is also true of the individual human nous and its noetic activity. 
It is important to note that the formulation of divine thinking as noeseos noesis is 
rather extraordinary and is not used anywhere else to describe theoretical thinking, let 
alone in connection with human thinking. Another crucial point in the formulation of 
divine noetic activity is that there is no bridge between the divine noes and the activity 
of divine nous, because Unmoved Mover signifies the perfect example of the term nous. 
It is what it is to be Nous. The nature of such a Nous is also described by the term 
energeia. It is perfect energeia. Unmoved Mover or God is what it is to be energeia in 
the perfect sense. In other words, God is nous and energeia and as such its thinking 
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activity is of nothing but itself. There is no change in it. It has no potentiality in it. It 
does not, and cannot, bother itself with something less valuable, therefore it is wrong to 
say that Unmoved Mover thinks all the highest truths that we sometimes do. For 
Aristotle does not appear to indicate anywhere that the objects of divine nous are the 
same as those of human nous so that God thinks them always whereas we sometimes 
do. " 
Just as in the case of sensation, the intellect is brought into actuality by the 
object. That is why it would not be wrong to say that the knower in thinking and the 
perceiver in sensation have a sort of passive role with regard to the object. Aristotle is, 
I believe, very much aware of this point. All thinking needs an object. For all thought 
must be of something. And after all Aristotle defines thinking as something like being 
affected. 
Conception of thinking in this way has lead Aristotle to claim that even the 
Unmoved Mover cannot escape from this necessity. It must think of something which 
does not change. For change in the object would imply change in the thinker. If what 
is best and does not change is only the Unmoved Mover than it thinks of itself. The 
object of thought of the Unmoved Mover is itself which happens to be thought. Add 
the fact that the act of thought is eternal and in virtue of this the last trace of 
distinction between thought and its object vanishes. The Unmoved Mover and its 
essence is for ever one. 
Now let us return to the discussion given at 1075a 5-10 and 1074b 35 - 107a 5 
where Aristotle explicitly deals with the difference between human and divine thinking as 
thinking of thinking. Aristotle first deals with the question that knowledge, perception, 
opinion and understanding are of something else, but in the case of theoretical sciences, 
knowledge and the object of knowledge are the same, so long as objects are without 
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matter. Therefore, it is true to say that in this context knowing and known are identical. 
Norman regards these lines as conclusive evidence to establish the identity of human lions 
with divine nits. However, that is not the case at all: it should be recalled that matter 
always signifies change and objects without matter exclude any sort of change. In this 
context, then, human raus which has its object without matter is not also subject to change. 
Thinking as energeia, even in the human case, precludes any movement and as such, when 
the human raus thinks, it is identical with what it thinks with. However, this identity of 
human rrous with its object does not last for a long period of time. It is like touching 
something; it is touching reality in fact. It has nothing to do with contemplation of the 
highest truths, for contemplation of the highest truths is bound to be contemplation through 
propositions, and propositions are not reality itself but surely the expression of it. 12 
Norman is not alone in rejecting the formulation of divine thinking as noeseos 
noesis. Anscombe also disregards the formula by saying that it is an absurdity that results 
from one of Aristotle's dialectical passages. There is no obvious evidence that the passage 
is of a dialectical nature; it is also wrong to assume that 1074b 35 - 1075a 5 represents 
Aristotle's final thoughts on the subject matter. There is nothing to prove that Aristotle 
hesitates to formulate divine thinking as thinking of thinking. He saves the formula by 
raising and removing objections to it. One can be inclined to interpret the formulation 
of noeseos noesis differently but it is clearly designed to explain the nature of divine 
thinking. 
In the final lines of Metaphysics XII. 9 Aristotle is concerned with the contrast 
between divine and human notes. First of all, he asks whether the object of divine nous 
can be composite or not (suntheton). If it is composite, such an object of thought 
necessarily implies that it changes from part to part of the whole. It has already been 
said that any kind of change has been excluded from the Unmoved Mover. To the 
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question of whether the object of divine noes can be conceptually composite, Ross 
replies that these will be objects of scientific knowledge and will be thought by 
discursive thought (dianoia) instead of nous. 'z The conclusion is that, whatever else is 
considered to be theoretical thinking, it cannot contain objects of science. As Wedin 
says, "if what results from any combination of thoughts counts as a syntheton, then 
precious little human thinking remains, even as a candidate for identification with divine 
thought". " Thus it is not evident that the human thinking is no different from divine 
thinking. j5 Although Aristotle ascribes to abstract thinking an important role in De 
Anima 111.4, nowhere does he explicitly say that human theoretical thinking is immune 
from change, whereas change is denied to divine noas in Metaphysics at 1075a 6. It 
should also be remembered that Aristotle after all defines thinking as something like 
being affected. The possibility of change, in fact, has never been excluded both from 
the individual human nous and the individual human noetic activity. 
Let us now deal with the question of indivisibility in relation to our subject 
matter. Aristotle says that everything which has no matter is to be considered 
indivisible. Firstly, it is possible to distinguish two types of indivisibility: the one 
corresponding to human thinking, and the other to divine thinking. Again, this division 
finely corresponds to characterisation of human thought as energeia and divine thought 
as energeia. In the former case, change (kinesis) and energeia form the aspect of 
human thinking whereas in the latter it is considered to be pure energeia. It should also 
be recalled that divine nous as pure energeia contains its end within itself. It is 
complete, perfect. On the contrary, the potential human nous is directed to reach or to 
be energeia. Even then, it is not immune to change, it cannot go on thinking 
continuously. Human thinking happens in a certain period of time even though it thinks 
of things which are timeless. 16 
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Aristotle speaks of actual and potential indivisibles in De Anima 111.6,430b 6- 
16. Although it is possible that human noes may contemplate an actual individual object 
in a single period of time, nevertheless the object remains potentially a divided object. 
This is why the human type of indivisibles contain a source of change as far as human 
thinking is concerned, whereas this cannot be the case for the divine type of indivisibles. 
In addition, the human type of undivided object is open, to be grasped in terms of its 
parts in two different periods of time, i. e. a divided object can be grasped in an 
undivided thought. As has been shown, neither of these is to be applied to divine 
thinking for they both contain a source of potentiality. 
One must also bear in mind that human and divine nous do not share the same 
ontological status in Aristotle. It also appears that the source of confusion in many 
interpretations of Aristotle's theory of noetic activity derives from the misconception of 
the concept of nous in Aristotle, particularly human and divine nous. Aristotle states 
that we are composite beings so that we must grasp everything in a certain period of 
time, which is why the human type of thinking indivisibles cannot escape from the 
threat of potentiality and change. Aristotle asserts at De Memoria at 50a 7-9 that human 
thinking occurs in time: "Why it is impossible to think of anything without continuity, 
or to think of things which are timeless except in terms of time, .... 
" (450 a 7-9). The 
crucial point here is that since we are composite beings we can only grasp everything 
in a certain period of time In virtue of this it has been suggested that the undivided 
objects of De Anima 111.6,430 614-15 cannot be thought of apart from continuity and 
time. " (Berti, 1978,151-154). 
Aristotle speaks of in Physics 2216-4 what always exists (IQ aiei onla) as 
beings which are not in time. He mentions the incommensurability of a diagonal as 
always existing thing (222 a 4). It is not difficult to see that human thought of such 
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objects contains potentiality. In De Anima 111.6 Aristotle distinguishes the 
incommensurable from diagonal and what results from their combination. It is obvious 
that in that case syrrtheton will hardly be a candidate as an object of divine thought. 
Thus it follows from this passage that any indivisible object of human thinking is 
necessarily a potentially divisible object. The same objection also applies to De Anima 
111.6,430b 14-15. Even the undivided object of De Anima 111.6 cannot be thought of apart 
from continuity. " Thus it is obvious that divine rious cannot have the undivided objects of 
human nous as its object. 18 
What has been said so far clearly indicates that the objects of human thinking 
cannot be the objects of divine nous. It seems to be wrong, therefore, to claim that we 
sometimes engage in the same activity of divine nous that it always engages in. The 
state of energeia in which Unmoved Mover is in, is eternal. We can be in this state 
sometimes when we overcome the kinetic side of our thinking. Nevertheless, it is bound 
to be episodic: our thinking activity should not be taken to be divine absolutely but it 
may be understood in terms of as-if divinity. The nature of divine noetic activity and 
the individual noctic activity remains importantly different. The formulation of divine 
thinking as noeseos noesis sharply distinguishes human thinking from divine thinking. 19 
The Unmoved Mover must think itself so that it does not even suffer from the slightest 
change. 
The interpretation of De Anima III. 4 and 5 in connection with Metaphysics XII. 7 
and 9,1 have proposed, importantly diverges from any interpretation which assumes that 
human and divine nous are identical. It also disagrees with any minimalist account of 
Aristotle's theory of divine noetic activity which succeeds in making Aristotle's theory 
of divine thinking not only difficult but also enigmatic. As Aristotle says at the 
beginning of Metaphysics, all individuals desire to know. The desire to know consti- 
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tutes our kinetic side of knowing effort, but this desire is directed to know things 
including ourselves. Perhaps Kal is right in identifying knowing with non-discursive 
noetic activity and searching with discursive. 20 
I am not particularly concerned with the place of divine nous in the universe but 
to understand the conception of it. Aristotle says in Metaphysics XII. 7 that divine noes 
is what it is and that it is simple (haplous 1072b 13). Thus it is the only being that is 
eternal, is not subject to any sort of change. We find nothing in Metaphysics XII. 9 
about the epistemological role for the divine nous. 
Norman and Kahn insist that it is impossible to make any sense of Aristotle's 
theory of noetic activity unless one assumes that divine nous is identical with the human 
nous. Norman therefore says that: 
The further point I wish to make is that this interpretation (minimalist 
one) lends an air of unnecessary absurdity to the whole account. It 
suggests that the Prime Mover is a sort of heavenly Narcissus, who looks 
around for the perfection which he wishes to contemplate, finds nothing 
to rival his own self, and settles into a posture of permanent self- 
admiration. 2' 
Norman's account of Aristotle's theory of noetic activity is based on the sameness of 
divine noetic activity with human noetic activity. I have tried to argue that one can only 
speak of as-if divinity of human nous and its noetic activity. Aristotle nowhere grants 
full-blown divinity to human noun, so it does not seem to be possible to claim that 
divine nous and human noun are the same in kind, and the same might be said of noetic 
activity. The ontological difference between the two may point to the difference 
between human and divine noetic activity. In contrast to Norman, the activity of the 
Unmoved Mover does not have to be the summum bonum of human life. Aristotle says 
no such thing in Nicomachean Ethics X or anywhere else. 22 
It is true that the real self is identified with noes by Aristotle and we are advised 
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to act in a divine way, but the activity of imitatio dei may also be understood as no more 
than realising ourselves as a noetic being. Bees, plants, heavenly bodies try to imitate 
divinity but this does not mean that they yearn to be what God is. Imitatio dei is 
perhaps just a realisation of our noetic nature. We can imitate divine activity by 
engaging in active thinking, reaching the state of energeia. 23 In other words, the human 
non-discursive noetic activity might be the closest sort of divine noetic activity that we 
can engage in but this is surely far from proving that our noetic activity is the same as 
divine non-discursive noetic activity. 
7. Conclusion 
Minimalist and Maximalist interpretations of Aristotle's theory of human and 
divine noetic activity have been unable to capture the real insight into what Aristotle 
says on the subject in De Anima, Ethics and Metaphysics. The reason behind their 
failure is that both interpretations pay almost no attention to the different uses of the 
term noun by Aristotle, nor his application to the term energeia / entelecheia in different 
cases. They mostly rely on Aristotle's use of language in terms of as-if divinity. As a 
result of this Maximalist interpretation, the human and divine nous are mistakenly 
identified with each other as the content of their thinking. On the other hand, the 
Minimalist interpretation does nothing but succeed in making divine notes and its activity 
extraordinarily enigmatic. In the end, both the Maximalist and Minimalist 
interpretations of Aristotle's theory of noetic activity have produced endless arguments 
and thus they have moved further away from the possibility of discovering the real 
nature of non-discursive noetic activity in Aristotle. 24 
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VI THEORIA, ENERGEIA AND EUDAIMONIA 
The understanding of Aristotle's conception of discursive and non-discursive 
thinking through the analysis of the term energeia / entelecheia, nous has shown us that 
non-discursive noetic activity is not an enigmatic activity of notes. As far as the human 
non-discursive noetic activity is concerned, it describes one of the loftiest achievements 
of the individual. In this chapter I shall try to elucidate the relationship between theoria, 
energeia and eudaimonia. By doing so I hope to prove that Aristotle does not conceive 
the individual noetic human life as a long motion. 
1. On the Meaning of Theoria 
We are told at 1177a 25-27 that philosophy contains the most precious pleasures 
which are not of kinetic nature at all. Thus it is reasonable to think that the life of those 
who have achieved active thinking is superior to that of those who seek. The term 
theoria is generally translated into English as contemplation or apprehension. However, 
this does not capture the meaning of the term theoria in Aristotle. In the tenth book of 
the Nicomachean Ethics theoria denotes the activity which is also the highest good for 
an individual. In addition to being the highest good, it is also the acme of happiness for 
an individual. Thus it is obvious that one needs to know what theoria means in 
Aristotle. 
There are two differing views of this, which I shall call static and kinetic. 
According to the former, theoria does not include scientific and philosophical inquiry. 
It restricts theoria merely to the contemplation of knowledge already gained. The 
proponents of this view rely essentially on the sentence from Nicomachean Ethics that I 
have just referred to above. Thus Barnes writes that: 
Aristotelian contemplation is not, as we might be tempted to imagine, an 
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exercise in discursive reasoning, it is not a matter of intellectual questioning or research; 
it is not a matter of moving by logical inference from known premises to hitherto 
unknown conclusions. (Barnes, J. Ethics, 38,1976) 
As an argument for the thesis that the contemplator enjoys himself, Aristotle 
observes that those who know actively have a more pleasant life than those who search 
(1 177a 26); evidently then, contemplators are not seekers of wisdom but possessors of 
it. The Aristotelian contemplator is one who has already acquired knowledge, ' 
furthermore one who has achieved a life of noetic activity (energeia). 
Barnes is not alone in taking this view of theoria. Earlier, Ross had also 
defended the view that the happy life is the life of contemplation, not the life of 
searching. ' Hardie thinks that Aristotle is actually creating "a startling paradox". He 
refers to Gauthier and Jolif to prove that Aristotle eliminates discovery from the 
contemplative life. 3 
There is however, a recent tendency, which I call the kinetic view, to include 
scientific and philosophical inquiry in theoria. According to those who take this view, 
whilst the completion of the task can be desired for its own sake, this does not mean that 
the activity of completing cannot also be desired for its own sake. Those who wish to 
include the process of inquiry in theoria are, I believe, doctrinally motivated. They 
think that the modern scientist would agree with them. They claim that pleasure does 
also lie in the process of inquiry. So intellectual excitement cannot merely be confined 
either to the discovery of truth or to the contemplation of it. 4 
Sorabji also writes in favour of the kinetic view, claiming that: 
Part of the pleasure of philosophical activity is emerging from the state of 
perplexity which Aristotle describes in Metaphysics 1.2 (98 2b 11). Aristotle's God who 
has always known and contemplated the truth, has missed this peculiar philosophical 
excitement. If we too had been so born or so educated that we never got into a state of 
perplexity, we should I think, have missed something of value. -' 
I believe that the defenders of the kinetic view and their opponents - who hold 
what I call the 'static view' - are both mistaken in their interpretation of theoria. The 
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reason is that they pay almost no attention to Aristotle's conception of nous. They are 
almost silent on De Anima 3.5 where Aristotle explicitly deals with how thinking comes 
out. Aristotle's view on nous and thinking in Metaphysics is merely overlooked. As a 
result of this, the meaning of theoria in Aristotle, particularly in Nicomachean Ethics, is 
constantly misrepresented. 
Aristotle says in several places that we have some divine element in us that turns 
out to be nous. But this does not mean that we sometimes think of things that God 
always thinks of. We are not completely absorbed in the godhead. The search for truth 
constitutes an important part of the rational human being. So if theoria means the 
contemplation of everything we are simply incapable of it. Although contemplation 
might play an important role in preserving knowledge, but Aristotle certainly would not 
approve of only sitting and contemplating a piece of knowledge that one has already 
acquired (De Anima II 5). Bonitz reminds us that the term theoria is used 
interchangeably with skepsis. ' 
Allan appears to be right in saying that there are different meanings of theoria. ' 
Aristotle speaks of practical, productive and theoretical science. He includes natural 
science among the theoretical sciences, since it is pursued to acquire knowledge for its 
own sake. Thus Aristotle describes the natural scientist as phusikos the6retikos. 8 And 
we are told at Metaphysics 993b 20-23 that although theoretical science is concerned 
with truth practical science aims at action. It also appears that theoria can signify a 
particular branch of study. Aristotle says that "these things are the subject of a different 
theoria". 9 However, it can also mean its investigation in writing, simply a book. The 
example comes from Historia Animalium at 589a 20 where Aristotle says that "as was 
stated in the theoria on plants". 
Although the term theoria seems to have different meanings in Aristotle, 
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theorein primarily meant 'to see' or 'observe'. And some uses in Aristotle of the term 
theoria and theorein can also mean 'observation' and 'observe'. In Nicomachean 
Ethics I 169b 33-34 Aristotle says that it is easier to observe our neighbours than 
ourselves. It would be rather odd to translate this as contemplation. Joachim writes, on 
the meaning of the term theoria, that: 
Man's attitude of mind is contemplation (theöria), the formal habit of thinking 
which gets established in him is theoretical science (thedretike episteme), and the thought 
which is at work in him is theoretical reason (dianoia the6retike). 1 ° All theoretical or 
speculative inquiries, all sciences as we use the term, fall under the heading of 
'theoretical sciences'. The 'scientific man', in this restricted sense of the term, is 
entirely concerned with knowing or understanding. He plays the part of a spectator of 
what is - and is independently of him. He neither desires nor is able to alter the truth of 
things. When the objects of his study are subject to change - when, for example, lie is 
investigating natural phenomena - he tries to watch the process, not to modify it, except 
in so far as experimental modification helps him to understand. " 
2. The Relation Between Theoria, Energeia and Kinesis 
I believe that it is essential to understand what Aristotle means by theoria, 
energeia and kinesis, since in Nicomachean Ethics (Book X chapter 7) Aristotle says that 
it is theoria that is eudaimonia. His definition of eudainwnia leaves out kinesis. In fact 
perfect happiness cannot be identified with kinesis at all. It is important to see why. '2 
In Metaphysics IX. 6 Aristotle states that energeia and kinesis are of different 
natures. Although energeia describes what is perfect and is an end in itself, kinesis is 
directed toward an end and is imperfect. In other words, it is determined and 
characterised by an end which is completely external to it. Therefore, kinesis is not and 
cannot be something complete (teleia) (1048b 18-22). 
The distinction between energeia and kinesis plays a very important role in 
Aristotle's metaphysics and his physics and it cannot be denied that it is also crucial to 
his ethics. A kinesis is directed toward an end outside itself. Thus it cannot be an 
ultimate end of human life. The ultimate end of human life must be some energeia. 
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And Aristotle uses being happy as an example of an energeia in Metaphysics IX. 6. 
Furthermore, in Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle defines the ultimate telos of human life as 
theoria and describes it as the most important human noetic activity (1177a 19-21). 
3. Theoretical Activity and the Nature of its Divinity 
In the tenth book of Nicomachean Ethics, particularly in Chapter 8, Aristotle 
comes to conclude that the philosophical life is best amongst other sorts of lives, for it 
consists of theoria and the theoretical nous is the best part in us. Philosophical life as 
such resembles the kind of life that the gods have. Aristotle claims that of all living 
beings, they are the ones who live in perfect happiness (1178b 8-9). Aristotle excludes 
them from any sort of practical activity. The only life they have is the life of theoria. 
... the activity (energeia) of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be (theöretike) contemplative; and of human activities (energeia), therefore, that which 
is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness (eudaimonikotate). This is 
indicated, too, by the fact that the other animals have no share in happiness, being 
completely deprived of such activity. For while the whole of the gods is blessed, and 
that of men too in so far as some likeness of such activity belongs to them, none of the 
other animals is happy, since they in no way share in contemplation (theoria). 
Happiness extends then, just so far as noetic activity does, and those to whom noetic 
activity more fully belongs are more truly happy, not as a more concomitant but in 
virtue of noetic activity; for this is in itself precious. Happiness therefore, must be some 
form of noetic activity. 13 
Those who work mostly on Aristotle's ethics busy themselves about whether Aristotle 
claims that those who are more involved in noetic activity also have more happiness or 
not. This is because those who perceive Aristotle in the way just indicated do not seem 
to have taken into account De Anima and Metaphysics where Aristotle tells us why he 
thinks that the life of God is the paradigm of happiness as a noetic being. 
This is why it is essential to go back to Metaphysics as well as De Anima. But 
here I only wish to discuss what Aristotle says on the nature of God in Book XII of 
Metaphysics. 
We are told in chapters 6 and 7 that the Unmoved Mover (God) is a substance 
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whose ousia is activity and matterless. It exists necessarily, and is the finest of things. 
Of course it thinks itself and its thinking is a thinking of thinking. This is in contrast 
with human thinking which is relative to a definite context of thought. It is not, say 
Selena, that thinks herself but it is Selena's intellect that thinks itself. What this means 
is that the human being is not aware of its intellect directly but only by thinking of 
objects which are external. This is as close as one can get to one's own intellect. 
If this is the case it would be wrong to assume any possibility of direct mental 
grasp of the self as a thinking substance. But this is not to say that Aristotle rejects the 
notion of self-consciousness. In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle states that we perceive 
that we perceive and think that we think. It is obvious that the passage countenances 
self-consciousness for individuals. Thus, to be aware of myself as perceiving or 
thinking is merely to be aware that I am perceiving or thinking. 
But when we come to the Unmoved Mover the situation is different. It is not 
something that it has an intellect but it is intellect, it is not aware of itself through 
perceiving or thinking. Secondly the Unmoved Mover is a particular, so the 
requirement that thought must be about universals does not apply to it, for it is a 
particular being. Thirdly, it is pure energeia and as such it seems to be entirely different 
from the individual human being. 
The Unmoved Mover certainly does not think of objects that ordinary 
individuals think of. And it is particularly important that it does not eternally think of 
the objects that we episodically think of (as Alexander and certain neo-Alexandrians 
think) (see Chapter V). 
Since Unmoved Mover is incomposite, it must also think something 
incomposite. Also Unmoved Mover has no potentiality for change, so it can only think 
itself. Assume that it were to think two incomposites, for instance A and B. Either it 
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thinks these two incomposite objects in combination or in separation. If it thinks these 
in combination, then it cannot think itself. If it thinks them in separation then it would 
not be incomposite. This is why Aristotle asserts that its thinking must be nothing other 
than a thinking of thinking. It is for this reason that in Book XII of Metaphysics at 
1074b 33-35 Aristotle discards the use of 'that' and says that it is thinking of thinking 
(noesis noeseos). Obviously the latter phrase does not necessitate the plurality and 
externality of the objects of thought for the Unmoved mover. The object of Unmoved 
Mover is itself, and when it thinks itself it does so directly. Let us now quote the 
passage where Aristotle also connects this sort of thinking with the highest pleasure 
which is enjoyed by Unmoved Mover: 
Such, then, is the finest principle upon which depends the sensible universe and 
the world of nature. And its life is like the best which we temporarily enjoy. It must be 
in that state always (which for us is impossible), since its actuality (energeia) is also 
pleasure. (And for this reason waking, sensation and thinking are most pleasant, and 
hopes and memories are pleasant because of them. ) Now thinking in itself is concerned 
with that which is in itself best, and thinking in the highest sense with that which is in 
the highest sense best. And thought thinks itself through participation in the object of 
thought; for it becomes an object of thought by the act of apprehension and thinking. 
So please retain that thought and the object of thought are the same because that which 
is receptive of the object of thought ie., essence, is thought. And it actually functions 
when it possesses this object. Hence it is actuality (energeia) rather than potentiality that 
is held to be the divine possession of rational thought, and its active contemplation 
(theoria) is that which is most pleasant and best. If, then, the happiness which God 
always enjoys is as great as that which we enjoy sometimes, it is marvellous; and if it is 
greater, this is still more marvellous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life belongs to 
God. For the actuality of thought (the activity of the noes is life) is life, and God is that 
actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. We hold, 
then, that God is a living being, eternal, most good; and therefore life and a continuous 
eternal existence belongs to God; for that is what God is. 14 
At the beginning of the passage that I have just quoted above Aristotle says 
that 'God's life is like the best we enjoy for a brief spell' (1072 b 4). To deny this 
would be to spoil the spirit of what Aristotle writes. 
But, the individual human being, like other physical beings, is a compound of 
matter and form, a syntheton (XII. 11). And the soul of the individual human being is 
the actuality of the body. However, nous appears to be different from the soul. He 
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writes in De Generation Animalium that 'frous comes from outside and is alone 
divine, for no bodily activity has any role in the activity of noes' (736 b 27-29). 
Thus it appears that it is difficult to distinguish human nous from divine 'raus. 
This is also true of human and divine noetic activity. However, it should be noted that 
human Woos is a capacity to be activated, like everything else in the physical world by 
the attraction of the Unmoved Mover who, unlike the individual human being, is pure 
energeia and eternal. 
Before going further I would like to point out that when Aristotle says that God's 
activity (energeia) is most pleasurable he identifies it with rest rather than motion. This is 
also the case with Nicomachean Ethics (1154b 26-280). But one should not forget that 
we, the individual noetic subjects, live in the world of motion (kinesis) and energeia. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle identifies the real with nuns and he also describes the activity of the 
real self in terms of energeia. However, the perfect paradigm of energeia is God, in 
which there is no kinesis. For change in the object would imply change in the thinker. 
What is best and does not change can only be itself and this is why Aristotle also 
identifies the real self in us with our nous. But there is always a gap between us and the 
world in which we live. Even so, we can still be happy through participating in the 
activity of theoria that cannot be continuous and eternal as is divine theoria. The 
pleasure of noetic activity (theoria) lies not in my thinking that I am thinking of a given 
object but rather simply in my thinking the object. In other words, theoria is complete 
immersion in the object that the individual human being can sustain for a short period of 
time. This is why the Unmoved Mover enjoys the greatest of pleasures; it is precisely 
because it is eternally and necessarily immersed in the object of its thought and need not 
suffer even the slightest distraction from thinking that is thinking. In its thinking the last 
trace of distinction or gap between thought and its object vanishes; their essence is for 
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ever one. 
4. Nous and the Real Self 
It is important to recall again that the term nous is employed by Aristotle in 
several different contexts. That is why, if one does not distinguish its various uses, one 
cannot find anything in Aristotle but inconsistency, contradiction and confusion. 
Aristotle says that the ethically virtuous individual loves himself / herself and at 
1168b 35 he also tells us that such a person loves his/her notes more than anything else. 
It is generally agreed that Aristotle here refers to the part of the soul that allows a person 
to be in control of his/her life. But in Book X of Nicomachean Ethics at 1177a 13 and 
1178a 7 nous signifies the part of the soul that is responsible for theoretical reasoning. 
And at 1169a 2 Aristotle states that each person is to be identified with this part of the 
soul 
My aim here is not to discuss whether Aristotle is right in his claim that a person 
is to be identified with his practical or theoretical noes, but to point out that the term 
nous is used in more than one sense. 
Now I would like to turn to the tenth book of Nicomachean Ethics where 
Aristotle defends the life of theoria and identifies the real self with the theoretical part of 
the soul. At 1178a 2 Aristotle says that a person is his/her nous. It is clear from the 
context that he identifies an individual with theoretical nous whereas he has said 
previously that a person is to be identified with his/her practical reason ([X. 8). 
I do not believe that Aristotle contradicts himself on the matter or changes his 
mind. He simply tries to distinguish different types of lives in accordance with different 
sorts of activity of noes. It would have been rather odd for Aristotle to say that the 
theoretical life is superior to all other types of life at the beginning of his inquiry into 
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eudaimonia. However, the tenth book of Nicomachean Ethics represents the end of his 
ethical inquiry where Aristotle shares his discovery of the perfect life with us and this is 
the life activity that is also called perfect happiness. 
In chapters VII and VIII of the tenth book of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tries 
to elucidate his conception of happiness and finally asks whether the political or the 
philosophical life is best. There are three types of the self-lover: 
i) the lover of theoretical nous; 
ii) the lover of practical nous; 
iii) the lover of external goods. 
However, he makes it clear that a person is to be identified with his/her theoretical sous; 
since it is a real self and the person who loves himself/herself most of all is the 
philosopher. Why Aristotle thinks that theoretical nous is the best part of the soul in us 
requires an investigation into his theory of thinking. I have already dealt with this in 
Chapter V. 
5. Perfect Happiness and Theoria 
In the sixth chapter of Book X of Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle finally gives free 
rein to his own inclinations. He has already dealt with the virtues, friendship and 
pleasure, it is now time to give a full response to the question of what is happiness. 
What is the final aim of human life and what sort of life should be called a happy life 
(1176a 31-32)? 
He briefly reminds us of what he has already said in Book I at 1032a 30-61 and 
b 24-25. Eudaimonia is not a state but an activity (energeia) which is chosen for its 
own sake. Here it is also important to recall the distinction between energeia and 
kinesis. While the former is complete and is its own end, kinesis is imperfect because of 
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its incompleteness, in that it has its purpose beyond itself. But happiness is self 
sufficient. Everything else is chosen for the sake of something in human life but 
happiness has no end beyond itself. It is not chosen for some further end. Although 
happiness is pleasure, pleasurable, nevertheless it is different from any sort of 
amusement. Amusements are a form of relaxation and as such they are necessary since 
we cannot go on working continuously. However, they are not energeiai and in virtue 
of this they are not ends in themselves. In the light of what has been said Aristotle goes 
on to say that: 
But if happiness consist in activity (energeia) in accordance with virtue, it is 
reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will 
be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the intellect, or whatever else 
it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is 
noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or being relatively the 
divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue 
proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness (teleia eudaimonia); and it has been 
stated already that this is the activity of noetic activity. " 
After identifying teleia eudairnonia with active theoria Aristotle continues his 
explanation of the nature of perfect happiness by saying that: 
And that happiness consists in noetic activity may be accepted as agreeing both 
with the results already reached and with the truth. For noetic activity is at once the 
highest form of activity (energeia) (since the intellect is the highest thing in us, and the 
objects with which the intellect deals are the highest things that can be known), and also 
it is the most continuous, for we can reflect more continuously than we can carry any 
form of action. And again we suppose that happiness must contain an element of 
pleasure; now activity in accordance with wisdom is admittedly the most pleasant of the 
activities in accordance with virtue: at all events it is held that philosophy or the pursuit 
of wisdom contains pleasures of marvelous purity and permanence, and it is reasonable 
to suppose that the enjoyment of knowledge is a still pleasanter occupation than the 
pursuit of it. Also the noetic activity will be found to possess in the highest degree the 
quality that is termed self sufficiency. 16 
In the first book of Nicomachean Ethics three ways of life were distinguished, 
namely the voluptuous, the political and the theoretical. The examination of the last one 
was left to a later stage. When we turn back to the tenth book of Nicomachean Ethics it 
is obvious that this last book represents the climax of the whole work. There is no 
inconsistency between what he says in Book X and what he has already said in Book I. 
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He just repeats the most essential point. The philosopher as human being needs also 
physical well being; for the composite nature of philosophy does not allow him/her to 
sustain himself on thought alone; good health, food and other practical necessities are 
indispensable. He must also act in accordance with justice, courage and all other 
virtues. For the philosopher is a human being and lives among other people. But the 
philosopher is the sort of person who does not aim to maximise his/her physical 
pleasures or practical needs. Instead the philosopher loves the best part of his/her soul 
and seeks to bring it to perfection. Therefore sufficiency does not require excess, and to 
display excellence "one need not be lord of land and sea". " 
Moreover happiness lies in leisure (schole). The purpose of being busy is to get 
leisure as the purpose of war is to have peace. Political activity has an end beyond 
itself, for it seeks either power or honours or at least to provide an environment in 
which his/her fellow citizens could be happy. However, political activity is itself 
unleisured. Only the philosophical life contains its end within itself and can provide the 
perfect 
Aristotle sums up the activity of noes at 1177b 19-26 by saying that it is an end 
in itself and has its own intrinsic pleasure. The activity of nous is also self sufficient and 
as free from kinesis as is humanly possible. As such it represents perfect happiness. 
But Aristotle is not completely certain of the conception of perfect happiness so 
described. Do not the poets and sages warn of the hybris of aiming too high, and the 
nemesis which follows it? Aristotle give a memorable reply to this question saying that: 
Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of 
his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine; 
and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so much as is 
its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is 
something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of intellect divine in comparison 
with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have a 
man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to 
achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest 
thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the 
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rest. It may even be held that this is the true self of each, in as much as it is the 
dominant and better part and therefore it would be a strange thing if a man should 
choose to live not his own life but the life of some other than itself. Moreover what was 
said before will apply here also: that which is best and most pleasant for each creature is 
that which is proper to the nature of each; accordingly the life of the intellect is the best 
and the pleasantest life for man, in as much as the intellect more than anything else is 
man; therefore this life will be the happiest. The life of moral virtue, on the other hand, 
is happy only in a secondary degree. ' 
The human being, like everything else in the world of change, is a compound of 
matter and form. In other words the human being is syntheton and it is the form which 
gives a syntheton its specific character and differentiates it from other things. It 
constitutes its essence (ousia). 19 But if that is the case why does Aristotle speak of two 
sorts of life, namely the life of nous and the life of virtue? 
According to Gauthier, here Aristotle does not compare or contrast two different 
sorts of life but they rather represent two integral parts of a single life. In other words 
Aristotle considers a single person's life which has two aspects. This interpretation is 
severely criticised by Cooper. He claims that in English and in French the Greek word 
bios refers to the two lives which are to be an integral part of a single person. One can 
lead a social as well as spiritual life. But he thinks this cannot be true because in Greek 
bios always means a mode of life and in any one period of time one can only have one 
mode of life. Hence, according to him, Aristotle contrasts an intellectual life with a 
moral life. As a result the Greek expressions, he argues, should be understood as 
referring to different lives led by two different kinds of persons. 20 
But I find it very hard to agree with Cooper because if a person is syntheton 
he/she will not be able to realise perfect activity of theoria in its ultimate sense. He or 
she can only engage in the highest activity of theoria as a composite human being. 
Therefore the life of an individual necessarily contains two aspects of life. 
It is not easy to grasp Aristotle's thought about the nature of nous. Although the 
distinctive mark of humanity is not found in the lower beings, the best thing in an 
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individual is nous and nous is the real self of an individual. But does this mean that the 
nous we have is of the same nature as the nous of God? If the answer is yes then it is 
hard to see what prevents us from leading a life like that of God (see particularly 
Chapter V section 6). 
Aristotle says that the ergon of the human being is to live according to the 
highest that is in it. But when he says this he does not mean that one has to lead a life 
of kinesis but to live a life activity, having the capacity to grow, to reproduce, to 
perceive. Aristotle is aware of the fact that we are clogged with matter and in virtue of 
this there are imperfections and hindrances in our life. On the other hand, God does not 
have any imperfection. God does not have to think anything except itself, whereas we 
have to struggle to activate even the best part, the divine-like part in us, namely noes, in 
the world of change. He also says that nous comes from outside and is alone divine 
since no bodily activity has any part in the activity of nous. 2' In virtue of this the 
activity of nous completely differs from that of perception, indeed from any other bodily 
activities: 
But that the perceptive and thinking faculties are not alike in their impassivity is 
obvious if we consider the sense organs and sensation. For the sense loses sensation 
under the stimulus of a too violent sensible object; e. g., of sound immediately after loud 
sounds, and neither seeing nor smelling is possible just after strong colours and scents; 
but when mind (nous) thinks the highly intelligible, it is not less able to think of slighter 
things, but even more able; for the faculty of sense is not apart from the body, whereas 
the mind (nous) is separable. 22 
I believe that understanding the different uses of the term nous is indispensable 
for understanding Aristotle. He nowhere says in Ethics that the notes of the human 
being is identical with the noes of God. Although in De Anima 111.5 he speaks of the 
nous poietikos, he does not say that it is of the human being, and the divine noetic 
activity certainly does not correspond to the human noetic activity. 
But I do not see anything incompatible with the idea that human nous is a faculty 
or dynamis that is activated, like everything else in the world, by the attraction of the 
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First Unmoved Mover, who unlike us, is pure nous, simple and active. At 1178b 8 
Aristotle argues that intellectual activity is best for a person. For we also think of God 
as happy and blessed so it would be ridiculous to ascribe to it any form of practical 
activity. No activity is superior to that of divine noetic activity. Thus he comes to say 
that those who cultivate and use their intellect are in the best condition and are also the 
favourite of God. 
And it seems likely that the man who pursues intellectual activity, and who 
cultivates his intellect and keeps that in the best condition, is also the man most beloved 
of the gods. For if, as is generally believed, the gods exercise some superintendence 
over human affairs, then it will be reasonable to suppose that they take pleasure in that 
part of man which is best and most akin to themselves, namely the intellect, and that 
they recompense with their favours those men who esteem and honour this most, 
because they care for the things dear to themselves, and act rightly and nobly. Now it is 
clear that all these attributes belong most of all to the wise man. He therefore is most 
beloved by the gods; and if so, he is naturally most happy. Here is another proof that 
the wise man is the happiest. 23 
6. Conclusion 
The theoretical psychology of De Anima does not seem to countenance that a 
human being is essentially godlike. Neither does Aristotle say anywhere in 
Nicomachean Ethics that the human nous is identical with divine nous even though he 
identifies each person with his/her own nous. It is precisely for this reason that the 
conception of happiness is to be based on human nature. But some think that Aristotle 
does draw a picture of a superhuman in the tenth book of Nicomachean Ethics. 21 
According to them, Aristotle claims that some individuals are potentially gods. But the 
history of humanity does not suggest we have been godlike at all. 
Imitatio dei does not necessarily mean that things yearn to be God or strive to 
partake of divinity in order to become a part of God but rather it means to become 
perfect, complete, through realising their essence (ousia). 
Only by doing can human beings actualise the divine element in themselves. We 
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can perfect ourselves by realising our nature but not by striving to become godlike. As 
Aristotle says in Nicomachean Ethics: 
... choice 
is certainly not a wish, though they appear closely akin. Choice 
cannot have for its object impossibilities: if a man were to say he chose something 
impossible he would be thought a fool; but we can wish for things that are impossible, 
for instance immortality. Z" 
We may wish to become like God but this is not within our power, for example like 
being immortal as Aristotle says above. 
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VII ON THE INTERPRETATIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S 
THEORY OF INTELLECT 
1. Greek Commentators 
The bounds of soul you would not discover, though travelling every road 
so deep a logos has it. Heraclitus 
As for the subject of nous, when and how and from what source it is 
acquired by those who share this principle, raises a most baffling 
problem, which we must endeavour to solve so far as our powers allow 
and so far as it is soluble. Aristotle GA 73665-8 
So far I have tried to argue that there is an intrinsic relation between Aristotle's 
concept of discursive and non-discursive noetic activity and the terms energeia / 
entelecheia and noun. Now I would like to examine the views of the Greek and Arabic 
commentators on Aristotle's theory of intellect with this fact in mind. The reason for 
doing so is to provide an insight into the possible interpretations of his teaching on the 
subject. In addittion from that, I would like to survey the views of Greek and Islamic 
commentators from a particular point, which is the conception of the nature of divine 
and human poetic activity, and the relation between divine and human noetic activity. 
The most famous, arguably most important and the most intensely studied 
sentences in the history of philosophy are those in Aristotle's De Anima, where he 
undertakes to explain how thinking happens and what thinking is. ' Yet it is fascinating 
to discover that even Aristotle's immediate disciples did not agree in their conception of 
what the intellect is and how thinking occurs. That is to say, they even had diverging 
views on the interpretation of what Aristotle says on the subject in De Anima. For 
example, Theophrastus and Eudemus were Aristotle's greatest disciples and followers 
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and they received their knowledge on the subject-matter directly from the philosopher. 
Thus, Theophrastus and Eudemus are sources of two diverging interpretations. Does 
this mean that it is impossible to give a well-founded exegesis of Aristotle's exposition 
of the intellect? I believe that the answer need not be affirmative. For centuries Greek, 
medieval, Islamic, Jewish, Christian and European philosophers pored over what 
Aristotle says, seeking the key for deciphering the essence of being human and the 
structure of the universe. ' 
2. The Intellect is the Principle of Knowledge: Theophrastus 
It is interesting to see how interpretation of De Anima 111.4 and 5 has been the 
source of controversy since the beginning. In these chapters Aristotle tries to explain 
how thinking happens, that is, how we are able to think. But generations of interpreters 
have busied themselves with these questions, which are the following: 
1. Are noes poietikos and noes pathetikos immaterial or not? 
2. Is the intellect the principle of knowledge or not? 
3. How do we participate in divine thinking which is non-discursive, if this is 
possible at all? 
In exposition of Theophrastus' view on De Anima 111.4 and 111.5 1 shall try to concen- 
trate mainly on the three questions put above. 
According to Theophrastus, Aristotle takes nous poietikos to be a part of human 
nature, and with this interpretation of Theophrastus, one could say that the way to 
identify the human intellect with God has been opened, as opposed to that of Eudemus, 
who has been reported to be the most faithful to his teacher, and who identifies the 
active intellect with God. Thus, Theophrastus and Eudemus have come to represent the 
two opposite views on De Anima 111.4 and 5 and they constitute the deepest division 
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between interpretations. As far as the subject-matter is concerned, Theophrastus 
understood that both the active and the passive intellect are to be taken to be immaterial 
in Aristotle. Secondly, he claims that nous poietikos and the notes pathetikos were 
something belonging to the individual human being. Finally, in Theophrastus' view, 
both intellects are considered to be essential constituents of an individual human being. ' 
Now let us discuss Theophrastus' view on the matter in some detail. 
He is very much concerned with the statement that thinking is an identification 
with the object of its knowledge. However, Aristotle also says that thinking resembles 
sensation and in this sense it is an affection. On the other hand, he also states that the 
intellect, but not its object, is the principle of knowledge. Further, the intellect has the 
power to initiate the act of knowing. It is obvious that in the first case thinking 
corresponds to sensation whereas in the second case the intellect is conceived as the 
principle of knowledge. In other words, the intellect has the power to initiate the 
process of thinking. The difference between the two understandings is then: 
A. i) Thinking is an identification with the object of knowledge. 
ii) Thinking is an affection - like sensation. 
B. i) The intellect is the principle of knowledge. 
ii) Thinking has its origin in the intellect. ' 
It is obvious that A is based on De Aninta 111.4 where Aristotle speaks of 
thinking in terms of affection, which runs parallel to sensation. On the other hand, B 
appears to refer to De Ani= 11.5 in which thinking is contrasted with sensation in that 
the intellect is the principle of knowledge, which also has the primary initiating power to 
know. ' 
One could, however, go against Theophrastus by pointing out that in De Aninia 
111.4 Aristotle states that the initiative to know only belongs to the intellect that has 
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knowledge and has it at its disposal. In other words, the intellect becomes capable of 
thinking the object at its will if, and only if, it has already gained the knowledge. But 
apart from that the intellect does not have the power to produce the knowledge. 
However, then we are faced with the statement of Posterior Analytics where Aristotle 
describes the intellect as the principle of science. It may be that in this statement 
Theophrastus' view of the intellect could find its justification. Aristotle says in 
Posterior Analytics that notts is the source of knowledge. ' But it appears that Aristotle is 
concerned there with the question, that is, if thinking is an activity of the intellect, could 
the starting-point required by thinking in turn be provided by the reasoning activity of 
the intellect? One might give a reply to the question by saying that the intellect (noes) is 
actually called a principle here because it has the potential to be affected, to gain 
knowledge. 7 
It is also true that in De Anima 11.12 the term principle is used of the faculty of 
sensation. Nevertheless, Aristotle does not mean that sensation is the principle of 
knowledge. It would also be wrong to ignore what Aristotle says about thinking in 
Metaphysics. ' Therefore, Theophrastus does not regard the term principle as equivalent 
to faculty. For it would be uninformative then to describe the faculty of sensation as the 
principle of sensation. In fact sensation is an affection. It is obvious that Theophrastus 
attaches a specific meaning to the tern principle but it would be wrong to confine his 
argument to certain passages in De Anima and Posterior Analytics. ' 
It appears, however, that Theophrastus does not consider the different uses of 
the term notes in Aristotle. It might be true to say that the intellect (noes) in charge of 
scientific inquiry could be a starting point of the thinking activity. But it is wrong to 
think that Theophrastus understands the term principle to denote the faculty of thinking 
or sensation. He attaches a special meaning to it and I believe his view could be traced 
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back to Aristotle. 10 
Now we will consider Theophrastus' characterisation of the human intellect in 
more detail. According to him, the human intellect contains a potential and a causative 
principle. " lt appears that in Theophrastus' account the human intellect is freed from 
the limitation of the objects of thinking. For the productive intellect in a sense is 
external to a human being, but nevertheless it is also embedded in human intellect from 
the beginning. ' 
Theophrastus considers that the mixture of the potential intellect with the active 
intellect in the human soul causes impurity on the part of the active intellect. The reason 
for this is that the human intellect does not always think, although he claims that the 
active intellect is present in the human soul once and for all. 13 
However, it seems to be impossible to see what role Theophrastus ascribes to the 
active principle, for we have only some fragments of his writings on this. The 
interpretation of Theophrastus by Priscianus allows us to say that the human intellect 
itself produces the objects of thinking from the matter-bound objects of knowledge. On 
this base Barbotin sees a theory of abstraction in Theophrastus, and naturally in 
Aristotle. However, Aristotle does not use the term abstraction in this connection and 
we also say that the parallel that Aristotle draws between sensation and thinking leaves 
no justification for the acceptance of such a theory. For affection could hardly be 
thought to include abstraction. " 
I believe Theophrastus is right in his attempt to understand what role could be 
ascribed to the active intellect. He has also tremendous reservations about the purely 
passive role which Aristotle gives to the intellect where thinking takes place. In addition 
to that, he takes the view that an external active principle is also responsible for the 
presence of such a principle in the human intellect. However, we have here two forms 
183 
of connection with an external active principle. Theophrastus speaks of the connection 
between the active and passive intellect in terms of mixture whereas Barbotin considers 
the connection between the two intellects in terms of participation. But as we come to 
forms of participation of the human intellect in an external intellect - non-human or 
supra-human or call it God - we could render it in two ways which are totally opposed 
to one another. In the first form of participation the human intellect is supplied once 
and for all with a faculty in virtue of which it exercises its activities independently. In 
the second form of participation almost no autonomy is given to the human intellect. 
Therefore, it is continually and constantly acted on by an external-active principle. In 
this case the human intellect is totally passive. In other words, it just waits to be acted 
upon by an external principle. It is in a sense a very enigmatic form of participation or 
perhaps a mystical way of participation. 
In virtue of its passivity, the human intellect is left to the mercy of an external 
agent to enable it to think, to understand or to take part in any intellectual activities. But 
in the former type of participation which takes the immanence of a transcendent intellect 
in the human soul for granted, the human intellect is required to acquire at some point in 
time an active role whereas in the second way of participation the intellect is always the 
object of the action of a transcendent intellect. In this form of participation the human 
intellect is also allowed to obtain such a causative power itself, and it appears that 
Theophrastus advocates the first form of participation. 's ( See sections on perception and 
thinking in Chapter 3 where I have argued the relation between the two) 
3. God and Intellect: Alexander Aphrodisiensis 
Unfortunately, we do not possess early writings of Peripatetics, so it is difficult 
to get a clear view even of their own philosophical opinions, let alone to be precise on 
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how they have construed Aristotle's theory of intellect. Nevertheless it appears that they 
had divergent views over the matter: for example, Strato dismissed any sort of thinking 
and he even went further and abolished the entire domain of the intellect. It is reported 
that Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus followed a similar path. 16 (Strato's reduction of 
thinking to perception is not without any foundation. See particularly De Anima And 
Metaphysics XII. 7. g) 
As opposed to the attitude of early Peripatetics, the members of the Peripatetic 
school in the first and second centuries AD devoted themselves to understanding, and 
explaining Aristotle's philosophy. One of the most important writings from this period 
are those of Alexander Aphrodisiensis. He is mainly concerned with Aristotle's theory 
of the soul. According to him, nous poietikos is a purely immaterial substance and it is 
also separate from the human being. However, it acts upon the human being and as 
such noun poietikos is the first principle of all things. It is the divine intellect itself. It is 
only through its direct influence on the individual that one can gain actual knowledge. 
However, there is also an important point to mention, which is this: the acquisition of 
knowledge depends on the capacity for receiving this influence. In other words, 
although the human being acquires knowledge through the influence of noes poietikos 
there is a requirement on the side of the human being which must have the capacity to 
receive this influence, and that in turn depends on a certain mixture of elements in the 
human body. Therefore, in Alexander's view, the existence of soul is dependent on the 
body. The body is necessary for the soul to think, to exist and the soul with the body is 
mortal. The characterisation of the active intellect in Alexander is this: 
i) It is incorruptible. " 
ii) It is not mixed with any matter in any way. '8 
iii) The active intellect as such is shown by Aristotle to be the first cause which is 
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the intellect in its true sense. 19 
iv) lt makes the intelligible actual and it actualises the material intellect. 20 
v) It is not a part of our soul nor a faculty of it. '' 
vi) To know its existence depends upon our recognition of God. " 
We should also note that Alexander calls the capacity to receive the influence of 
the nous poietikos the material intellect (noes hulikos), which is retained from De Anima 
430a 10-13,19 and accepted by the Arabs. Alexander had a great reputation as an 
exemplary exegete. Thus many followed him and as a result of this the active intellect 
has come to be identified with God by almost all Islamic interpreters. Nevertheless, 
some others came to claim that the noes poietikos should be identified with immediately 
known propositions and the truths that follow from them. 23 In accepting this belief, they 
went against Alexander and Theophrastus. The basis for the latter interpretation comes 
from the last chapter of PosteriorAnalytics and Nicomachean Ethics which are: 89a 1, 
89b 7,100b 8 and 1139b 17,1141a 5. 
Alexander was regarded as the greatest elaborator of Aristotle's philosophy. He 
was also known to later generations as an exemplary exegete until Averroes took over 
that title. Alexander wrote at the end of the second century AD and the beginning of the 
third. The emperors Septimius, Severus and Caracalla appointed him as a publicly- 
funded teacher of Aristotelian philosophy between 198 and 209 AD. The most 
interesting and most important thing is that Alexander was not committed to Platonism 
or Christianity, unlike some later commentators. His aim was to construe statements of 
Aristotle in the light of what he says elsewhere. He agrees with Aristotle that there is a 
single objectively true account of reality. Thus, Alexander comes to equate objective 
truth and Aristotle's philosophy. '' 
As has just been stated, Alexander identifies nous poietikos of De Anima with 
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the First Cause of Metaphysics XII, namely, with the intellect of God. Thus he broke 
away from earlier interpretations and presented a radical interpretation of Aristotle's 
theory of intellect. Although Ross argues against Alexander's conception of the matter 
he is not completely convincing: still, it should be noted that some scholars firmly 
rejected Alexander's view, but later came very close to advocating a similar theory. 25 
As we have noted above, Alexander identifies nous poietikos with the Prime 
Mover, to proton aition. But it is interesting that only a few modern scholars have 
come to agree with him on this point, for example Clark, Guthrie, Nuyens and 
Anscombe. However, Ross argues purely for the deistic theory of Metaphysics. 26 
However, against this deistic view one could say that the divine noes in Metaphysics XII 
is called the "Prime Mover" and originates change by being loved (1072b 3). Thus it 
seems that there is some sort of relation between the Prime Mover and the universe. 28 
Here I will briefly discuss Guthrie's view. According to him the First Cause, 
God, is the principle of activity for human thinking. In a way it calls latent human 
intellects or thoughts into activity. Therefore God originates the process of knowing, it 
realises the operation which is prior to thinking proper. In opposition to that, some 
think that noes poietikos (430al2) is a part of the human intellect. 29 However, 
Alexander's view is very much followed by Islamic interpreters of Aristotle and Guthrie 
has also come to take up a very close position to them, Islamic commentators maintain 
that a supra-human intellect, which is absolutely subordinate to the intellect of God 
brings latent human thought into actuality. As I have tried to prove in Chapters III and 
V, noun poietikos seems to be identical with the divine nous of Metaphysics XII. 7-9. 
In Alexander's view the divine nous is the principle of activity and the human 
Woos could participate in the principle of activity, namely the divine nous, as long as it 
prepares itself to receive the influence of the divine noun. Thus the principle of activity 
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is external to the human being. The passivity of the human intellect is absolute without 
the divine noes. But Themistius rejects such a view on the ground that the First Cause 
cannot be the active intellect. According to him, the active intellect is described as 
immortal and eternal, and these attributes are also ascribed to other divine beings. 3° 
Themistius interprets what Aristotle says on the subject as seeing that among the human 
faculties only the Woos poietikos is immortal and eternal. One objection to this view is 
put by pointing out that in De Aninia 111.4 and 111.5, Aristotle merely contrasts the noun 
poietikos with the potential noes. Furthermore, he contrasts the actualised potential 
nous of the individual being with the active noes. Therefore it is not necessary to ask 
whether there could be other immortal and eternal intellects as far as De Aninia 111.4 and 
111.5 is concerned. 31 
As to the discussion about making potential colour actual colour, Themistius 
points out that Aristotle compares the active nous to light, but not to the sun as Plato 
does. However, the point is that Aristotle assigns the same function to light as Plato 
ascribes to the sun and this function is to make potential colour actual colour. 32 As a 
result, many interpreters have come to advocate the view that the distinction between 
two kinds of nous should be within the soul. " 
4. The Objects of Intellect in Alexander and Themistius 
Many of the later interpretations of Aristotle agree that the human intellect is not 
passive. In this regard they closely follow Alexander's views. Thus the human intellect 
is considered to realise the act of knowing in relation to sense data. However, it is only 
able to do so in virtue of the influence of the divine intellect which is somehow and in 
some way external to the human intellect and immaterial. As far as Alexander and 
Themistius are concerned, we could speak of two types of the objects of thinking. But it 
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is hard to justify such a distinction because Aristotle does not speak of them in De 
Anima 111.4 and 111.5. In these chapters Aristotle nowhere states that there are 
compound substances and simple substances which account for the immaterial and 
material objects of thinking. As opposed to that, he is concerned with the question of 
how forms can reside in matter' Nevertheless, Alexander distinguishes two kinds of 
object of thinking and the distinction plays a very important role in his interpretation of 
Aristotle. This distinction has a very profound role in almost all Neoplatonic 
interpretations of Aristotle too.; ` 
Alexander holds that the human intellect has the capacity to make the object of 
sensation an object of thinking. In a sense the human intellect produces the object of 
thinking by separating intelligible knowledge from sensory knowledge. What this 
means is that the human intellect operates as a maker or producer of the intelligible 
objects. It is this process or operation of the intellect that provides universals. And the 
universal is obtained from the particular. In sum, it could be said that the human 
intellect produces its own object of thinking. However, Alexander also states that the 
Unmoved Mover, the divine noun, is the principle for everything to be known which is 
not by nature knowable. In other words the Unmoved Mover causes everything else to 
be known. If that is the case, the function which is assigned to the human intellect is 
either needless or else presents inconsistency at best. 
In sum, Alexander regards human thinking as identification with the immaterial 
objects, but the human intellect is also capable of knowing material objects by the 
process of abstraction. Moreover, human thinking in essence is related to something 
which transcends the human intellect that in turn transcends itself and becomes like what 
it is affected by. In other words, the human intellect identifies itself with the divine 
nous. 
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The main point of Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of intellect is 
that human thinking is not a form of affection. According to him, thinking is a 
combining of that which is universal in the many individual things. It is also interesting 
to note that Alexander connects the concept of passivity or affection to corporeality. He 
goes even further by saying that even sensation is not completely affection. It is an act 
of discerning and being, as such it should not be conceived as an affection. He regards 
affection as a secondary aspect of thinking. According to him, thinking in essence is 
active. 36 
Like Theophrastus, Alexander also refuses to regard thinking as an affection or a 
form of passivity. They both consider the intellect as an active principle. However, 
Theophrastus conceives the principle of activity as being immanent in the human being, 
but that does not mean that he does not postulate an external intellect which is ultimately 
the originator of the activity of thinking in the human intellect. Alexander identifies it 
with divine noes (Prime Mover or First Cause). " However, in Alexander's view the 
union of the human notcs with divine nous does not constitute immortality on the side of 
the former, whereas the divine noccs is absolutely immortal. " Thus the human intellect 
is not guaranteed any immortality. As long as the human intellect receives the influence 
from the divine nous, it can be blissful but when it is left alone it is like a man or 
woman sitting in a room in the dark. When electricity is turned on he or she is in the 
light but in the absence of light one is in the dark. However, the capacity or preparation 
of the intellect is part of the activity of the human noes. Does that mean that one should 
turn on her/his electricity her/himself? Is this the only active role to be played by the 
human being? But one thing is certain: in Alexander the human intellect is not capable 
of joining once and for all in the divine nous. The divine nous could reside in the 
human intellect in so far as the human intellect is perfect enough to receive it. As 
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opposed to Theophrastus, Alexander appears to be less concerned with granting the 
principle of activity, namely, any divinity to the human being. Therefore if one has to 
talk about the form of participation with divine intellect in Alexander, it must be the sort 
of participation which is not genetic. 
Themistius maintains that the notes poietikos which Aristotle speaks of in De 
Anima 111.5 belongs to a human faculty. ' On this point his view diverges from 
Alexander. Instead, Themistius attributes two kinds of intellect to the human being, 
which are the potential intellect and an intellect which acts upon it. 4° He insists on the 
unity of the two intellects. " He also defends the view that through the union the human 
being becomes the possessor of an active intellect once and for all. 42 For he sees the 
essence of being human in this unity. " More clearly, the human 'I' is represented in 
the active intellect which comes to be possessed. 44 However, on this basis one is not 
sure any more whether the transcendency of the active intellect has any function at all. 
It appears that he emphasises the immanence of the active intellect rather than its 
transcendency. Nevertheless, he holds that there is an intellect which is one in number, 
that all human intellects participate in it. For otherwise it would be impossible for 
individuals to reach any agreement with one another. Themistius' view about the 
immanence of the active intellect involves a genetic type of participation, but this 
participation is not through the influence of the active intellect but possessing it as a part 
of the human faculty. The problem Themistius faces is the multitude of the active 
intellects, and he himself finds it difficult to accept this. It cannot be supported by the 
principle of individuation because the active intellect is immaterial and he accepts that 
the principle of individuation is matter. 
Themistius tries to solve the problem of the multiplication of the active intellect 
by offering a comparison which is as follows: the first intellect is one in number, it is 
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numerically one. On the contrary, that which illuminates and which is illuminated in 
turn becomes manifold, i. e. that light is manifold, whereas the sun is one. 45 It appears 
that Themistius' example just conceals the source of the problem. In my opinion, the 
comparison with the sun and its light in fact does not solve the problem. For the rays of 
the sun are merely the effect of the sun, and as such they do not represent any 
independence and purity from the sun but in turn independence and purity simply 
characterise the sun. In this context, one cannot talk of a plurality but just the active 
intellect and its influence. I think that the analogy suits rather better to illustrate 
Alexander's view on the intellect than Themistius'. 
When we come to discuss the immortality of the intellect in the human being, 
we shall see that Alexander follows Aristotle more closely than Themistius. As we have 
said earlier, Themistius speaks of the unity of the potential human intellect with the 
active intellect. But he cannot have ignored the fact that Aristotle speaks of the imma- 
terial and imperishable intellect while the passive intellect which is discussed at the end 
of De Anima 111.5 is called corruptible. 46 
5. Neoplatonism and Aristotle: Introductory Remarks 
The interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy by Alexander marks the fullest 
flowering of the Aristotelian philosophical tradition, but the view of Themistius is far 
from being unsupported. He thought that the job of commentary was over. It appears 
that he was wrong, because Neoplatonists were to introduce new dimensions into the 
interpretations of Aristotle's philosophy. Themistius' relation to the Neoplatonists has 
not been settled yet. Philoponus' Physics draws on Themistius six hundred times. That 
might indicate a strong relation between Themistius' view and Neoplatonism but, as it 
has been said, the matter is controversial in many ways. 47 
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Between AD 200 and 600 one of the ways of involving oneself in philosophical 
activity was to write commentaries. The works which were produced during this period 
contain the writings of the Peripatetic and Neoplatonist schools, so the writings from 
this period present a panorama of every period of Ancient Greek philosophy. However, 
the great bulk of extant commentaries belong to the Neoplatonists. Neoplatonism was 
founded by Plotinus and, apart from him, many of the distinguished Neoplatonists wrote 
commentaries on Aristotle, among them lamblichus, Plutarchus, Proclus, Damascius, 
Plotinus' disciple and editor Porphyry, Dexippus, Syrianus, Proclus' pupil Ammonius 
and Ammonius' three disciples Philoponus, Simplicius and Asclepius, Olympiodonrus, 
Elias, David, Stephanus. Some of them were Christians, for example Philoponus, 
Elias, David and Stephanus. Although they were Christians, nevertheless they wrote in 
the Neoplatonist tradition. However, the Neoplatonist commentaries of the main group 
were set up by Porphyry. Plotinus, who was Porphyry's master, had criticised 
Aristotle. For example, he devoted three whole treatises of Enneads to him and he 
discussed Aristotle's classification of the things in the universe into categories. Until 
Porphyry the question had been how far a Platonist should agree with Aristotle's theory 
of categories. However, by the time of Porphyry the question became whether there 
was any harmony between Plato and Aristotle at all. 48 It might appear to someone as a 
very difficult task to realise. However, it proved very fruitful from the philosophical 
point of view, but all Neoplatonists were in favour of reconciling Plato with Aristotle. 
Although lamblichus argued against the view that Aristotle disapproved of Plato's 
Theory of Ideas, this was also unacceptable to Syrianus and Proclus. While they accept 
that there is a harmony between Plato and Aristotle on most things, at the same time 
they could see that it is impossible to argue for a complete harmony between Plato and 
Aristotle. In Plato, God was conceived to be responsible - causally - for the existence of 
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the universe whereas Aristotle just denied it. But for some even this did not present any 
disharmony; for example, Ammonius claimed that Aristotle accepted Plato's theory of 
ideas in the form of principles in the divine intellect and these principles were the cause 
of existence. He thus wrote a book to prove that Aristotle's God was also an efficient 
cause. " It was this claim that paved the way towards accepting God as a Creator, as St. 
Thomas Aquinas did. 50 As a result of this great effort, Aristotle was made safe for 
Christianity. 
After establishing harmony between Plato and Aristotle, the aim became to find 
harmony in the whole of Greek philosophy. In other words, the idea of harmony was 
extended to the Pro-Socratics. For example, Proclus tried to unify the whole of Greek 
philosophy. For him, it was a continuous clarification of divine revelation. Simplicius, 
on the other hand, sought to unify the whole of Greek philosophy in order to rebut the 
Christian criticism that pagan philosophy contained contradictions. 
I would now like to make some remarks on the relation of Neoplatonist 
commentators to the Christians. The relation was subtle and it was not always a happy 
one. For example, Porphyry wrote a book against Christianity which was destined to 
be burnt. We have come to think that later Neoplatonists were more circumspect. 
Boethius and Philoponus are among the last commentators. Philoponus tries to prove 
the doctrine of the Creation and tries to replace Aristotelian science with other rival 
theories. These theories were preserved by the Arabs and reached the West only in the 
sixteenth century. 
As stated above, the relations of Neoplatonist commentators with the Christians 
were not always happy. It is claimed that the Neoplatonists did not abandon the 
distinction between the One and the intellect in favour of Christian monotheism and this 
appears to be true. For the Christian Emperor Justinian stopped the teaching of 
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Simplicus and the whole pagan Neoplatonist school in Athens in 529. It was during this 
same year that the Christian Philoponus proclaimed his evidence of Creation against the 
Neoplatonist Proclus. The Athenian Neoplatonists left and did not return to Athens. It 
has been claimed that Simplicius went to Harran (Carrhae) which is in Turkey now. 51 
The commentaries written by Simplicius are highly regarded. They are con- 
sidered to be a treasure house of information about a thousand years of Greek philos- 
ophy. He recorded them painstakingly after the closure of the Neoplatonist school in 
Athens. His bitterness towards Christianity is very understandable; Simplicius 
considers Christianity and its representatives irreverent. 52 
6. Intellect and Existence: Philoponus 
The answer to the question of how Neoplatonism was born could be found in the 
divergent interpretations of Aristotle's philosophy. In other words, it might be said that 
untenable interpretations of Aristotle helped the birth of Neoplatonism. 
Philoponus, the representative of Neoplatonism, opposes Alexander's view that 
the active intellect of De Aninia 111.5 is the First Cause. He dismisses any identification 
of the noun poietikos with the God of Metaphysics XII. 7-9. According to Philoponus 
the First Cause does not only actualise a potentiality, but also gives existence to the 
universe. therefore, in his view, Aristotle would not have compared the active intellect 
to light in De Ani, na 111.5 if he had been talking about the mind of God. He overlooks 
the fact that the Unmoved mover is not a creative cause or a Creator itself in 
Metaphysics XII. 7-9. It is said to be the cause in terms of having power to attract, in 
other words it affects things by its power of attraction. It is, I believe, quite obvious 
that the God of Philoponus is not Aristotle's God but the God of Christianity. 
The interpretation of DeAni, na given by Philoponus is as follows: 
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i) The noes poietikos belongs to an individual human being. 
ii) It functions in the way the teacher does. 
iii) The teacher does not pass on knowledge but he/she removes the obstacles in the 
way of having already existing knowledge. 
iv) The knowledge is hidden; the function of the teacher or the noes poietikos is to 
make known the already existing knowledge. 
The last point is definitely reminiscent of Plato. And what cannot be denied is this: it 
does not explain the interpretation of De Anima 111.4 and 5. Aristotle does not speak of 
"the theory of remembering" there. 53 
When we come to Simplicius, one thing we notice is that he emphasises the 
immanence of the active intellect. Part of this claim ignores the fact that a potentiality 
and the actuality of this potentiality cannot reside side by side in the same being. 
Nevertheless, the relation between divine intellect and human intellect was taken to be a 
direct relation. On the contrary, the human potential intellect is concerned with 
knowing physical things. For, by having the potential intellect, the human intellect 
cannot know the purely immaterial. It appears that beginning with Theophrastus and 
onwards the Greek commentators were unable to eliminate certain Platonic and 
Neoplatonic presuppositions from Aristotle's philosophy. Perhaps these untenable 
interpretations of Aristotle's philosophy played a significant part in the birth of 
Neoplatonism. " 
Whatever caused the birth of Neoplatonism, one thing is certain: from then on, 
Plato and Aristotle constituted the starting point for the Christian and Muslim 
philosophers or, more correctly, theologians. 
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7. Plotinus, J\'nus, Experience 
Some Preliminaries: 
Themistius argued that Aristotle cannot be referring to the Unmoved Mover of Metaph 
ysics in De Anima 111.5 where he speaks of nous poietikos which is called to be 
immortal and eternal. According to him these attributes also belong to other divine 
beings. (De Anima 111.5,430 a 23; Themistius 10 3,9-13; 103,13-15). It would not 
be wrong to say that Islamic Aristotelians followed Themistius closely in their 
conception of izous poielikos; since they never identified it God but as a subordinate 
intellect to God. For them izous poietikos was one of the divine intelligences. Being as 
such, iiou. s poictikos was conceived as a necessary chain between the human individual 
and God. 
Although the question of how the individual human intellect participates in the 
mind of God does not arise in Aristotle, Islamic Aristotelians were immensely 
interested in the question. It is possible to speak of two kinds of participation: a) 
ontological participation, b) cognitive participation. In the case of the first type of 
participation the human individual is endowed once and for all with a faculty which 
from then on it exercises independently. (For example Aquinas) In the second type of 
participation the human intellect is the object of the action of a super-intellect. 
In the first type of participation the human soul acquires at some point in time a 
certain causative power in virtue of the imminence of a transcendent intellect. In the 
second sort of participation the intellect is subject to the effect proceeding from the 
transcendent intellect since it does not possess it itself. Of Islamic Aristotelians, the 
second type of participation was acceptable since they generally refused to conceive 
lions poieeikos as being identical with God. In addition to that they discarded any 
possibility of participating in the mind of God directly. 
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Islamic Aristotelians generally hold that non-discursive thought and the union 
with the transcendent intellect require some preparation of a discursive nature (see 
sections on Islamic Philosophers in chapter 7). It cannot be denied that experience has 
an important role in knowing the highest principle (Nicomachean Ethics 1142 a1 1-20; 
1143 b 11-14). However, it is not true that experience does belong to the domain of 
discursive reasoning in Aristotle. Experience happens in the sphere of the senses. 
(Metaphysics, 891 a 1-12). It seems to be that Islamic Aristotelians do not follow 
Aristotle here. He aimed to base discursive science on a non-discursive knowing. 
Thus, these philosophers appear to have distorted what Aristotle says on the subject by 
the Neoplotanic interpretations. 
Islamic Aristotelian philosophers argued that the participation of the human 
intellect in a super-intellect is a union with the latter and can only be achieved with 
great effort. However, they never regarded the union with a super-intellect as 
complete. That is why the union with a super-intellect had to be brought about each 
time afresh. In other words a living and recurring participation necessitates intellectual 
perfection. Nevertheless this should not be taken that Islamic Aristotelian philosophers 
completely disregard the first form of participation. They thought that the human 
intellect can carry out an abstracting operation in virtue of its union with a super- 
intellect (Brentano, 11; 16 n- 44 and see section on Avicenndl). 
The super-intellect is a necessary precondition for the human intellect to know 
and for the latter the super-intellect is an aim to be united. For the super-intellect not 
only inspires the human intellect but it is also the source of knowledge. That is why 
the aim of intellectual activity is to succeed a union with the super-intellect. 
For Islamic Aristotelian philosophers the immanence of the super-intellect in 
the human soul requires to be brought about each time afresh. That is why it is 
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impossible to say that the super-intellect is joined to the human soul. It does not 
belong to the human soul from the outset. However, it is interesting to see that 
according to them the essence of being a human being lies in the super-intellect as long 
as the human intellect succeeds a union with it. (Nicomachean Ethics, X. 7; 1178 a 2- 
8; De Anima 424 b 2; 427 a 14-16; Themistius 108,24). 
8. Plotinus and Thinking 
In Plotinus we find two kinds of noelic activity of the intellect which are called 
discursive (dianoia) and non-discursive (hots). Although discursive noelic activity is 
related to the soul non-discursive rroetic activity is conceived to be something 
different. It has been generally considered that non-discursive noelic activity does not 
involve propositions but contemplation of concepts in isolation from each other. It has 
been commonly held that Plotinus' conception of non-discursive uoetrc activity is to be 
traced back to Plato and Aristotle. 
I firstly would like to deal with the question of eternity and noelic activity in 
Plotinus. Secondly I intend to elucidate the concept of non-discursive poetic activity 
in Plotinus and argue that as Plotinus does, contemplation cannot be the mean to 
contact reality. In that respect he continuously transformed Aristotle's conception of 
non-discursive itoetic activity of the intellect. Plotinus certainly believed that 
propositional discursive noetic activity cannot lead us to know, to be identical with 
reality. Perhaps this sort of poetic activity should be placed above any sort of 
thinking. And it will be clear in chapter 7 that Islamic Aristotelian philosophers 
followed Plotinus closely in this respect. They were greatly, particularly Ghazali and 
Suhrawardi, dissatisfied with discursive way of knowing things. 
Philo who lived in the first century of AD argued that there are two kinds of 
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life, one of which is of the intelligible realm and the other of that is of the sensible 
world. (Philo, de Mut. Nom. 47,267). 
When we come to Plotinus we see that he also speaks of two different kinds of 
life: the life of time and the life of eternity. Of course the life of eternity signifies that 
nrous is identical with its objects. Plotinus speaks of three levels of reality: soul, 
intellect and the One. Soul is of the sensible world and it is temporal whereas intellect 
is conceived to be eternal. The One is treated to be beyond these two, namely soul and 
intellect, although it is defined in terms of aidior and aei. 
It is interesting to see that Plotinus identifies the life of the soul with time and 
the life of the intellect with eternity. He distinguishes the noetic activity of the intellect 
from the activity of the soul and connects thinking with eternity. The life of the 
intellect is a life of poetic activity. This noetic activity is a very special kind and is not 
temporal. Plotinus writes of eternity saying that it (aion) is: 
... never other and 
is not a thinking or life that goes from one thing to another but is 
always the self-same without extension of interval; seeing all this one sees eternity in 
seeing a life that abides in the same, and always has the all present to it, not now this, 
and then again that, but all things at once, and not now some things, and then again 
others, but a partless completion, as if they move all together in a point, and had not 
yet begun to go out and then into lives; it is something which abides in the same in 
itself and does not change at all but is always in the present, because nothing of it has 
passed away, nor again is there anything to come into being, but that which it is, it is, 
.... 
(Loeb, 3.7.3 (16-23)). 
It is not difficult to see the parallel between the definition of eternity in Plotinus 
and description of the Unmoved Mover in Aristotle. The latter is said to be always 
active yet remains the same as being eternally existing. Although the Unmoved Mover 
is the principle of the universe and the cause of the motion in the universe it is not 
subject to time. 
And Plotinus also writes about time that: 
So would it be sense to say that time is the life of soul in a movement of passage from 
one way of life to another? Yes, for eternity is life at rest, unchanging and identical 
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and already unbounded, .... 
(3.7.11 (43-9; 45-47)). 
Time, according to Plotinus, is a mere copy of eternity which is a life, is unchangeable 
and is undermined by anything else (3.7.11 (45-47)). 
It should be recalled that although Aristotle describes the human noetic activity 
and divine poetic activity as energeia the latter one is necessarily so and has no relation 
to kinesis whereas the former must take place within time. It is possible to see 
efrergeia of physical beings as a mere copy of the activity of the eternal being, the 
Unmoved Mover but not identical with each other. 
Although the soul and intellect are conceived to be a sort of world-soul and 
world-intellect in Plotinus nevertheless they can be found within the individual human 
being. That is why he argues that an individual can ascend from the kind of thinking of 
the soul to the iroetic activity of the intellect, and finally to a union with the One. This 
is what I am going to consider in the next section. 
9. Toward the Union with the One 
AC Lloyd argues that the idea of non-discursive noelic thought is not coherent. 
In other words it is incoherent. Sorabji appears to be sensibly, if I may say so, 
dissatisfied with any conception of it too. But he does not deny that there may be non- 
discursive poetic activity which is beyond any thinking. For he thinks that any thinking 
must be prepositional even non-discursive. 
I have tried to argue in the previous chapters that Sorabji appears to be 
mistaken that any thought must be propositional. However, he seems to be right in 
thinking that when the intellect is identical with its object there is no difference 
between the intellect and its object. In other words the intellect and the object is 
identical. They are one thing. And Sorabji rightly argues that this is surely not any 
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sort of thinking in the way we understand it. 
My aim here is not to deal with Lloyd's understanding of non-discursive 
thought nor mainly justify Sorabji's claim, but to present Plotinus' view on the subject 
matter in order to shed light on non-discursive iroetic activity in general. Plotinus 
speaks of three kinds of noetic experience which are: a) discursive (dianoia); b) non- 
discursive; c) the identity of intellect with the One, a union. He identifies the 
discursive poetic experience with the activity of the soul whereas non-discursive noetic 
experience corresponds to the domain of the intellect. The identity of intellect with the 
One is a final stage that one can attain to and in this stage there is no thinking. 
It is important to recall that an important feature of discursive thinking is that it 
includes change. In other words the soul moves from one thing to another. In 
addition to that this kind of thinking happens to take place in time. As opposed to 
non-discursive poetic activity, discursive poetic activity involves contemplating 
imprinted images (3.7.11; 5.3.2; 5.3.5 (23-5)). 
Unlike discursive activity, non-discursive noetic activity is not spread out in 
time. It is timeless. There is no extension and progress in it. He also claims that it 
does not involve seeking (zetein) (4.4.1; 3.7.3; 5.1.4 (16)). Plotinus also declares that 
the intellect in action is identical with its objects (1.8.2 (16); 5.1.4 (21)).. What 
follows from these statements are the following: 
a) The intellect does not depend on images. For the intellect is identical with its 
objects. 
b) In non-discursive activity there is no gap between what is known and knowing. 
c) The intellect thinks itself, since the intellect is identical with its object, thus in 
thinking of its object, the intellect thinks of itself. 
It is not difficult to trace back these ideas to Aristotle. However, what we do 
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not find in Aristotle explicitly is the conception of a union with the One. Aristotle 
nowhere explicitly or implicitly appears to be concerned with the union of intellects 
with the Unmoved Mover or God. But this constitutes a major theme in Plotinus' 
thought. And in virtue of the specific background of their thought Islamic Aristotelian 
philosophers followed Plotinus very closely as it will be seen in chapter 7. 
Plotinus rejects any sort of divergence between the intellect and the One. It 
seems that he even denies that the intellect cannot say that 'I am this'. For I and the 
this will constitute two things. It means duality which Plotinus denies in thinking 
where there is a complete union between the intellect and the One. In order to 
overcome this, this one would have to say that 'am am' or 'I I' (5.3.10 c 34.7). In 
6.7.38 Plotinus says that one cannot also say that 'I am the good'. Again this would 
introduce too much duality into the union of the intellect with the One. As Aristotle 
does, Plotinus argues that what is dealt with here is of simple nature. It is also true 
that the One signifies what it is to be simple. Again as Aristotle does, Plotinus uses the 
analogy of touch or contact in order to describe the sort of thinking in question (thixis, 
thingein, thinganein, haphe, ephapsasthai, epaphe, stunaphe) (5.3.10 (41-4); 5.3.17 
(25-34); 6.7.36 (4); 6.7.39 (15-19); 6.7.40 (2)). This touching is not aimed at 
something other than simple and as I have argued previously touching in this context 
does not describe discursive thinking. That is why Plotinus says insistently that the 
One is simple and its thinking is not thinking in the ordinary sense of the word (3.9. 
(1); 5.3.13 (10); 5.4.2 (18); 5.6.4-5). And when the intellect becomes identical with 
the One it does not think. In a sense the process of thinking is completed. Again this 
reminds us of Aristotle's description of thinking as energeia. Everything is completed. 
There is nowhere to be reached. The union with the One is the end of the road for the 
intellect. And I call this type of thinking as perfect non-discursive thinking 
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(Hupernoesis (6.8.16 (33)). 
One of the crucial passages which reveals Plotinus' ideas on the subject matter 
comes from V. 3.10 (28-52): 
.... what will the thinker think which 
does not contain one and then another? For 
certainly if each one is a rational principle, it is many. So it comes to know itself by 
being an eye which sees a variety of images or by being an object of varied colours. 
For if it is directed its gaze to a single object without parts, it would be without 
thought or word for what would it have to say about it, or to understand? For if the 
absolutely partless had to speak itself, it must, first of all, say what it is not; so that in 
this way too it would be many in order to be one. then when it says 'I am this', if it 
means something other than itself by 'this', it will be telling a lie; but if it is speaking of 
some incidental property of itself, it will be saying that it is many or saying 'am am' or 'I 
I'. Well then, suppose it was only two things and said 'I and this'. It would be already 
necessary for it to be many; for as the two things are diverse and in the manner of their 
diversity, number is present and many other things. Then here the thinker must 
approach one thing different from another and the object of thought in being thought 
must contain variety; or there will not be a thought of it, but only a touching and a sort 
of contact without speech or thought, pre-thinking because intellect has not yet come 
into being and that which touches does not think. But the thinker must not itself 
remain simple, especially in so far as it thinks itself: for it will duplicate itself, even if it 
gives an understanding which is silent. Then [the One] will not need to make a kind of 
fuss about itself for what will it learn by thinking itself? For what it is will belong to 
itself before intellect thinks. Also, knowledge is a kind of longing for the absent, and 
like the discovery made by a seeker. But that which is absolutely different remains 
itself by itself, and seeks nothing about itself; but that which explicates itself must be 
many. 
Is the description of the One which engages in perfect non-discursive noetic 
activity other than the Aristotle's Unmoved Mover? I believe that it is not hard to see 
that it is not. Plotinus speaks of the poetic activities that take the individual human 
being towards a union with the One in 1.3 1-4. Those who love music and those who 
love in true sense are to be a candidate on the way ascend to the One. Philosophers 
are necessarily so by their nature. Discursive preparation forms one side of training. 
Moral training is also required. Plotinus himself practised intellectual and moral 
training in order to be united with the One. It is said that he had little food and slept 
little. 
No doubt that his ideas had enormous influence on Islamic Aristotelian 
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philosophers as well as Christian mystics. It is especially important to remember 
Ghazali and Suhrawardi. They both finally were greatly dissatisfied with merely 
discursive poetic activity and involved in some sort of mystical religious movement. 
(See sections on Islamic philosophers). Ghazali even wrote a book on 'Inconsistency 
of Philosophy and Philosophers' to show that a pure discursive activity is nothing but 
incoherent understanding of reality. In order to know reality one must first turn to 
somewhere else. 
10. The Road from Philosophy to Islam 
Introduction 
The flowering of philosophy in the Islamic world started around the 8th century 
AD. This period is called a 'First Wave of Hellenism'. At this time the majority of Muslim 
religious scholars accepted Greek ideas enthusiastically. Later, however, they made no 
attempt to go further with their explorations of Greek philosophy. They became rather 
self-satisfied. As a result of that, almost all intellectual activity was confined to criticising or 
assimilating what was available in Islamic works. But this period did not last long. The 
second wave of the Hellenic tide started around the 10th century AD. During this century 
small intellectual groups continued to cultivate philosophy. They were interested in Greek 
medicine and the other sciences. It is important to see that although the Muslim students of 
philosophy were sincere in their beliefs, they were far from being fanatical followers of 
Islam. In virtue of this, Muslims and Christians came to be associated on equal terms in 
philosophical discussions as well as in teaching. 
However, the question of how exactly the intellectual transition from translation to 
the composition of original works took place is not completely clear. It is possible to 
assume that the scholars who engaged in translation felt impelled to write something 
205 
original and to provide a simple introduction to Greek science and philosophy. Above all, 
there was a great desire to bring philosophical conclusions into line with the teaching of the 
Quran. The representative of this transition and this ambition is Abu-Yusuf Yaqub Ibn- 
Ishaq al-Kindi, but he is usually referred to as al-Kindi. He is regarded as the first 
important Islamic philosopher. " 
The second wave of Hellenism, is marked by the outstanding achievements of 
Avicenna (Ibn-Sina) in both philosophy and medicine. Through the influence of his 
work, further Greek conceptions and methods were accepted into Islamic theology, 
mainly by the work of al-Ghazali. 
Aristotle constituted the starting point for Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna and for 
Averroes (Ibn-Rushd). Apart from Aristotle's works, some post-Aristotelian Greek 
texts and early Arabic texts provided the setting in which they worked. The most 
important texts for them were the following: 
1. Alexander, De Anima. There is also a work called De Intellectu which is also 
attributed to Alexander. 56 
2. Plotinus, Enneads. s' 
3. Themistius, De Anima. 58 It should be noted also that Themistius' Paraphrase of 
Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book XII, was intensively studied by Islamic scholars. 59 
4. There is also another Greek commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, which is 
commonly attributed to John Philoponus. In addition to this, there is a com- 
mentary on Book III of De Anima, ascribed to Philoponus. 6° 
The two works of Alexander - De Anima and De Intellectu - and Themistius' paraphrase 
of Aristotle's De Anima and Metaphysics XII were available to the Islamic philosophers 
in Arabic. Of these works, only De Intellectu and Aristotle's De Anima by Themistius 
are preserved and published. However, manuscripts of the Arabic translations of 
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Alexander's De Anima and paraphrase of Aristotle's Metaphysics XII by Themistius are 
no longer extant. Avicenna speaks of the views of Alexander and Themistius. 
Averroes also refers to them on the subject of soul. 61 
Although the works of Plotinus were very much in circulation - parts of the 
Enneads - they did not know it by name. The Theology of Aristotle was considered by 
al-Farabi to be Aristotle's work. Avicenna even wrote a commentary on it. 62 
Some other works which were prior to Al-Farabi played an important role as 
well, for example the paraphrase of Aristotle's De Anima by Ishaq ibn Hunain, and the 
works by Bakr al-Mawsili and al-Kindi. These were mostly from the First Wave of 
Greek Philosophy in the Islamic world. There was also a treatise on the soul, which 
was ascribed to Porphyry and extant only in Arabic. Avicenna discusses and argues 
against it strongly. 63 
However, it should be noted that for al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes the most 
important works amongst the ones we have mentioned were Alexander's De Anima, De 
Intellectu, Plotinus' Enneads, and Themistius' Paraphrase of Aristotle's De Anima. 
Before beginning to expound the views of islamic philosophers' interpretation of 
Aristotle's theory of intellect, I would like to say a few words on terminology. Greek 
and Arabic have only one word for intellect and intelligence, which is nous = aql. 
However, the terms intellect and intelligence, which originated in the Latin Middle 
Ages, signify two different things: the term intelligence refers to the incorporeal beings 
that represent celestial spheres which govern the world, but the term intellect is used in 
various contexts. So, in exploring the views of al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna and 
Averroes, I will use the terms intelligence and intellect in accordance with the distinction 
mentioned above. However, as I have said, there is a single Greek or Arabic word 
which covers the meaning of the two terms coined in the Latin Middle Ages. `'y 
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Now let us discover how Aristotle's ideas on intellect have been transformed 
into Islamic thought through al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes. 
11. Yaqub Ibn-Ishaq al-Kindi (800-70)65 
Al-Kindi devoted himself to studying and was considered to be an expert in 
almost all the Greek sciences. Although many Islamic philosophers were considered to 
be affected predominantly by Aristotle it would be wrong to think that they had nothing 
to do with Plato and Neoplatonism. Aristotle was studied carefully, but he was neo- 
platonised. For example, The Theology of Aristotle was very much in circulation among 
the Muslim scholars and philosophers. We know also that it was attributed to Aristotle 
by al-Farabi and Avicenna wrote a commentary on it. However, it belongs to the 
Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus. It was very much revered, perhaps due to the 
conception of God which was conceived to be very close to the Quranic monotheism. 
Al-Kindi defended the view that the truths revealed by God through prophets were 
indeed metaphysical knowledge. Thus he saw no contradiction between philosophy and 
revelation or religion. Al-Kindi had also no difficulty in inserting the idea of creation 
into Aristotle by the help of the Neoplatonic theory of emanation. Let us take a close 
look at al-Kindi's theory of intellect now. 
What we find in his De Intellectu is the various meanings of the term intellect 
(acgl). He firstly speaks of an intellect which is always in action. It is a transcendent 
intellect. It is not the intellect of God nor does it belong to human beings. The human 
intellect is placed at the opposite side of the intellect which is always active. But the 
human intellect has the potentiality to know but in virtue of its potentiality it does not 
know yet. The only way the human potential intellect attains knowledge is by making 
contact with the transcendent intellect. And by means of joining the transcendent 
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intellect, the human intellect becomes able to know immaterial ideas and becomes like 
the transcendent intellect. The human potential intellect, which becomes like the active 
transcendent intellect, is identical with the object it thinks. It is an identification with 
the ideas provided by the active transcendent intellect. However, it is interesting to see 
that, in al-Kindi's view, the object of knowledge is not identical with the active 
transcendent intellect. Using a very Neoplatonic idea, he claims that once the 
immaterial ideas or metaphysical truths become known by the human intellect, they lose 
their purity. He also speaks of the intellect which possesses knowledge and the intellect 
which contemplates at its disposal. The distinction of four types of intellect in al-Kindi 
nearly corresponds to Aristotle's four types of intellect in De Anima. In fact it does not 
appear to be difficult to recognise them in DeAnima. They are the following: 
a) Nous poietikos of De Anima 111.5. 
b) The potential intellect of De Anima 111.4. 
c) The intellect which possesses knowledge but is not contemplating it now. 
d) The intellect which actually contemplates it. 
The last of the two intellects are distinguished by Aristotle in De Anima 111.4 also. 
I would like to say something about the point al-Kindi makes by saying that 
when the human potential intellect gains access to the immaterial ideas by joining the 
transcendent intellect, the immaterial ideas which are known by the human intellect 
become less pure. Further, the identity of the human intellect with the immaterial ideas 
provided by or derived from the transcendent intellect does not mean that the human 
intellect becomes identical with the transcendent intellect. It also rules out any 
identification of the knowledge or the immaterial ideas with the transcendent intellect. I 
believe that al-Kindi here introduces very fundamental principles of the Qu'ran into 
Aristotle's theory of intellect. For, according to the Qu'ran, God and God's creation 
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are never to be conceived in a genetic sense. Whatever sort of relation God has to its 
creation, God is never considered to be identical with what it has created. Things are 
the proofs of its existence but they are not what God is. 
The views of the Islamic philosophers are criticised by Walzer. He thinks that 
they are not right in taking the nous poietikos of De Anima 111.5 to be a transcendent 
intellect, and Aristotle himself does not say anything about the transcendency of the 
nous poietikos. 
The Islamic philosophers do not identify the noun poietikos with the intellect of 
God either. In other words, they refuse to see the God of Metaphysics XII. 7-9 and De 
Anima 111.5 to be identical with the nous poietikos. In general they conceive the notes 
poietikos as one of the intellects which are subordinate to God. According to them, the 
nous poietikos does not represent the highest actuality nor the highest immateriality. In 
sum, the nous poietikos is not the First Cause, it is not God. In effect, the transcendent 
intellect acts as the vicar of God on earth. 
Al-Kindi also speaks of the preparation for union with the active intellect. Here 
he is much more in line with the Greek commentators. This also indicates where al- 
Kindi inserts the Neoplatonic element into his interpretation of Aristotle. In Aristotle we 
have no trace of the element of preparation as far as the potential intellect is concerned. 
It is also interesting to see that the tendency in al-Kindi and in general in all Islamic 
philosophers is to try to relate the knowing or thinking activity of the human potential 
intellect to the active intellect which is conceived to be transcendent to the human 
intellect. ` 
12. Human Perfection and Intellect: Al-Farabi 
In al-Farabi's view the perfection of the human being lies in general in intellect. 
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However, he is bound to distinguish the types of the intellect in order to explain how 
the human intellect passes from potentiality to actuality. He argues in al-Siyasa al- 
Madaniyya and in Theology of Aristotle that human perfection, which consists in the 
actualisation of the human intellect, cannot be achieved without active intellect. For the 
human potentiality for thinking cannot by itself become actual intellect. Thus it requires 
something else to bring it from the state of potentiality into actuality, and that is perforce 
an intellect which is actual. It is like the vicar of God working on behalf of human 
beings. Anybody who leaves matter behind and attains freedom comes close to the 
active intellect. Where the natural forces leave a human being at physical perfection, 
the active intellect takes over and in perfecting human intellect, the active intellect 
exercises providence over it. " According to al-Farabi there are three levels of human 
intellect, which are: 
1. Natural disposition to think. 68 
2. Actual passive intellect. It is the intellect which has just passed from potentiality 
to actuality via the active intellect. 
3. The third level signifies a perfection. An individual human being perfects 
his/her passive intellects with all intelligible thoughts and becomes acquired 
intellect. Although it is extremely difficult to gain the totality of thoughts, 
nevertheless in al-Farabi's view we are able to do so. It lies within our power to 
obtain it. 69 
In al-Farabi each stage of intellect seems to be the matter and substratum for the 
succeeding level. After the succeeding level is realised, the two become one thing. 
During the union with the active intellect, acquired intellect represents matter for the 
active intellect, and it appears that the active intellect becomes the form of the acquired 
intellect. None of the previous commentators conceived the relation between the 
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acquired and active intellect in the way al-Farabi did. In his account the active intellect 
conjoins with the human intellect as its form after the highest stage of human intellect is 
realised. When an individual reaches the phase of the acquired intellect, the active 
intellect comes into him/her. At this stage an individual becomes a philosopher. 
However, he refuses to identify the acquired intellect with the active intellect. 
According to al-Farabi, immortality is not granted to human beings by God. It 
is rather a product of the human being's intellectual development. In other words, 
immortality is not given but earned, perhaps reached. He states that ignorant individuals 
are mortal. He also speaks of the retention of individuality. In his view the soul and 
body of each individual are distinct from the souls and bodies of other individuals. 
The activity of the active intellect is not confined to the operation on the human 
intellect. The emanation from the active intellect goes to the human faculty of 
imagination. In virtue of this, prophecy and revelation become possible. 
Al-Farabi speaks of the two levels of prophetic phenomena which are namely 
' prophecy' (nubuwwa) and 'revelation' (wahy). They are both constituted by an 
emanation from the active intellect upon the imaginative faculty. Revelation is superior 
to prophecy. Prophecy does not require any specific intellectual attainment. However, 
revelation requires a conjunction with the active intellect. In a sense prophecy is 
considered to be granted by the active intellect but revelation could happen to someone 
who has also reached the stage of the acquired intellect. It rather recalls a philosopher- 
prophet. 70 
13. Avicenna (Abu-Ali Ibn-Sina) 
Philosophy continued flowering throughout the 1 Ith century in the Islamic world 
but there was a man from a small town near the south coast of the Caspian Sea who has 
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been considered in the opinion of many to be the greatest of all Islamic philosophers. 
Although he wrote in Arabic, he was Turkish; this philosopher was Abu-Ali Ibn-Sina 
but he is known in the West as Avicenna (980-1037). 
He spent the early years of his life in Bukhara. His first education was to 
memorise the Qur'an, however Avicenna was also very well versed in Arabic poetry. 
He later moved on to study jurisprudence. 
We are told that Avicenna was introduced to Aristotelian logic by a scholar 
when he was only fourteen. To the great surprise of his master, the scholar, Avicenna, 
developed a better grasp of the subject than himself. He had an insatiable thirst for 
knowledge. He devoured all the books in science and philosophy that were available to 
him. He was very much interested in medicine. It is believed that he studied medicine 
and reached a theoretical grasp of the subject by himself. Later, practising physicians 
studied medicine under his guidance and we are told that all this was realised before 
Avicenna reached seventeen. His approach to medicine was experimental, so that he 
sought to increase his medical knowledge by way of applying new techniques to 
patients. " 
However, there was something which presented grave trouble to Avicenna 
during his course of omnivorous study and this was Aristotle's Metaphysics. Accord- 
ingly, he read Aristotle's Metaphysics forty times and memorised it but he still could not 
penetrate into Aristotle's thought in Metaphysics. One day he happened to come across 
a small book on Metaphysics which was written by al-Farabi and it played a very 
important role in Avicenna's interpretation of Aristotle. What this anecdote implies is 
that al-Farabi had a direct influence on Avicenna in causing him to take a similar general 
position in philosophy. 
Avicenna had also an opportunity to gain access to a remarkable library of Greek 
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works. This library was owned by the Sultan of Bukhara and he was able to make the 
fullest use of it. Before reaching eighteen, Avicenna thought that he had completed the 
assimilation of all the scientific and philosophical knowledge available to him. After 
that he ceased searching and devoted himself to practising philosophy. However, his 
contribution to medieval science should also be remembered. Avicenna's Canon of 
Medicine had an outstanding value in medicine. When we come to his philosophy, the 
Shifa and the Najat have major importance from the philosophical point of view. The 
Shifa is a great compendium and contains sciences as well as philosophy. The Najat 
consists of three parts which are namely logic, natural philosophy and theology. It is 
hard to say whether his general position in philosophy is Neoplatonic or Aristotelian. 
However, he could be regarded as a Neoplatonist as far as his theology and cosmology 
were concerned. 
According to him, God is the One which exists necessarily (wajib al-wtjud). 
Everything is dependent on it in the sense that everything emanates from it. Beneath 
God, there are pure intelligences and the spheres, but when we come to the conception 
of soul, it is essentially Aristotelian. Nevertheless, it is a neoplatonised conception of 
the human soul. He, like the other Islamic philosophers, tries to explain prophethood. 
Some claim that Avicenna connects prophethood with the highest form of the soul, 
namely the intellect. In doing so, he does agree with al-Farabi. However, some others 
argue that while Avicenna connects prophethood with the intellect, al-Farabi identifies it 
with the highest form of imagination. 12 
As opposed to al-Farabi, Avicenna is not concerned with Shi'ism. His main 
object was to show how, through a prophet, a state could be governed in accordance 
with divine wisdom. He did have enough power so that he was not concerned about 
Sunnite ulema. Therefore he did not exaggerate the importance of philosophy and, like 
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Mutazilites, Avicenna regarded his philosophical conception of Islam as the true one. It 
should also be noted that his philosophy had a mystic side and mystics identified their 
own interpretation of Islam with the true Islam. 73 
I would like to finalise the remarks on Avicenna by stating that his philosophy 
had a certain relation to mysticism and Avicenna remained a sincere Muslim all his life. 
In relation to the latter point, he was a good Muslim and had learned the Quran by 
heart. He also studied the shari'a. We are even told that he went to the mosque and 
spoke to God about his intellectual problems. He does not say anything about his views 
with regard to his religion, Islam. He probably did not see any conflict between Greek 
scientific and philosophical activity and Islam. He appears to have conceived his 
intellectual efforts in terms of elucidating the essential principle of Islam which is the 
existence of God, who is believed to be the principle of all being. In virtue of God the 
human being was able to become a prophet and receive revelations. There is an 
intrinsic relation between Avicenna's theory of prophethood and his conception of an 
individual's journey to God. 
The European scholars in the 19th century denied any place of mysticism in his 
philosophy and conceived it as extraneous to his philosophical view. However, as a 
result of fuller acquaintance with Avicenna's writings it became clear that this is not the 
case. There is a direct relation between his mysticism and his philosophy. Rather, they 
form a single integrated unity. It is inferred from his mystical writings that mystical life 
was profoundly important to him. Perhaps the mystical life was the source of his 
intellectual energy. 
In virtue of his personal attitude to religion he is regarded as closer to Plato and 
naturally less Aristotelian. However, I will try to show in the coming section that this 
claim is without any ground. However, for the moment I will briefly state that because 
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he was closer to Aristotle, he even succeeded in rationalising prophethood and the 
immortality of the human soul. 74 
We have already witnessed the controversies in antiquity, and it has also already 
been indicated that we should not expect any more unanimity among Islamic and 
Christian philosophers in the Middle Ages. The Islamic philosophers were greatly 
influenced by Alexander. However, that does not mean that they were following in his 
footsteps. It would especially be true to say that Avicenna and Averroes were in much 
more agreement with Themistius and Theophrastus than with Alexander. Nevertheless, 
they were in agreement with Alexander to the extent that the nous poietikos did not 
belong to the human being. However, they never identified it with God as Alexander 
had done. Avicenna and Averroes considered that not only the nous poietikos but also 
the nous that is potentially all things is eternal and immaterial. Averroes goes further 
away from Avicenna in attributing the whole attributes of the nous poietikos to the 
material intellect. 75 
It could be seen from the exposition of the views of the Islamic philosophers that 
Aristotle's theory of the intellect was transformed into something which was rather alien 
to the spirit of Aristotelian philosophy. Although Aquinas reacted grossly against the 
interpretation of Aristotle's theory of intellect given by the Islamic philosopher, he did 
not refrain from making Aristotle's theory of intellect any less Christian, any less alien 
to the spirit of Aristotelian philosophy. However, we will deal with his interpretation 
later 
Before presenting Avicenna's view on Aristotle's De Anima and Metaphysics, let 
us spell out in what way the Islamic philosophers transformed Aristotle. It was accepted 
by the Islamic commentators of Aristotle that to gain the highest knowledge -which is 
non-discursive - and to be united with the transcendent intellect, necessitates some 
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preparation which is of a discursive nature. ' In other words, if the eternal truth is 
sought in order to be received, the human intellect must already be in some sort of 
perfection in terms of actuality. It appears that Aristotle advocates the idea that 
experience can lead us to cognition of the highest principles. Therefore, after all the 
Islamic philosophers in general might be right in their view, and in this sense experience 
could be construed as preparation for attaining non-discursive knowledge, however they 
might be wrong in considering experience as belonging to the domain of discursive 
reasoning, for experience belongs to the sphere of the senses. " 
As a result it could be said that the Islamic philosophers seem to be following in 
the footsteps of Plato and Plotinus rather than Aristotle. 78 I also think that Avicenna, 
among the other Islamic philosophers, is the one who neoplatonised Aristotle more than 
anybody. By doing so, he would also be able to explain prophethood in Islam which by 
no means can be traced back to Aristotle. Therefore, a severe judgement is passed by 
Hicks, who says that "he [Aristotle] was not a Moslem mystic nor a Christian 
theologian". 79 He appears, however, to fail in recognising the Neoplatonic influence on 
the Islamic philosopher. 
Now it is time to be concerned with Avicenna's philosophy in more detail. Here 
I shall mainly concentrate on the following topics in Avicenna, which are: 
1. The emanation of the universe and the active intellect. 
2. Levels of human intellect and the function of the active intellect in relation to 
human intellect. 
3. Imagination, thinking and intuition. 
4. Conjunction with the active intellect and immortality. 
5. Prophecy. 
Of the topics above, I do not think that the emanation of the universe and the role of the 
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active intellect in it has a great importance as far as the present study is concerned, since 
I here intend to examine Avicenna's theory of intellect in relation to Aristotle's theory of 
noetic activity in De Anima. Therefore, I shall deal with the first topic in brief. 
Avicenna does not hold an essentially different view from al-Farabi. He 
envisages a translunar region which contains nine primary spheres, namely an 
outermost, diurnal sphere, the sphere of the fixed stars, and finally the seven spheres 
that consist of the planets, the sun and the moon. According to him, each sphere has its 
own incorporeal intelligence (aql) which functions as its mover. He, like al-Farabi, 
interrelates intelligences and spheres through a series of emanations. However, while he 
is doing it he also tries to answer a philosophical question which is; how, from the one, 
can a plural universe be derived? For the philosophic problem is expressed in the terse 
formula "from the one, insofar as it is one, only one can come into existence [yujad]". 80 
It is said that the problem of explaining how a complete unitary first principle 
can cause a plural universe was put forward first by Plotinus. It also makes a reap- 
pearance in one of the Arabic interpretations of Plotinus. However, the formula which 
is "from one only one comes into existence" cannot be traced back before Avicenna. ' 
On his view of the universe, First Cause is beyond the intelligence and the celestial 
spheres. Although he agrees with al-Farabi that everything emanates from the First 
Cause necessarily (yalzam) he differs from him in saying that the incorporeal 
intelligences exist by reason of themselves. 
According to him, the object of thought for the first intelligence is nothing but 
the First Cause, and the second intelligence necessarily emanates from it. Although it 
exists by virtue of the First Cause, the first intelligence also has itself as a second object 
of thought and finally it emanates the soul of the outermost sphere. The scheme of 
successive emanations is designed in a similar way. The second intelligence has the 
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First Cause, itself as a being necessarily existent by reason of its cause, and itself as 
objects of its thought. The final link in the chain of incorporeal intelligence is the active 
intellect which is in charge of human thinking activity is identified with the nous 
poietikos in De Anima 111.5. Avicenna tries to explain why the process of emanation 
stops at the active intellect by saying that although it is true to say that necessary 
emanation of a multiplicity of things from, an incorporeal intelligence produces a 
plurality of aspects in the successive intelligence, nevertheless the process is not 
convertible. Additionally, all intelligences which contain the same kind of aspects do 
not produce the same type of effects. There is therefore an intrinsic relation between 
when an intelligence emanates and what an intelligence is. Throughout emanation 
intelligences become less powerful and pure. In other words, their power diminishes. 
Since the active intellect represents the final link in the series, it is not powerful enough 
and pure enough to emanate eternal beings like others. 12 
However, the active intellect has a set of functions to fulfil, which are: 
1. The active intellect cannot imitate the intelligences above, it cannot emanate 
anything eternally, but the active intellect is the emanating cause of the matter in 
the sublunar world. 
2. The active intellect is the emanating cause of natural forms such as the forming 
of plants, animals and human beings. 
3. It acts as the principle of the actualisation of the human intellect. 
He goes further and says that even some works in the sublunar world cannot solely be 
attributed to the active intellect. He prefers to talk, in some instances, of the 
participation of auxiliary factors. 
Avicenna, as opposed to al-Farabi, rejects the argument that the celestial spheres 
cannot merely be the existence of the underlying matter of the sublunar world. If 
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material substratum underlies the four elements and everything in the world of change 
the circular motion of the celestial spheres could only be regarded as an auxiliary factor 
in relation to a single common material substratum and the four elements. For the 
uniform motion of the spheres cannot explain multiplicity and diversity in the sublunar 
region. Each sphere is different from the next. They do not share common attributes. 
If that is the case, how could the sphere be regarded as the cause of the completely 
uniform prime matter of the sublunar world? According to him we should look at 
something different, and he comes to say that merely the incorporeal intelligences could 
be candidates for producing the wholly uniform prime matter of the sublunar world, the 
active intellect. It contains the forms of the lunar world, that is, the forms in the 
sublunar world, but we should make it clear that the active intellect, with the 
participation of the movements of the heavens and from the last of the intelligences is 
emanated (yaJ1d). So prime matter which contains the forms of all natural things in the 
sublunar world is emanated by the active intellect. However, this is not done without 
the participation of the heavens, but the contribution of the heavens through their 
circular motion is not explained. 
According to Davidson, what we see here is this: in Aristotle, the classic proof 
of existence of a First Cause is from motion in the universe. Avicenna, however, 
presents us with proof from the existence of the universe. Aristotle inferred the 
existence of the celestial intelligences from the motion of celestial spheres whereas 
Avicenna came to infer their existence from the existence of the spheres. In this 
context, many Aristotelian commentators have come to regard the active intellect as 
something which enables the human intellect to pass from potentiality to actuality. In 
Avicenna, however, the matter is understood quite differently. He inferred the 
existence of the active intellect from the existence of sublunar prime matter. He went 
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further and inferred the existence of an active intellect from the existence of natural 
forms in the sublunar region and more truly from the existence of the human soul. 
In sum, the active intellect possesses all natural forms in a unified mode. The 
active intellect emanates the forms eternally. It emanates them out of necessity, for to 
act in the way the active intellect does is also the necessary expression of its being. " 
The active intellect is described as the giver of forms however, the active intellect is an 
immaterial, unifying being. Being as such, it could only produce a unitary effect in a 
unitary subject, and if the active intellect acts upon undifferentiated matter it will only 
produce undifferentiated effect. What this would mean is that matter would not 
potentially contain a plurality of forms. In Avicenna, an individualising principle 
(mukhossis) is related to the celestial spheres which impose four qualities, namely heat, 
cold, dryness and wetness, on matter. He also speaks of the same sphere which also 
helps matter for the reception of forms. 
The active intellect, as it has been said already, emanates the forms of the four 
elements, which are earth, water, air and fire. He dismisses completely a mechanical 
understanding of the universe. He thinks that matter cannot exist without the form of an 
element. 
There is an intrinsic relation between the matter of something and the form. In a 
sense, the finer the blend the more perfect the form. The four elements cannot receive 
life in virtue of containing contrary qualities in them. Avicenna accepts that matter has 
the potentiality of receiving all physical forms. Matter, in a way, possesses the imprint 
of the forms of the sublunar world in virtue of being acted on by the active intellect. A 
manifestation of new form in matter is no more than an exhibition of the form in matter, 
for matter has merely exhibited what it had potentially. The manifestation of form in 
matter is realised by way of preparation which includes removal of obstacles. When 
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obstacles are removed and matter is prepared to receive higher forms, the contrary 
qualities begin to disappear in a given portion of matter. At the final stage of this 
process the mixture comes to resemble the celestial bodies which have no contrary 
qualities. 
At the possible upper limit of homogeneity, matter could reach the point where 
no further destruction of contrary is possible, and when matter is blended to the perfect 
degree it becomes capable of receiving a human soul which is immaterial substance. A 
human soul in a sense represents the relation between the body of a celestial sphere, the 
soul of the sphere and the corresponding immaterial intelligence. 
Avicenna firmly argues that the active intellect is the cause of the existence of 
the human soul. He maintains that the human body cannot produce its own soul insofar 
as it is a body. The reason for it is that a body does not act except through its powers. 
However, the powers within the human body are also not enough to produce the human 
soul, for they are material as opposed to the human soul. He goes further and states that 
anything corporeal cannot produce anything incorporeal. In other words, the corporeal 
cannot be the cause of the incorporeal. For what is above cannot be produced by what 
is under. 
Some final remarks on the subject: he claims that the celestial spheres are not 
the cause of the existence of other souls. For the soul of the spheres acts only through 
their bodies. If that is the case, a body cannot be intermediary amongst souls. When 
we come to the First Cause of the universe, it cannot be the cause of the existence of 
human souls and intellect, for it is a simple being and creates only a single effect. 
However, there are many human souls and intellects. The incorporeal intelligences are 
also dismissed on the same base. Although the intelligences produce a multiplicity of 
effects, they are far from producing multiplicity within a single species. The cause of 
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multiplicity in a single species could only be produced by an agent which acts upon 
divisible matter, and this is the active intellect which produces a multiplicity of things 
within a single species. " 
14. The Active Intellect and Human Thinking in Avicenna 
It would be wrong to perceive the role of the active intellect in relation to human 
thinking in terms of participation. What I mean is that the active intellect does not 
reside in the human soul, it acts on the human intellect as being a transcendent agent. If 
that is the case, we should investigate how the active intellect produces sublunar matter, 
sublunar forms, intelligible thoughts. However, Avicenna does not explicitly deal with 
it and he also does not explain how they are emanated, whether the active intellect 
produces them through a single emanation or through separate emanation. Therefore I 
would like to concentrate on his theory of the active intellect as the cause of human 
noetic activity in essence. 
Avicenna states that the human soul is immaterial. His argument runs as 
follows: a portion of proper matter receives a human soul from the ever-present 
emanation of the active intellect. As opposed to the other natural forms, the human soul 
has no relation to anything material. In other words, the human soul does not exist in a 
body in any way - as a power or as a form of the body - nor has anything to do with it. 
His reason is that intelligible thoughts are indivisible and can only reside in an 
indivisible subject. If the human soul is to receive intelligible thought then it must be an 
immaterial substance but, he does not deny that as long as the soul operates through the 
body, the soul is not conscious of composite propositions originating from perception. 
But the question is, how can the soul as an indivisible immaterial substance relate itself 
to perception? Further, if the soul is an immaterial substance and does not reside in a 
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human body, how could it ever be said to be in a state of potentiality? 
Some have detected a Cartesian flavour in Avicenna's argument. He offers an 
example to explain his view: imagine a man who imagines himself floating in the air 
but no part of his body touches any other part and he does not have any sensory 
experience. According to him, the man will still be aware of his existence. 
He accepts that the immaterial human soul has just capacity to think at birth. It 
does not contain any thought whatsoever. The potentiality to think develops as the child 
grows. He differentiates three stages of human intellect: 
a) 'Material' intellect which is merely an empty potentiality for thinking and 
belongs to all individuals. It inheres within the human being from birth. It is a 
disposition (istidad). 
b) 'Intellect in habitu' (bil-malaka) provides the first intelligible thoughts. For 
example, "the whole is greater than the part" and "things equal to the same thing 
are equal to each other". 
c) The final stage of potential theoretical intellect is called 'actual intellect'. In a 
sense, it represents the perfect potential stage of theoretical intellect. It is the 
complete (kamaliyya) potentiality. Nevertheless, at this stage an individual 
human is still not able to attend to thinking actually. 
He also speaks of the acquired intellect (mustafad). It is entirely different from 
the other levels of the human theoretical intellect. At this level, 'intelligible forms' are 
actually open to the man and he attends to them. Although al-Farabi considered having 
the acquired intellect as the highest level of the human soul, he did not regard it as being 
acquired externally. It rather signifies the level which is reached by human effort. In 
Avicenna, the term acquired intellect points to a completely different fact. He calls it 
acquired intellect for, by virtue of it, potential intellect passes to actuality. It is acquired 
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through contact with the active intellect. What this also indicates is that forms are 
gained externally, namely they are not in the soul. 
It should be noted that the active intellect is the cause of the four levels of human 
intellect. It emanates a human soul which is received by a portion of proper matter. 
With being the cause of the existence of the human material intellect, the active intellect 
leads man from one stage to the next. It also provides the individual human being with 
the first principles of thought and concepts. 
It is interesting also to point out that Avicenna rejects the principles of practical 
intellect in the active intellect. He considers the principle of practical intellect as 
commonly accepted views, traditions, opinions and flimsy experiences. Al-Farabi had 
also regarded the principles of practical intellect as coming from experience. He had 
also refuted the view that they have anything to do with the active intellect. 
Avicenna also claims that experience does not give us necessary propositions. In 
other words, universal propositions which are of certainty do not come from experience. 
For example, "one could say that all animals move their lower jaw when they are 
eating", but it is a fact that "the crocodile moves its upper jaw when it chews". 
Avicenna here observes the limitations of empirical knowledge. As opposed to the 
example above, the first principles of thought, for example the proposition "the whole is 
greater than the part" is universally true. He thus comes to conclude that certainty 
cannot come from judgements based on experience. Universal propositions emanate 
from a divine source, namely from the active intellect. Therefore, to know them is to 
enter into conjunction (ittisal) with the immaterial principle that is the active intellect. 
Knowing, in his view, is the process of replacing the soul's original defective disposition 
with a perfect (tamm) disposition. To attend to knowledge is to enter into conjunction 
with the active intellect. 
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Now let us consider Avicenna's understanding of the conjunction. He firmly 
rejects the view that conjunction is union. The reason he gives for his refutation goes as 
follows: if we say that "the human soul becomes united with the active intellect" we 
must also accept that when it knows a single thought it would be able to possess 
everything that the active intellect contains. In other words, it would know everything 
that the active intellect knows. This would also necessitate that the human soul knows 
all intelligible thoughts and be ignorant of nothing which is impossible. Another reason 
for the impossibility of union with the active intellect for the human soul is that the soul 
cannot unite with a part of the active intellect, for immaterial beings are indivisible so 
they do not have parts. Therefore, the only way left is conjunction which does rule out 
any union but effect (athar). The active intellect is then the direct source of human 
thought. When the human soul enters into conjunction with the active intellect, it 
becomes identical with it. Thoughts it receives or which emanate from the active 
intellect are absolute, simple and undifferentiated. They are namely concepts which are 
of non-discursive nature. Therefore, thoughts given by the active intellect and received 
by the human soul are of divine nature. They resemble the thoughts of the celestial 
bodies. 85 
15. Discursive and Non-Discursive Noetic Activity 
As was stated previously, the Islamic interpreters of Aristotle regarded the active 
intellect as a transcendent substance. However, they did not agree in their under- 
standing of how the active intellect produces actual thought in the potential human 
intellect. 
In De Anima, Aristotle says that we never think without images. The images, 
he also states, are in the imaginative faculty. 86 Aristotle also maintains that intellect is 
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related to what is intelligible as perception is to what is perceptible. The intellect is 
identified with what it thinks. However, unlike perception, thinking is not an affec 
tion. 87 In sum, the human intellect does not think without images and images are within 
the imaginative faculty. Whenever the intellect thinks, then, it becomes identical with 
what it thinks. But when we come to try to understand the role given to the active 
intellect, we find that Aristotle himself does not say much about it. He offers us two 
undeveloped analogies, the first of which compares the active intellect to the 'art' which 
acts on matter. He gives us another example a few lines later, in which the active 
intellect is compared to light. The active intellect makes actual what is potential, like 
light makes potential colours actual. The analogy suggests that the active intellect leads 
the human intellect to actuality by way of illuminating what is intelligible in the world. 
If we would like to be more precise, it leads the human intellect by way of illuminating 
what is intelligible in images contained in the imaginative faculty. The intelligible 
images are then presented to the human intellect. The potential intellect becomes actual 
and identical with them. This way of understanding the analogies brings us closer to 
Plato, but there is no textual support for understanding the analogies in this way. He 
writes a few sentences on the matter and gives us two analogies and then turns his 
attention to other things. 
In general, we could say that al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes offer us two 
sorts of explanation by which they try to explain how the active intellect produces actual 
human thought. The core of the explanation goes like this: the active intellect 
illuminates images in the imaginative faculty and leads the potential intellect to actuality 
by way of doing this. The other explanation is that the active intellect functions as a 
cosmic transmitter. It eternally emanates all intelligible thoughts. Its transmissions are 
then received by the human intellects which are capable of it. In other words, the 
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human intellects receive intelligible thoughts directly from the active intellect. RB 
Avicenna speaks of a retention and compositive imaginative faculty (khayal and 
ashya mutakhayyala). The retentive imaginative faculty receives and retains images 
from the sensus communis whereas the compositive imaginative faculty combines 
images in the retentive imagination with one another and separates them at its own 
disposal. 
We have already seen that Avicenna claims that the human intellect receives 
intelligible thoughts directly from the active intellect when it is properly prepared by the 
compositive imaginative faculty and it obtains thought when it looks on particulars in the 
retentive imagination (khayal). Whatever the relation between the human intellect, the 
retentive and compositive imaginative faculty may be, he appears to be claiming that the 
human intellect takes forms from images that are provided either by retentive or 
compositive imaginative faculties that present images to the human intellect. In other 
words, the human intellect receives thoughts from the active intellect and the active 
intellect works on it through the retentive and imaginative faculty. 
Another important faculty in Avicenna is the thinking faculty which is called in 
Arabic mutafakkira or fikra. It, like the two kinds of imaginative faculty, is internal to 
all individuals. As far as the function of the imaginative faculty is concerned, it is 
almost identical with it. The faculty of mutafakkira works on images in the retentive 
imagination by way of combining and discombining in order to form new 
configurations. It is in the brain and is subject to change. More precisely, it is not an 
intellectual faculty but a physical one. It does not survive after death. 
Avicenna distinguishes two phases of human thought. In the first phase the 
active intellect produces an intellect in which thought is not differentiated. In the second 
phase thought becomes differentiated. With the second phase the act of the active 
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intellect starts and ends within the human soul. The thinking faculty (mafakkira, frkra) 
retains the further emanations of differentiated forms from the absolute or abstract 
intellect which had emanated in the first place. The thinking faculty puts differentiated 
forms into forms (alfaz) and arranges the forms in sequences. Since differentiated 
knowledge is produced through the thinking faculty, Avicenna distinguishes it from the 
undifferentiated knowledge or simple knowledge which emanates in the first of the two 
phases. Avicenna also says that simple knowledge belongs to intellect whereas 
differentiated knowledge is contained in the soul. 89 
The aim of thinking (discursive thinking) is to enable the individual to have a 
perfect disposition for conjunction with the active intellect. Discursive thinking seeks to 
establish a relation, a perfect relation with the active intellect. The discursive faculty 
prepares the soul for conjoining with the active intellect in a sense in two phases. In the 
first phase, it combines and separates images preserved in the retentive imagination and 
passes on the human intellect. In the second phase it produces thoughts which are 
undifferentiated and ordered in logical sequence. In doing so, the discursive faculty 
induces the emanation of the active intellect within the human soul. After this, the soul 
is ready to conjoin with the active intellect at its will. Furthermore, the soul does not 
need the discursive faculty any more. It does not have to go back to images and resort 
to the use of the discursive faculty in order to conjoin with the active intellect. 
Now it is perhaps time to question the place of discursive thinking in Avicenna's 
philosophy. The discursive faculty or discursive thinking brings the human soul from 
the level of merely having material intellect to the highest possible stage. In a way the 
discursive faculty follows the human soul through the stage of intellect in habitu, the 
stage of actual intellect, and finally is at work at the stage of the acquired intellect. 
Avicenna generally associates discursive thinking with conclusions of syllogism. The 
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soul comes to recognise the conclusion of a syllogism when its discursive faculty retains 
the middle term through the emanation of the active intellect and combines the elements 
of syllogism. For example, a person begins with the concept of man and mortal. These 
two concepts, however, were provided by the emanation of the active intellect through 
the discursive faculty. During the formation of a syllogism the discursive faculty 
presents an image to the soul. By doing so, it prepares the soul to receive the emanation 
of the active intellect. It differentiates the concept animal from the emanation of the 
active intellect, which could function as a middle term. And the discursive faculty, 
indeed the same faculty, then forms the major premise of a syllogism; all men are 
animals. 
Avicenna also tries to explain why we make mistakes or, more precisely, why 
the discursive faculty appears to make mistakes. For if the discursive faculty does so 
more than preparing the soul for conjoining with the active intellect, how does error 
occur? He already thinks that conjunction with the active intellect produces the terms 
and concepts (including the middle term). Therefore, error cannot come from the 
above, i. e. from the active intellect or through conjunction with it. However, it is the 
result of combining and separating by the discursive faculty. It is said therefore that it 
does sometimes well and sometimes badly. It should also be remembered that the 
discursive faculty is a physical faculty of the soul. It makes mistakes sometimes. The 
active intellect cannot be held responsible for the mistakes the discursive faculty 
sometimes makes. 90 Although the discursive faculty has an important role to play in 
establishing conjunction with the active intellect, it is no longer needed once the human 
intellect has conjoined with the active intellect. In sum, it could be said that it loses its 
centrality in human thought at a point of conjunction. Thus the discursive faculty is to 
be dispensed with at the end. It even need not be used to re-establish conjunction with 
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the active intellect to rethink the thought. 
I would now like to enter into the discussion of non-discursive thought, or 
intuition, in Avicenna. 
The term agkhinoia in Posterior Analytics is translated into Arabic meaning that 
"wit (dhaka) indicates a fine attribute of intuition (husn hals) to find out middle terms in 
no time". Avicenna shares the same view and considers quick wit as the strength of 
intuition (hads). 9' 
As opposed to the discursive faculty, the person who has intuitive power reaches 
"the middle term" and the conclusion of the syllogism instantaneously. There is no need 
to resort to images to produce the middle term of a syllogism. It is a divine power 
within the human being. In other words, intuition is a divine emanation and intellectual 
12 conjunction which does not require any discursive activity (kasb). 
Although the discursive faculty could sometimes err, intuition does not make 
any mistakes, for it receives the conclusions together with the middle term from the 
active intellect. A person with the power of intuition conjoins with the active intellect 
without any discursive activity of the intellect. It is a direct relationship with the active 
intellect. However, a person who lacks it could also enter into conjunction with active 
intellect through the discursive faculty. I would finally like to say that intuition in the 
perfect sense signifies the highest level of prophecy in Avicenna. 
16. Conjunction versus Union: the Active Intellect and Immortality 
It should be remembered that among the stages of the human intellect, acquired 
intellect signifies the highest level of intellectual development, for it brings the human 
intellect into conjunction with the active intellect. It is the crowning state of the human 
intellect. However, in Avicenna conjunction is perceived rather differently from al- 
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Farabi. He considers conjunction and having the acquired intellect as quotidian events. 
They do not indicate or signify absolute intellectual perfection. Al-Farabi claims that 
the acquired intellect leads the human intellect to conjunction with the active intellect, 
whereas Avicenna thinks that through conjunction the human soul gains the acquired 
intellect. In sum, the conjunction of the human intellect with the active intellect does 
not in any way indicate union with the active intellect. It is the non-discursive faculty 
that signifies the perfection. Before that, the human being depends on the external and 
internal senses. However, after having a thought the human soul no longer resorts to 
images. It immerses itself in its own activity. The soul in a sense discards the faculty 
of perception, imagination. Just as when a person reaches the summit of a mountain 
he/she discards equipment that is used to get there. If he/she keeps this equipment it 
will get in the way. Similarly, when the human soul reaches its perfection or its 
ultimate aim, the physical faculties which helped it to get there are no longer needed and 
should be dispensed with. Furthermore the human soul does not need the entire body. 
Avicenna thinks that the human intellect can apprehend only one thought at a 
time. However, it is not clear whether this applies to the intellect which has reached its 
intellectual perfection. He definitely speaks of a state of the human soul in which it is 
released from the body and enters into conjunction with the active intellect permanently. 
It also becomes identical with the immaterial beings which contain the entire corpus of 
the intelligible order of all existence. It suggests that the soul is also able to think the 
entire corpus of thought which is undifferentiated. Avicenna cancels such a conjunction 
with the active intellect and immaterial beings until the death of the body, but it is not 
clear whether the human intellect can achieve permanent conjunction and be able to 
think the entire corpus of thought in an undifferentiated mode during the life of the 
body. It appears that it could only be achieved through intuition. Whether Avicenna 
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envisages here the mystical or ecstatic experience is rather controversial. 93 
Corbin finds a full expression of mystical doctrine in the work of Avicenna, 
namely Isharat. But Davidson claims that the term arif might appear to imply mystical 
overtones in such contexts. Nevertheless, the fact is that it means knower, man of 
knowledge. So the cognate abstract noun, irfan, basically means knowledge, therefore 
the Isharat describes the person of knowledge who attains a course of training and 
devotes him/herself completely to the "absolute truth". Such a person turns away from 
the world of falsehood and experiences intense feelings frequently by which the "light of 
the truth" shines on him/her. He/she could eventually realise conjunction. ' It appears 
to me that Davidson cannot be justified in his claim that conjunction does not imply 
genuine mystical or ecstatic experience, for the language that Avicenna uses just 
indicates otherwise. 
In general, philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition and Aristotelian commenta- 
tors limit human immortality to the intellect in the human being. Al-Farabi tried to 
establish a direct relation between immortality and the acquired intellect. However, 
Avicenna follows a different path from him. According to him, the immortality of the 
human being has nothing to do with the perfection or the intellectual development of the 
human intellect. He says that the human soul is immortal because it is an immaterial 
substance. In other words, every individual human soul is immortal perforce. 
Another of Avicenna's formulations in favour of the immortality of the human 
soul is the suggestion that it does not contain the potentiality of being destroyed, since it 
is an immaterial substance. Therefore, it does not perish with the decay of the human 
body. The human soul is thus intrinsically immortal. 
Avicenna conceives intelligible thoughts as concepts. He argues that concepts 
are indivisible and they could only reside in an indivisible and immaterial subject. If the 
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human soul is to have concepts, the soul must be immaterial. 
Avicenna justifies the independence of the human soul from the body in stating 
that: 
1. The body cannot and is not the cause of the existence of the soul. The human 
body does not bring the human soul into existence. The body is nothing and 
affects nothing so long as it is a body. It just helps the soul accidentally. 
Therefore the human soul as being immaterial and self-sufficient substance 
cannot be, in a sense, produced by the body. Avicenna also rejects the con- 
sideration that the body is the material cause of the soul. He does not see that 
the soul is imprinted in the body. The body is also declared not to be the formal 
cause or the final cause of the immaterial soul. 
2. The body and the soul are substances but they are not interdependent on each 
other for their existence. 
3. Since they do not depend on each other to exist, the existence of the soul does 
not require the existence of the body. It is clear from the fact that the body 
decays in virtue of its nature but not as a result of the soul. Therefore the 
human soul does not perforce die with the decay of the body. 
If that is the case, one is rightly entitled to ask, is there any role left to be played by the 
body? The answer is the affirmative. However, it is not significant at all. The body 
determines the time when a soul is emanated from the active intellect. The way in 
which a portion of matter blended acts as an accidental cause of the soul. 
Avicenna has another thesis with regard to the immortality of the human soul 
which is: the body cannot be the cause of the destruction of the soul because an object 
which is subject to destruction contains two features which oppose each other. Things 
which now exist but also are subject to destruction are composite beings. On the 
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contrary, immaterial beings are incomposite and they do not contain any multiplicity so 
that they are immune to destruction. For the human soul is of the same nature as the 
immaterial beings, it is not subject to destruction too. 
Avicenna also goes back to the discussion Aristotle offers in De Caelo. 
According to Aristotle, the things that are generated are also subject to destruction. 95 
Avicenna also appeals to what Aristotle says in De Anima 2.1. Aristotle says that any 
part of the soul whose actuality (entelecheia) constitutes also the actuality of a part of the 
body cannot be separated from the body. However, he also says that a part of the soul 
whose actuality is not the actuality of a part of the body survives death. Avicenna 
construes Aristotle's thought in a way which allows him to make the human soul 
entirely immortal. According to Avicenna, Aristotle cannot speak of a part of the soul 
being immortal because he conceives the soul as one. Immortality cannot also be gained 
through the development of the human intellectual faculty because whatever is not self- 
subsistent at the beginning cannot become so through the acquisition of an attribute. 
Avicenna also argues that Aristotle cannot be referring to the active intellect, since it 
does not form part of the human soul. Furthermore, Aristotle speaks of the human soul 
as a unity, therefore he comes to conclude that the human soul is immaterial and 
separate from the body. 
However, it should be noted that Avicenna does not completely dismiss any 
relation between the immortality of the human soul and its intellectual perfection. Not 
only does it determine levels of immortality, the intellectual development also bears a 
great importance as far as the happiness of an individual is concerned. 96 
Firstly, I would like to say that in Avicenna's view every individual human 
being is not to have supreme eudaimonia (saada). In order to enjoy the highest 
eudaimonia an individual must achieve a perfect disposition for intellectual thought. 
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The soul of such an individual does not have any use for the sense faculties. It also 
preserves its disposition after the death of the body. It enters into conjunction with the 
active intellect and experiences eternal eudaimonia. It is now united with the immaterial 
beings and becomes identical with them. As they are, the human soul also attains the 
corpus of the intelligible thought. There is, I believe, no need to say that the corpus of 
thoughts are non-discursive ones. 
Eudaimonia which is below the supreme one is available to those who succeed in 
achieving some sort of intellectual development in the present life. However, it is not 
perfect enough for conjunction with the active intellect and the immaterial beings. A 
person of this level must gain a considerable segment of physical and metaphysical 
science to enjoy a degree of eudaimonia. 
Below this level a person can hope for no eudaimonia whatsoever. The human 
souls that could not acquire nor have the minimum degree of knowledge for minimal 
eudaimonia, appreciate the importance of the intellectual perfection. The appreciation 
of the intellectual activity, however, brings them just misery and pain after the death of 
their bodies. They have been controlled by two divergent factors: on the one hand they 
know that they are able to participate in intellectual activity and it is only the soul that 
could allow them to obtain perfection. In other words, they are aware of the soul's 
natural desire for intellectual perfection. However, they are equally controlled by the 
need of their bodies, which cause them to forget or to ignore their own essence. At the 
end of their lives, they realise that it is too late to follow the telos of the soul. The 
principles of science can only be acquired during our lifetime through the help of the 
physical faculties but, now the body is perished, there is nothing left to do to reverse the 
whole thing. They are destined to experience inevitable intense pain. 
At the bottom of the scale, Avicenna speaks of the souls which are simple and 
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have no appreciation of intellectual pleasure. They do not have dispositions to conjoin 
with the active intellect, nor have they any desire for it. In virtue of not having any 
inkling of intellectual desire, this sort of human souls are also immune to the pain 
experienced by the souls above them. 
The life they could have after death is void of intellectual pleasure and the pain 
of realising that intellectual pleasure and perfection are beyond them. According to 
him, they are like formless material substratum and share a kind of peace for all 
eternity. In fact, such a life is almost equal to non-existence. 97 
However, the pain experienced by a soul subservient to the body and its needs 
fades away gradually but the pain of unfulfilled intellectual desire endures forever. The 
reason he gives is that intellectual desire explains the essence of the human rational soul. 
Therefore it exists as long as the soul continues to exist. As opposed to this, the pain of 
the subservient soul fades away. For the pain enslaved soul experience is due to the 
body. In sum, Avicenna does not relate immortality directly to intellect but the 
perfection of intellect plays a significant role in relation to eudaimonia. 
17. Intuition, Prophecy and Intellect 
It would not be wrong to say that the source of divergent views on Aristotle's 
theory of intellect among the Aristotelian commentators has been mainly to establish the 
relation between the noun poietikos and the human intellect. As we have particularly 
witnessed in Avicenna, the relation between the two intellects has almost lost any 
connection with Aristotle's views on the subject. It appears to be more plausible to talk 
of a Neoplatonised Aristotle rather than anything else. Furthermore, Avicenna 
introduces some other elements into his interpretation of Aristotle which bear no relation 
to Aristotelian philosophy. The most important and the most interesting of these is 
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prophecy, which is considered by Avicenna very subtly; therefore, it seems that he 
ultimately intended to explain what is said in the Quran rather than wishing to 
Neoplatonise Aristotle, and he conceded that it could only be done by resorting to 
Neoplatonic thoughts. However, the conception of Aristotelian God remained essential 
in almost all Islamic philosophers. 
I do not intend here to provide Avicenna's view on prophecy in full, for it is 
beyond the scope of this project. 
Avicenna, as opposed to al-Farabi, relates prophecy directly to the active 
intellect. It will be remembered that al-Farabi found a place for prophecy in intellect. 
He distinguishes two types of people, which also determines two levels of prophecy. At 
the lower level of prophecy the emanation of the active intellect passes through the 
rational faculty and enters the imaginative faculty of the human soul whose intellect is 
not perfected. The human soul can receive the knowledge of individual events which 
are of future and beyond the power of senses. It can also depict theoretical truth 
figuratively. However, at the higher level of prophecy, which is also called revelation, 
the emanation from the active intellect is received by a human intellect which is perfect 
and ready to enter into conjunction with the active intellect. However, it should be 
made clear that in both cases of prophecy the emanation of the active intellect is 
reflected in the imaginative faculty. The human intellect does not actually play an 
important role, therefore prophecy is not conceived to produce genuine theoretical 
knowledge. Avicenna also tries to explain prophecy mainly in terms of al-Farabi but he 
recognises that prophecy produces theoretical knowledge. According to Avicenna, the 
human soul obtains intelligible thoughts from the active intellect so that the human 
intellect just does not have to follow discursive procedures. He thinks that intellectual 
and imaginative prophecy are all internal. They could be attended by any soul which is 
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properly prepared. 
Avicenna connects intellectual prophecy to intuition. The discursive faculty has 
the function of presenting images to the human intellect. By doing so, it prepares the 
soul and intellect for conjunction with the active intellect. Once conjunction is 
established with the active intellect, the discursive faculty starts to work by differenti- 
ating intelligible thoughts out of the emanation. However, for some souls this is not a 
compulsory route to follow in order to reach knowledge. They do not have to revert to 
the discursive procedure. Avicenna says that intuition can vary with respect to quantity 
and quality. The quantity is of the numbers of the middle terms of syllogisms. Of the 
quality, it can be discovered in relation to quickness. The people with the lower 
intellectual power possess no intuition at all, but a person who is at the highest level of 
intellectual perfection possesses intuition with regard to all subjects of inquiry and can 
exercise their ability in the briefest time. In other words, Avicenna considers that the 
people who are at the upper level of intellectual perfection have also intuition in the 
superlative sense. Such people receive only a report of the truth. He also speaks of 
prophecy which is peculiar to the compositive imaginative faculty. It is inferior to 
intellectual prophecy, for it happens to a person whose intellect is not necessarily meant 
to be at its perfection. In addition, depiction of theoretical thoughts is figurative but not 
scientific in character. Avicenna also speaks of another type of prophecy which enables 
him to rationalise miracles. He relates it to the desire of the soul. A noble, powerful 
soul can affect other bodies by complete strength of will. Such a soul can heal the sick, 
turn fire into earth, cause rain to fall and so on. It is a non-intellectual prophecy and 
creates changes in the physical world through acts of 'sheer will'. 
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18. From Reason to Experience: A Transition and Transformation 
Islamic philosophers did not see any conflict between their religion and 
philosophy, therefore they believed that they could establish the principles of Islam 
philosophically or remove some mistakes from the sayings of philosophy - so much so 
that al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna, Averroes and al-Ghazali endorsed different 
philosophical theories and approaches throughout their intellectual lives. Although, by 
the time of al-Ghazali, we witness a real break between philosophy and religion, he is 
nevertheless seen by Averroes as being an Asharite with the Asharities, a Suf with the 
Sufis and a philosopher with the philosophers. 98 Islamic philosophers in general 
followed Aristotle enthusiastically. I believe the reason for this is the monotheist 
conception of God in Aristotle, for nous poietikos is generally perceived as a 
transcendent being, but it is never identified with God. It essentially remains, if one can 
say it, as a vicar of God on earth. However, they were very much influenced by 
Neoplatonist philosophy because the Quranic conception of God, regardless of its strict 
monotheist conception of God, is the one which is in full charge of everything on earth. 
From that point of view, the combination of Aristotle's thoughts with Neoplatonist 
philosophy was very much needed, and they just did it. 
My interest in following the interpretation of Aristotle's theory of the intellect 
lies in rediscovering Aristotle. Seeing the different and divergent understanding of the 
theory of the intellect at different times and by different minds, I am hoping to make my 
contribution to this long struggle, but for now let us proceed with the views of the 
Islamic philosophers who mainly endorsed Avicenna's philosophy. 
Avicenna wrote in Arabic as well as in Persian, and his works were available to 
Moslem readers. 99 One of his infamous followers was Ghazali. He criticised him 
severely yet at the same time followed some of Ibn-sina's thoughts so closely but at the 
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end decided that philosophy should be killed. "' 
The first encounter in search of truth was with the rational theologians (muta- 
kallimun). According to al-Ghazali they operate on the basis of certain presuppositions 
which are not discussed but taken for granted. However, al-Ghazali thinks that they are 
those that require a rational justification, but theologians are unable to provide this 
justification. Thus he turned to philosophy to get rid of his intellectual worries. 
He encountered Isma' ilities who receive their instruction in an authoritative 
form, imam. The main point with which Ghazali did not agree was that according to 
Isma'ilities, if one wants to reach internal truth or infallible knowledge on any point, 
one must turn to the infallible source of it, namely to the infallible imam. 
His final encounter was with sufism. Ghazali finally came to realise that 
philosophy cannot provide an answer to the problem of knowledge. There is a limit to 
the knowledge that could be gained by rational methods. Watt tells us that in Munqidh, 
Ghazali speaks of his dissatisfaction by saying that "I realised ... that I had already 
advanced as far as was possible by way of knowledge. What remained for me was not 
to be attained by instruction and study but only by immediate experience and by living 
as a Sufi" 101 
While he was in Baghdad, Ghazali became very much dissatisfied with his life. 
It occurred to him that his activity was controlled by personal ambition instead of the 
desire to serve God. He had profound internal perplexities and struggles which in turn 
led him to some sort of serious psychological illness. He almost could not speak 
because his tongue dried up. He also became unable to teach and feed himself. The 
doctors could not do anything and at the end he decided to give up academic work 
entirely and join the life of a sufi. 
He died in Tus on 18th December 1110. According to his brother Ahmad, on 
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the day of his death he first had his ablutions and performed the dawn prayer. Then he 
asked for his shroud, kissed it, put it on his eyes and said, "Obediently, I enter into the 
presence of the King". He then turned and faced Mecca. Then he stretched out his feet 
and was dead before sunrise. 102 
19. Greek Philosophy, Islam and Ghazali 
It is known from al-Munqidh min ad-dalal (The Deliverer from Error) that 
Ghazali's intellectual journey was long, painful and difficult. His quest for truth never 
ceased and his personal difficulties did not end until he gave up his academic work and 
joined the life of a Sufi. At the beginning, however, he decided to study 'the sciences' 
of philosophy to find truth. It is also true, however, that at his time theology was in a 
weak position as opposed to philosophy. It could not stand philosophical criticism, for 
the religious scholars tried to reply to philosophical questions with inadequate answers 
and became ridiculed by the philosophers. 
Al-Ghazali began as a sceptic. He was ready to be led by truth. He also wanted 
to see how far the Greek sciences were in line with the principles of Islam. Like most 
of the Islamic philosophers, he saw no conflict between Islam and logic, mathematics 
and physics, but al-Ghazali also noticed that the clarity and certainty of mathematical 
arguments used by the philosophers were misleading people. It led people to think that 
all the arguments of the philosophers were of the same clarity and certainty and thus 
followed their views, their metaphysical thoughts, without any question. 
After writing Maqasid al falasifa (The Aims of the Philosophers), he wrote 
another book, called Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Inconsistency of the Philosophers). 
Ghazali mainly criticised philosophers and tried to show how their metaphysical views 
were wrong and weak from the logical point of view. He subtly argued against the 
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views of philosophers and came to conclude that they were wrong, at least on twenty 
points. In other words, they were mistaken on many things and their views contained 
many contradictions. Of the twenty points, Ghazali considered three as the most 
serious: 
1. Bodies cannot be resurrected but only souls. 
2. God knows what is universal but not particulars. 
3. The world is eternal, thus it is not created. 
The positive influence of Ghazali's work was that the disciplines associated with 
philosophy are neutral with regard to Islam. Thus he persuaded some of the theologians 
to be involved with them, e. g. Aristotelian logic and metaphysical conceptions, except 
the twenty points. He himself adored the logical works of Aristotle. As a result of his 
effort, later rational theologians in Islam tended to base their views on a philosophical 
basis. 
When we come to the negative results of Ghazali's study, it is hard to be 
objective. However, it is generally considered that his attack on the philosophers was 
devastating, so that as a result philosophy was killed off. 'o3 
However, it seems to me absurd to blame Ghazali for the death of philosophy in 
the Islamic world. It may be true that there were no great philosophers in the east after 
1100 who could be placed within the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions, but it 
should also be remembered that the last great philosopher, Ibn-sina, had died in 1037. 
This shows that Avicenna had died twenty years before al-Ghazali was born. It is 
possible that the decline of philosophy may have started long before Ghazali. However, 
Averroes was writing a critique of the Tahafut in the western Islamic world, but what 
cannot be denied is that philosophy almost perished with his death in 1111. 
We will see in what follows that the end of a particular philosophical tradition 
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did not mean the end of philosophising. People continued to profess al-Farabi and 
Avicenna. It would be more correct to say that doing philosophy was transformed along 
two fresh lines: on the one hand, through the incorporation of philosophical conceptions 
and methods into rational theology, certain disciplines of philosophy became a kind of 
prolegomena to theology. This was particularly true of Sunnite theologians. On the 
other hand, some were interested in the fusion of philosophy with Shi'ite ideas or with 
non-Islamic mystical thoughts. After Ghazali Shihab-ad-din as-Subrawardi developed 
the philosophy or theosophy of the Ishraq (illuminative window) (1191). It has been 
greatly influential in general but particularly in Iran. Therefore it is, I believe, wrong to 
think that philosophy was killed off by al-Ghazali's critique of philosophy; on the 
contrary, it appears that the study of philosophy was transformed by it in the Islamic 
world. 
The conception of Sufism in previous centuries had not been positive. It had 
been identified with heretical beliefs and with a neglect of the common practice of 
Islam. Therefore, it had not found a great favour among many jurists and theologians. 
Ghazali, being Sufi himself, intended in his greatest work in the Ihya (The Revival of the 
Religious Sciences) to prove how a strict Muslim could lead a genuine Sufi life, and his 
Bidayat al-hidaya explains the rules of such a life which he himself practised after being 
exhausted by academic life in Baghdad. It was also followed in the Monastery College 
which was established by him in Tus. 104 
20. Experience: An Alternative to Discursive Thinking 
We could say that philosophy as a discursive form of thinking has lost its 
attraction in the Islamic world by the time of Ghazali. Islamic theologians and thinkers 
began to question the value of philosophy and sought to discover the meaning of life, 
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truth and happiness in some other way. 
Before discussing the thoughts of Islamic thinkers after Avicenna, I believe that 
it would be useful to say something of the term Sufism. It could mean either a regimen 
of God-fearing asceticism or it could signify mystical experience. 1 ' 
Ghazali's work, entitled Mishkat al Anwar (The Niche of Lights) presents us 
with two types of people who desire to ascend to the 'true heavens' and gain a genuine 
understanding of God. People who try to know through the means of scientific inquiry 
(irfan, i[m) form the one type of people, whereas those who are already in a state of 
direct experience of God or 'true heavens' (hal dhawgi; dwhawq) form the second type 
of people, although Ghazali is aware that the people who belong to the second class are 
open to the danger of pantheistic error, which is to identify oneself with God, are 
nevertheless superior to the people of the first type. Therefore, he does not hesitate in 
his works to say that one should become a person of direct experience, but those who 
cannot be are told to become a person of science. Thus we already witness a new 
understanding in Ghazali. He places intellect below direct experience. Philosophical 
thinking is not considered to satisfy the individual so we are advised to become a person 
of direct experience. 106 
Dissatisfaction with discursive activity of the intellect becomes quite obvious 
when we look at the works of Suhrawardi. Although he has left a number of works, the 
most important of them are Avaz-i Par-i Cibra'ii, Kitab al-Talwiliat and Hikmat al- 
Ishraq (The Philosophy of Illumination). 
Avaz-i Par-i Cibra'il, which has been translated into English under the title of 
The Sound of Gabriel's Wing, is a summary of Avicenna's philosophy, and in Talwiliat, 
which means elucidation, he acknowledges Avicenna as "the finest of philosophers". 
But when we come to Hikmat al-Ishraq, we find Suhrawardi completely disagrees with 
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his conception of the universe. He tells us that although he was once a follower of the 
Peripatetic philosophy, he finally came to see the light. 107 
It is interesting to see that Suhrawardi associates perception with women and 
intellect with men. It is possible that the active intellect is also to be thought of as a 
man. In general, his perception of the universe is not very different from Avicenna. 
The active intellect is essentially the giver of the forms and everything else emanating 
from it, but with the Hikmat aI-Ishraq, Suhrawardi breaks away from Aristotelian 
tradition entirely. The concept of "direct experience" (mushahada) occupies an essential 
role in it as it had done in Ghazali and Ibn-Tufail. It was used to indicate that "direct 
experience" can lead the high road to eternal truth but not discursive thinking. We are 
told that he was himself vouchsafed direct experience of the divine light after his 
'Peripatetic' period, and the Hikmat al-Ishraq is not for those who have not received the 
divine light. They cannot benefit from it in any way whatsoever. Those who pursue 
discursive investigation (bahth) should turn to the Peripatetics where they can find the 
perfect version of discursive philosophy. Even so, I would like to say that he also 
conceived discursive and non-discursive thinking as means to grasp or to attain the 
eternal truth. As such, non-discursive thinking does not comprehend the eternal truth. 
In Siahrawardi, direct experience reveals only the basic propositions, therefore the 
thinker must develop his/her system from them. The science of illumination is a science 
based on premises which were discovered through direct experience. He also does not 
think that he is the first to be vouchsafed direct experience of the divine light. Hermes, 
Plato, Zarathustra, the mystical "faithful, blessed king Kay Khosrow" and Empedocles 
are also credited with the experience. 'os 
In sum, whether the way of conjunction with the divine intellect (the active 
intellect) is discursive or non-discursive, the Islamic philosophers have never identified 
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nous poietikos with God nor the human intellect with nous poietikos and God. The 
active intellect remains as an immaterial and transcendent thing. In addition, discursive 
and non-discursive thinking do not go beyond being merely means to the eternal truth, 
and there is a final point to be made: conjunction with the divine being must be earned. 
There are degrees of eudaimonia and each soul lives happiness according to the level of 
its own intellectual achievement. The eyes of intellect are definitely turned to what is 
above, namely to divine beings by Suhrawardi. 
21. One Potential Intellect for all Humankind: Averroes (Ibn-Rushd) 
Aristotle, in De Anima, posits an intellect which becomes everything. '09 The 
controversy over the nature of the potential intellect has never ceased until now, along 
with the discussion of the nature of the nous poietikos. However, Averroes became 
particularly infamous for his interpretation of Aristotle's words of the potential intellect 
and it stirred up much inconvenience in the Middle Ages among scholars. 
Alexander, as opposed to Themistius, understood the human potential intellect or 
material intellect as a mere disposition, whereas Themistius had construed it as a 
substance. The issue had not been raised until Averroes. 1° 
Islamic philosophers already had a great interest in the interpretation of the 
active intellect but Averroes is haunted by the issue. In attempting to resolve the issue 
he goes from one extreme position to another. The differing understanding of the 
human potential intellect by him has great importance in the history of philosophy. He 
is largely ignored in the Islamic world but his writings stimulated two movements in 
Jewish and Christian philosophical circles. The two movements followed by partial 
reading of Averroes' writings, primarily concerned about the question of the nature of 
the potential human intellect. 
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He refers to the question of the potential intellect against the background of 
Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisiensis, Themistius and Avempace (Ibn-Baja). Aristotle 
himself and writers in the Aristotelian philosophical tradition presupposed that the 
potential intellect reflects the external world without any distortion, for Aristotle thought 
that if the intellect with which the individual is born has some quality before it starts to 
think, the quality the potential intellect has would prevent its operation. In other words, 
it would not mirror reality if it was to be determined. So, in Aristotle, the human 
intellect has no determinations at the beginning and as such it can mirror reality as it is. 
Thus he came to conclude that the part of the soul called intellect exists as a potentiality 
for Aristotle before it thinks, and as such it is not mixed with the body and is separate 
from it. "' 
Aristotle tries to explain the potential intellect by saying that it resembles a tablet 
which has the capacity to be written on, but which so far has nothing actually written on 
it. The intellect which is at the outset potentially everything but actually nothing at all, 
is like the empty writing tablet. There is a further statement made by Aristotle, 
however, which was quoted, requoted and discussed through the centuries: the human 
intellect is impassable. ' 12 
Alexander focused on Aristotle's statements which describe the human potential 
intellect as being nothing until it thinks. He reasoned that anything that is receptive of 
forms of a certain type cannot contain them in its own nature. The reason is that it 
would have its own form and as such it would be unable to receive the other form. If 
all things are capable of being known by the intellect, it can originally have no form in 
itself. It would be nothing actually, but everything potentially; it is nothing actually, it 
is not anything substantial and as such the human potential intellect could only be a 
disposition to receive intelligible forms. 
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In order to eliminate some possible objections, Alexander felt required to give a 
further explanation. It is a fact that a tablet is already an existent being prior to any 
writing on it, whereas Aristotle had compared the material intellect to a tablet but it is 
nothing before it starts to think. In order to overcome the apparent difficulty, Alexander 
offers a distinction between the 'unwritten tablet itself' and the 'written character of the 
tablet'. Thus he comes to construe that the true analogue of the tablet is the soul 
whereas the material intellect corresponds to the unwritten aspect of the tablet. In other 
words, it is the disposition for being written on. When it is written on, the writing 
tablet undergoes change, but the disposition which the tablet has in order to receive 
writing does not undergo change. It is not affected when it is brought to actuality, since 
it is not some substratum or anything in actuality. 
As a result the material intellect which corresponds to the disposition the tablet 
has to receive writing undergoes no affection when it starts to think, provided that it 
does not belong to the class of actual things because only something actual, only a 
subject or substratum can be said to be capable of being affected. 
In sum, Alexander construed the potential or material intellect to be merely a 
disposition in the human soul. It has no actuality and in virtue of this it undergoes no 
change. If that is true, the material intellect is a power in the soul and decays with the 
soul. For him there is no hope of immortality for the individual, who is just born with 
the potentiality to think. 
We have a different picture in Themistius' understanding. He pays heed to the 
characterisation of the intellect as being not mixed with the body but separate. It does 
not have a bodily organ for its activity. The potential intellect is completely unmixed 
with the body, impassive and separate, and he came to conclude from its latter two 
attributes - namely being wholly unmixed with the body and being separate - that it is 
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not destructible. He turns also to Theophrastus to support his interpretation because lie 
had also considered the potential intellect as separate from matter. Themistius, in 
agreement with Theophrastus, claims that it joins the individual at birth. Averroes 
draws on Themistius and they took a similar line on the understanding in order to show 
that the potential intellect is an immaterial substance or a disposition inhering in such a 
substance. He finally claims that Avempace had construed the material intellect as a 
disposition. Being aware of divergent views on the subject, Averroes tried to determine 
the true nature of the material intellect in Aristotle and we will see later whether he does 
or not. 
Averroes comes to defend the view that there is one potential intellect for all 
people, just as there is only one active intellect for all people. He concentrates on the 
attributes of the potential intellect which are: (a) to be unmixed with the body, (b) to be 
impassive, and (c) to be separate from the body. ' 13 In his view there is no difference 
between the potential intellect and the active intellect which is also described by 
Aristotle as separate, impassive and immaterial. "' Thus Averroes came to conclude that 
the potential intellect is a single entity and there is only one potential intellect for all 
mankind. It appears that the correspondence between the active intellect and the 
potential intellect is untenable. 1' 
22. The Impact of Averroes' Theory of the Potential Intellect 
Medieval Hebrew writers had access to the early, intermediate and later works 
of Averroes whereas Latin readers worked with a more limited corpus, but what both 
groups were deprived of was the realisation that Averroes changed his views radically 
and constantly on many issues. Thus the two groups who had different bodies of text 
obtained different perceptions of Averroes' view on the subject-matter. Hebrew writers 
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supposed his view on the material intellect as the hybrid conception whereas Latin 
readers regarded it to be the single eternal substance which serves all people by being 
intermediary between the active intellect and them. 116 
Moses Nanbony, Levi Gorsonides and Shem Tob Ibn Shem Tob report that a 
material intellect is engendered when the transcendent active intellect links itself to the 
inborn disposition of an individual in Averroes. ' 17 
Averroes' Long Commentary was translated into Latin around 1230. Albert the 
Great is said not to have realised that he proposes a single material intellect but some 
others certainly did. Aquinas, in his work The Summa contra Gentiles describes him as 
protagonist. "8 Although Aquinas and William of Baglione rejected his conception of 
the material intellect as a single entity, he nevertheless gained very much acceptance 
among scholars in Paris. 1' However, ecclesiastical authorities did not receive his 
theory of the material intellect with pleasure. Finally, in 1267 and 1268 Bonaventure 
objected against the improper use of philosophy which created a lot of errors, and one of 
these errors was to say that one intellect serves all people. In 1270, Stephen Tempier, 
who was Bishop of Paris, condemned and banned thirteen mistakes to be taught. The 
first of the errors was that "the intellect of all people is one and numerically identical". 
At around the same time a member of the Dominican Order communicated with Albert 
the Great who was living in Germany at that time. He was sent a list of fifteen 
propositions, which were objected to in many assemblies, and was asked for his 
comments. It is interesting to see that the first of the fifteen was once again the 
proposition that "the intellect of all people is one and identical in number". 
Bishop Tempies (1277), acting at the Pope's behest, extended his list of 
condemnation. The errors were execrable, but they were being taught by scholars who 
overstepped the boundaries of their realm. Those who taught in the Faculty of Arts at 
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Paris were dealing with the subjects belonging to theology and were also claiming that 
things can be true according to philosophy but not so according to the Catholic faith, 
and the proposition which states that the substance of the soul as well as the active and 
possible intellects are eternal and the proposition that the intellect is numerically one for 
all men was included in the list of condemnation. 12° Siger of Brabant was a member of 
the Faculty of Art and a manuscript listing the theses condemned in 1272 has the 
heading Against the heretics Siger and Boetius of Docia. 12` 
We have already witnessed that philosophy was first greatly admired by Islamic 
philosophers, then came to stand against religion and finally was done away with. The 
works of philosophers and philosophy also found little favour in the Christian world. 
Through studying Islamic philosophers as well as Christian scholars, I have come to see 
that philosophy was never to be understood as a natural intellectual activity of the 
individual. In a sense philosophy was used to justify religious dogmas (See the section 
on Ghazali). Thus those who had a philosophical attitude towards any question 
inevitably faced a very difficult life, such as fear of prosecution, condemnation or 
punishment if not to be killed inhumanely. 
The death of Siger is very sad. He was assassinated by a demented companion 
(1281-1284) in Italy despite his recantation. Recantation of Averroes' theory of the 
material intellect was adhered to by a line of Christian thinkers. The tradition persisted 
for some time and strongly resisted repeated attempts to suppress it. Those who belong 
to the Aristotelian / Averroes tradition reason that the possible or potential or material 
intellect is separate from the body. More precisely, they think that it is immaterial, 
eternal but linked to the human being in some way. One potential intellect serves all 
human beings; this is what is called Latin Averroism. 
By the end of the thirteenth century and at the beginning of the fourteenth, 
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Averroes' conception of the intellect was followed by philosophers such as Giles of 
Orleans, John of Goettingen, Anthony of Parma, Thomas Wilton, Morsilius of Padua, 
and Walter Bunley. They were reported to be very active in Paris. Between 1320 and 
1350 Averroism was transplanted to Bologna where it was embraced with deep 
sympathy. However, as we have seen, Averroes' conception of the intellect elicited 
opposition from its first appearance in Latin. 
We could also mention some others who rejected his conception of the intellect, 
for example Bonaventure, Aquinas, William of Baglione, Albert, Giles of Rome, 
William of la Mane, John Peckam, Peter of Trabos, Raymond Lull, Duns Scotus, 
Simon of Feversham and William of Alnwick. There is one more thing to be added to 
this, namely the formal condemnation of the church of the Council of Vienna in 1311. 
John of Jaudun gives an extreme materialist account of the intellect through 
following Alexander, and Siger. He thinks that the Averroist position cannot be shaken 
by demonstrative reasoning. The Bolognese tradition does not represent the swan-song 
of Averroes' theory of human intellect in the Latin world. It is said that two 
philosophers followed Averroes very closely in at Erfurt in the fourteenth century, and 
in the following century a professor endorsed Averroes' view on the intellect at the 
University of Krakow. The interest in Averroism continued throughout the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries in northern Italy and Padua. Although fresh humanist zephyrs were 
blowing away the medieval cobwebs, Italian philosophers never ceased analysing and 
commenting on the Averroist theory of intellect. Paul of Venice, Nicoletto Vernias, 
Alexander Achillini, Tiberio Morcantonio Zimara, Marcantonio Genua and Antonio 
Bernardi della Mirandola. 
In sum, the positions which Averroes reached in the final stage of his thought on 
De Anima sparked off practically no intellectual excitement in the Islamic world and 
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remained mostly unknown in Jewish circles, but it shaped European philosophy for 
three centuries. "' 
Although I do not like to form a rigid judgement of anything or anybody as far 
as Aristotelian interpretation is concerned, it nevertheless appears to be right to say that 
Islamic-Aristotelians construed what Aristotle said in the light of the principles of the 
Quran. Therefore, as we have witnessed previously, their philosophical and theological 
concerns made it almost impossible to recognise the thought of the Greek philosophers. 
On the other hand, however, I think Aristotle himself must be responsible for allowing 
such divergent interpretations of his thought because, for example, we are nowhere told 
whether nous poietikos belongs to the individual or whether it is itself divine. 
Therefore, Islamic-Aristotelians construed that the active intellect has knowledge of all 
incorruptible substances. Whoever has entered into conjunction with the active intellect 
or received the active intellect completely into the material intellect, knows through the 
active intellect whatever it knows. Thus in this exalted contemplation they find highest 
happiness and perfect bliss. It is the last and ultimate aim that an individual can realise, 
and it should also be recorded that Islamic-Aristotelians have never identified the active 
intellect with God, whereas it was regarded as possible to identify the human intellect 
with the active intellect. 
23. Reflection on Aquinas' Theory of Intellect in Aristotle 
With St. Thomas Aquinas, the interpretation of Aristotle's theory of intellect 
reaches a point by which we could in a sense speak of it as a superrationalist interpre- 
tation of Aristotle's theory of intellect. What I mean by the superrationalist interpreta- 
tion is that Aquinas identified the nous poietikos with the human intellect and refuted 
any sort of conjunction with it. It is rather considered as a part of the human intellect. 
254 
After stating these general remarks, let us now look into his interpretation of the 
noun poietikos in more detail. 123 
Aquinas regarded not only the intellectus agens but also the intellectus possibilis 
as immaterial. In addition, he also accepted that not only does the potential intellect but 
also the active intellect belong to the human intellect. In his view they both form the 
faculties of the human soul. The active intellect is not external to the human soul, and 
the potential intellect is all things potentially. According to him, what Aristotle means 
by saying that they are not attached to any bodily organ is that the two faculties of the 
human soul (the active intellect and the potential intellect) do not have an organ like the 
faculty of nutrition and sensation. They are in the soul but not in the body. Aquinas 
construes that the human soul has a place between the world of bodies and intellects, 
and as such it surpasses the receptive power of matter and is not included in it in any 
sense. Therefore, its powers cannot be thought of as the faculties of the ensouled body 
but primarily belong to it. Because of the way in which the two intellects are said to be 
separated from the body, the potential and the active intellect do not share anything with 
corporeal matter. More clearly, the body has no role to play or share anything in their 
activities, therefore it is true to say that the activities of the two intellects do not require 
any participation of matter. The potential and the active intellect are immaterial in their 
existence and in their activity. They are unmixed with matter in any sense. " 
Aquinas regards the potential intellect as the proper thinking faculty of the 
intellectual part of the soul. Everything is potentially contained in it. However, this 
does not mean that they are in it from the beginning. The potential intellect is mainly 
the mere capacity for thinking. It is viewed as an empty tablet upon which nothing is 
written. The empty tablet analogy is connected to the statement in which Aristotle says 
that thinking is an affection, for the potential intellect gains intelligible forms through a 
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kind of affection. 125 
Aquinas also conceives the relation between being affected and affecting in a 
different way. Firstly, each affection requires an active principle. If this is true, what is 
the active principle in virtue of which the potential intellect gains the intelligible forms? 
In addition to this, we are told by Aristotle that the source of knowledge lies in the 
senses. It is for this reason that he also tells us that we do not think without images. Is 
it possible then to claim that something material can affect the immaterial? In 
Aristotle's view the merely sensory objects cannot account for the generation of our 
thoughts. Thus there must be something which could be responsible for the generation 
of our thoughts. That is why Aristotle says that the active is superior to the affected in 
dignity. "' 
It is construed that this higher principle of activity is notes poietikos - the active 
intellect. The images which are derived from the sensible things are intelligible 
potentially, for they are embedded in particulars and as such they are adhered to matter. 
The active intellect makes them actually intelligible through abstraction, and in virtue of 
this function the active intellect is the primary cause of intellectual knowledge. In this 
context the images count as the secondary cause. 
It is obvious that Aquinas' explanation coincides to a remarkable extent in all the 
previously stated points with the fragment of Theophrastus, which is in the paraphrase 
of Themistius. As Theophrastus does, Aquinas construes not only the active intellect 
(intellectus agens) to be immaterial, but also the potential intellect (intellectus possibilis), 
and they both ascribe the potential and the active intellect to the human being. 
The active intellect, as being part of the human soul, illuminates the images and 
derives the intelligible species from the images. It brings them into actuality, into light. 
The images are to the intellect as colours are to the sense of sight. The active intellect 
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works with the images and as a result of this process intellectual concepts can be derived 
from them. The active intellect derives the intelligible forms from the images. It is 
through the work of the active intellect that we can understand and think the essence of 
things without their individual determinations. In other words, the nature of things is 
represented in the potential intellect as intelligible actual forms. 
It is obvious that Aquinas' interpretation of Aristotle's theory of intellect is 
profoundly different from the views of Alexander and the Islamic-Aristotelians. It gives 
rise to many questions and difficulties. 
Aquinas conceives that the active intellect acts upon the images. It prepares the 
images so that the images generate thoughts in the potential intellect. He followed the 
principle that the corporeal cannot act upon an intellectual thing, but if we follow him it 
would be very hard to believe what he says on the function of the active intellect. How 
could the active intellect prepare the images and help to construct forms from something 
which is individual and attached to matter? It is obvious that if we follow Aquinas, the 
active intellect can realise its function through something intellectual. However, we 
have already pointed out that this is impossible so that the effect which has been ascribed 
to the active intellect is clearly impossible. 
The other, I believe, fatal objection to Aquinas' view comes from Brentano. He 
argues that the effect of the active intellect through images cannot be defended. First of 
all, let us presume that the active intellect is able to make images intellectual. In that 
case, the images would not be the same, for they had been the images previously and 
later they become something intellectual. In other words, they would not be images any 
longer. As he rightly points out, Aristotle says that we always think with images. If 
this is true, Aquinas must be wrong since Aristotle never speaks of the image which has 
been transformed into a higher, intelligible thing at the time of thinking. '=' 
257 
It appears that we are engulfed with serious difficulties here once more. Suarez, 
nevertheless, tries to overcome them by saying that the abstracting activity of the active 
intellect need not be conceived as the influence upon sensible things. It should be 
viewed rather as an activity that is contained in intellect itself. There is only one soul 
which thinks through sense and through the intellect. He thinks that the presence of 
sensible objects could be enough to bring the intellect into activity and this activity is 
aimed at sensible things. Finally, he says that sensible objects cannot have any more 
influence on the intellect than just being a stimulus. He accepts that material things 
cannot influence and change anything in the immaterial. Therefore, he comes to 
conclude that it is impossible to think that: 
the intellect (the active intellect) purifies the sensory representation, 
eliminating, as it were, the material element, in order to transfer it thus 
transformed and spiritualised from the imagination into itself (the 
potential intellect). The activity of abstraction does not produce any 
change at all in the sensory representation, it consists only in the intellect 
generating within itself the intelligible picture of the object of which the 
imagination possesses a sensory picture. 128 
However, it appears that to conceive the sensible objects in terms of being 
merely the cause for stimulation of the intellect cannot be true for Aristotle but only for 
Plato. It is known that in Plato we were taken to possess all higher knowledge from 
birth. All knowledge had been acquired in a previous life, thus after birth our souls 
need a stimulus in order to remember so that thinking is no more than recollecting. 
When we come to Aristotle, however, we are faced with a completely different account 
of thinking. He is profoundly concerned with the original acquisition of our thoughts. 
He thinks that when we are born our intellect resembles a blank tablet, devoid of any 
ideas. Furthermore, the active intellect, regardless of whether it belongs to the human 
being or not, has no thought in it. If this is the case, how could we assume that it is 
able to impart concepts to the potential intellect? It is not denied here that the 
intelligible is in a sense included in the particular, but the images do not influence the 
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intellect. It would not be enough to assume that the active intellect might have sufficient 
power at once to create intelligible forms in the intellect when it is stimulated by sensible 
objects. But then we also have to presume that the intelligible forms must be potentially 
present in the active intellect from the start, for the images are not to generate change in 
it. However, there is a very obvious objection to it. Why does a lack of sensation 
always lead to a lack of cognition? It becomes rather difficult then to understand 
Aristotle when he says that even after having knowledge of something, actual thinking is 
possible as long as we have the ability to retain the corresponding individual 
representation in the imagination. '29 
It appears that Aquinas' interpretation of Aristotle's theory of the intellect is no 
more satisfactory than those previous interpretations. It could be seen as oversim- 
plifying to some, but attributing or discussing the active intellect in terms of belonging 
to the human soul or identifying it with God or seeing it as a vicar of God are equally 
useless. Perhaps the solution lies not in deciding where it belongs but rather in trying to 
understand what it is. 
In Aquinas' account it is obvious that we cannot see an active principle which 
leads potential thoughts to actuality. It also does not explain the relation between 
perception and thinking. Brentano also criticises Aquinas by saying that Aristotle thinks 
that there is no activity without a striving toward activity, and if the active intellect is 
conceived to produce actual thinking in the human being, it must mean that "all people 
desire to know". In other words, all people strive for knowledge. It is through this 
striving that the active intellect operates. Brentano thinks that there are only two ways 
of doing this: 
1. Striving towards activity could be an unconscious desire, as a result of which the 
activity of plants and inanimate nature could be indicated. However, if this is 
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the case there is no role left to be played by perception; for, if desiring towards 
activity is unconscious drive, what is needed for such activity is the presence and 
appropriate disposition of something which is capable of receiving the effect. 
Thus the potential intellect, in connection with this conception of the present 
matter, is naturally designed to receive the influence of the active intellect. It 
also requires the unity of the potential intellect with the active intellect. There 
is, on this account, no part to be played by sensation, for the intellectual part of 
the soul could produce thoughts within itself from the start. 
2. a) Presupposes that the striving in virtue of which the active intellect 
originates its effect may be as a result of conscious desire. If that is 
accepted, then it must also be agreed that it cannot be other than a 
sensory or intellectual desire. Brentano dismisses immediately that it 
could be a sensory desire. The question is, how could the sensitive part 
yearn for truth? Furthermore, on this account it is difficult to explain 
how the sensitive part designs the activity of the active intellect in a 
theory which restricts anything material to act upon the individual. Thus 
it cannot be a sensory desire, even if it is thought to be conscious. 
b) Assuming that it could be an intellectual desire, is also of no help in 
understanding the role of the active intellect. Brentano refuses it on the 
grounds that any intellectual desire presupposes intellectual thought, and 
what matters is here to explain how thought arises in the intellect. When 
the intellect begins to think, it does not turn to the truth of the thought 
towards which the desire, by virtue of which the activity of the active 
intellect is conceived to begin, would have to be directed. In his view, 
the intellect firstly knows the nature of external beings, therefore he 
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concludes that the account of Aristotle's theory of the intellect given by 
Aquinas is altogether dismissable. 13o 
It is quite obvious that Aquinas construes Aristotle's theory of the intellect 
almost in a completely different way. It is possible to speak of a break with previous 
conceptions of Aristotle's theory of intellect. 
He definitely refutes the transcendental account of the intellect. In Aquinas' 
account nous poietikos and the potential intellect form an integral part of the human 
soul. It is important to note that both intellects are not required during life. He also 
dismisses any relation of nous poietikos to a higher intellect in terms of fluctuation. He 
thinks that the human being possesses nous poietikos from the beginning. 
When it comes to the question of participation, Aquinas does not reject the 
conjunction of nous poietikos with a superior intellect. However, this participation is 
received in a quite different way from previous accounts. The participation he envisages 
is not based on psychological principles but, although I do not feel very safe with this, 
on ontological principles. As such, it is not a sort of participation which requires 
fluctuating intensity, nor a participation which must be realised afresh each time. He 
does not conceive the participation in terms of psychological ground and as such it has 
no significant role to play in the theory of knowledge and psychology. He speaks of no 
living participation with a higher intellect, which is why it makes sense to speak of a 
break with earlier interpretations here. Alexander regarded the knowledge of the 
immaterial as providing a basis for the further activity of the intellect. It is also true to 
say that in Themistius we also see a living participation between the intellects in 
question. Finally, Islamic-Aristotelians conceived the relation between the human 
intellect and the noes poietikos in terms of entering into conjunction with a superior 
intellect. It was a relation which was based on knowing. However, it should be 
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remembered that Thomas diverges from a Latin-Christian on this point here. Those 
who combine St. Augustine's theory of illumination with Avicenna's theory of 
emanation consider the illumination of the human soul by God as the most important 
matter in epistemology. It is said that although he appears to play down the contrast 
between Augustine's view on illumination and his interpretation of the nature of light in 
Aristotle, he nevertheless comes closer to Augustine. In Thomas the light of nature in 
man replaces the particular illumination by God . The participation of the human 
intellect in divine intellect is replaced by a general illumination. In this case it is not an 
epistemological event but, as Kai puts it, it is now an ontological fact. 13' 
As a result, he rescues the interpretation of De Anima II1.4 and 5 from the 
Platonic and mystic views which in general allow the human intellect to know the purely 
immaterial things directly. 
In Aquinas' view the primary objects of the human thinking are not of the divine 
beings but it is the essence of sense-perceptible things. It could be stated that the eyes of 
the intellect are cast downwards instead of upwards. On the contrary, Islamic- 
Aristotelians made the intellect to think what is above. Aquinas says that this is why 
Aristotle introduces nous poietikos in De Anima 111.5. Although the forms are in 
readiness as an object of thinking in the Platonic sense, the essence of sensible things is 
to be separated from the matter by way of abstraction. Only as a result of this 
operation, the essence of a sensible thing could be known. 
What did he achieve? It is certain that he freed Aristotle's theory of the intellect 
from a Platonic interpretation, but the question now to be asked is, did lie reach 
satisfactory results? The answer to this is no. As is the case with every interpretation of 
Aristotle, he reached rather unsatisfactory results. Firstly, he made sous poretikos the 
integral part of the human soul on which Aristotle says nothing definite. He also could 
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not explain how the nous poietikos leads the human intellect into actuality. There are 
also other questions that his account of the intellect in Aristotle appears to have no 
answers to. For example, he is strongly opposed to Averroes' view in which even the 
potential intellect is not regarded as forming an integral part of the human intellect and 
the potential intellect as such is one in number. However, he is unable to explain how 
an intellect which is entirely immanent in the human soul is to be perceived as wholly 
immaterial and incorruptible. 112 
Aquinas says that the intellect belongs to the soul. If that is the case, then it is 
also right to regard it as the form of the body. The question arises whether the intellect 
can be purely immaterial. He accepts that the soul is really the form of the body, but 
the intellect has nothing to do with the body. In his view, although the intellect is a part 
and a faculty of the soul, it is not material. This part of the soul, namely intellect, is 
immaterial. According to him, the soul itself is not completely taken by matter, and he 
denies that while the soul is the form of the body the intellect is not. However, it 
appears that he cannot really explain how this immaterial part of the soul forms a unity 
with the matter-bound body. He was aware of the difficulties with his account and he 
came to say that the intellect does not have any existence without the body but is 
immaterial in its intellectual activity. The reason for this is that it has no organ and 
operates without an organ. 133 
Islamic Aristotelians defend the view that an intellect which exists independently 
from the body always knows and as such it does not need the knowledge of the 
senses. '4 Thomas opposes this but he cannot explain how the intellect, which is not 
dependent on the body, can function without it. The difficulty arises once more when 
he replies to the objection that the pure immaterial intellect is not to be plural in relation 
to the plurality of individuals, for matter is the principle of multiplication and the purely 
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immaterial intellect is just lacking it. Hamelin thinks that he merely introduces a 
Platonic element into Aristotle's theory of the intellect here, in other words an intellect 
which is independent of the body cannot be considered to be part of Aristotelian doctrine 
in this aspect, and in my view Islamic-Aristotelians who think that the human soul only 
participates in a divine intellect, seem to be closer to Aristotle. 135 
The point of Plato's conception of the soul is that although the soul does not 
form a unity with the intellect as it does in Aristotle, nevertheless the soul is attached to 
the body in Plato. In Aquinas, however, the human intellect is independent and 
sovereign. The individual human intellect is not dependent on the body to exist, and 
operates without one. 
It should, however, be recalled that what Aristotle confronts in De Anima 111.4 
is the question of how the intellect and its objects exist in the external world. Aristotle 
postulates in De Anima 111.5 an intellect of which attributes are not the same as the 
potential intellect. 13' One thing is imperative to remember: in Aristotle the human 
potential intellect cannot be brought into actuality by itself. It requires an active 
principle to do so and this is the nous poietikos, regardless of thinking of it as belonging 
to the human being or identifying it as divine or God. The conclusion to be drawn here 
is that a sovereign intellect acting or thinking in virtue of itself is of impossibility in 
Aristotle. 
24. Thinking in Aquinas 
Aquinas maintains that thinking is that which is originated by the knower. In his 
view, thinking cannot be reduced to affection. In other words, it is not a divine 
affection. On this point he completely diverges from Neoplatonic and Islarnic-Aristot- 
elians. He puts the active principle, which is necessary for having knowledge of things 
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in the human soul. In a sense he makes the human soul an as-if divine element, and 
therefore he has not, I believe, reached a radical interpretation of Aristotle's theory of 
intellect. It was a problem for Aristotle to explain how the intelligible exists in an 
embodied soul. He deals with the question of the first principles and sense images in De 
Anima III. 8.13' It could be inferred, rightly, that Aristotle considers the human intellect 
and its objects in relation to matter. 1 " Therefore, it is impossible to claim that a human 
intellect that thinks could ever free itself from the relation between the body and the 
soul, but is it true that an immaterial intellect which causes intellect to govern the 
material world is multiple? In other words, would it be right to speak of the 
multiplication of the immaterial as A'Ruinas does by attributing a nous poietikos to every 
individual human being? 
It seems that Aristotle himself has no definite criteria to distinguish intelligible 
objects from sensible objects, for sense perceptions are of things and represent them 
without their matter. Thus, images which come to be representing intelligible thoughts 
are nothing but sense perceptions, but the point is that they are without matter. `i' 
It appears that immateriality is of sense perceptions and of sense images 
representing intelligible thoughts, but how about the thinking of God? Divine thinking 
involves no materiality, it is described as being absolutely immaterial. How are we 
supposed to understand the difference between the two cases? 
I do not think that there is an easy answer to this question. One might say that 
what is immaterial in us resembles only the absolutely immaterial thinking of God's 
intellect. This means that we could speak here only of relativity, for Aristotle says that 
there is that which is what it is necessarily, and on the other hand there is that which is 
subject to exceptions or deviations in virtue of matter. 140 
Aquinas finally states that the human being has intellect because God made them 
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so. God created the intellect, the human soul. He also reckons that that was also 
Aristotle's view on the subject. There is no consensus reached on this point among the 
scholars today, but the general tendency is that there is no concept of creation in 
Aristotle. "' However, some others consider Aquinas' solutions very satisfying, for 
example Nuyens thinks that in the absence of creation, the noetic problem is bound to be 
problematic. He says that Aristotle failed to explain the relation between the soul and 
the intellect in the human being. In other words, he thinks that the soul which is joined 
to the human body and the intellect, which is independent of the body, remained a 
problem for Aristotle, but it is hard to see that this was a problem for Aristotle. For 
Aristotle, the human soul is not required to achieve pure immateriality. '42 
25. The Question of Consistency in Aristotle: On the Soul 
In a sense Aquinas' failure can be traced back to Aristotle's failure. He writes 
in De Generation Animalitum at 736 b 27-29 that noes, the faculty of pure thought 
enters from outside and is divine alone. For it does not share anything with body.. It 
has also been said in De Anima that 'ilous is more divine and is impossible' (408 b 29- 
413 b 24-27). 
It should be noted that although Aristotle sees a close relation between 
sensation and thinking nevertheless the analogy with sensation is not perfect. And he 
comes to say that thinking is toiouton heteron, something different like this. Aristotle 
appears to get more and more concerned with the analogy. He has already pointed out 
that it would be unreasonable for soul to be attached to body. For this would mean 
that it can have some physical quality like heat or cold, and a physical organ. 
However, soul has not got any organ. Nevertheless intellect is conceived to be as a 
unity in De Anima III. 4 and as such it cannot be independent of body. For it forms a 
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part of the soul. In other words body and soul form a single compound (synthelmi). 
Although it is not mixed with body in the sense of not acting through a bodily organ, it 
is not easy to get a consistent view from what Aristotle tells us in De Anima: 
... mind (noes) seems to be an independent substance (ousia) engendered in us, and to be imperishable. 
If it could be destroyed the most probable cause would be the feebleness of old age, 
but in fact, probably the same thing occurs as in the sense organs/ for if an old man 
could acquire the right kind of eye, he could see as a young man sees. Hence old age 
is due to an affection, not of the soul, but only of that in which the soul resides, as in 
the case in drunkenness and disease. Thus the power of thought and speculation 
decays because something else within perishes, but itself it is unaffected. Thinking, 
loving and hating, are affections not of the mind, but rather of the individual which 
possesses the mind, in so far as it does so. Memory and love fail when this perishes; 
for they were never part of the mind, but of the whole entity which has perished. 
Presumably the mind (nous) is something more divine, and is unaffected. (408 b 18- 
29) 
Aristotle connects the impossibility of noris with its resemblance to the senses. 
For instance, in defective sight it is not the soul that is affected but merely its physical 
agent. However, Aristotle has just reminded us that aisthesis, an activity of the soul is 
impaired by deficiency in its organs. In the light of these considerations it would be 
extraordinarily difficult to argue that intoxication has no effect on the soul. 
26. The interpretation of Aristotle's Theory of Intellect from Past to Present 
Towards the end of the survey of previous interpretations of Aristotle's theory of 
intellect, I would like to concentrate on those who have come to represent an influential 
line of thinking on the subject we have been dealing with. This will, I hope, enable us 
to realise that what is important is not to pursue or dismiss certain lines of interpretation 
or tradition, but to help us to see the need to find a new way of approaching the subject, 
that is the close analysis of the terms with which Aristotle has come to explain the 
question of thinking, the subject of the intellect. 
It could be considered an unnecessary or perhaps not a perfect way of justifying 
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a new approach to deal with the matter, but I believe, nevertheless, that the survey of 
previous interpretations may prove useful to enable us to seek another way of 
approaching the subject, if not to help us to discover a deeper nature of the intellect with 
which Aristotle was profoundly concerned. It is in this hope that I shall continue, to 
evaluate, discuss and consider the opinions of previous Aristotelian scholars and 
philosophers. 
It should be noted that the view that nous poietikos in De Anima 111.5 does not 
form a part of the human intellect has not, by and large, found much favour among 
scholars and writers after Thomas had firmly rejected it. Nevertheless, there has been a 
school of thought which followed the tradition of Alexander and Averroes , 
Zabarella is 
one of the most important representatives of this school of thought. 143 
As has been stated earlier, Alexander identifies noes poietikos with God. 
Zabarella follows him on this point. According to him, nous poietikos exists 
independently from matter, ' and he goes on to relate the discussion of the intellect in 
De Anima to Metaphysics Lambda where Aristotle considers the existence of pure 
immaterial forms. Aristotle comes to conclude that there are pure immaterial fortes 
which are the intelligences and God. Zabarella thinks that nous poietikos cannot be one 
of the intelligences because they have the sole function of moving their respective 
spheres, and as such the intelligences are inferior beings by comparison to God. 
Therefore, nous poietikos must be God which, as bring primarily intelligible, is the 
source of intelligibility in all other intelligibles. 145 It is noes poietikos that leads the 
potential human intellect to actuality. It makes the potential object of knowledge an 
actual object of knowledge. It is like the sun, which causes the potentially visible to be 
actually visible, and it plays a very important part in explaining the term choristos 
meaning separate in his account. I believe the real difficulty lies in the fact that 
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Aristotle does not mention God in De Anima 111.5, nor does he state that nous poietikos 
belongs to the human soul. We should also remember that none of the Islamic- 
Aristotelian philosophers have identified nous poietikos with God, they regarded it as a 
transcendent being but not as God. Nous poietikos is received as the vicar of God but 
absolutely not as God. Nevertheless, Zabarella's view, which I shall return to later, is 
always worthy of the most serious attention. 
Trendelenburg gives the account of nous poietikos through the analysis of the 
word nous and asks how we are supposed to understand nous poietikos and pathetikos. 
He thinks that nous pathetikos describes all lower powers which are necessary for 
thinking in Aristotle. However, nous pathetikos cannot be enough for the thinking of 
things, because as such it lacks the principle of activity. It needs to be led by noes 
poietikos. 
Trendelenburg comes to conclude that although nous pathetikos is different from 
nous poietikos, the latter is more noble, also it belongs to each human being and cannot 
be the same for everyone. 
Trendelenburg also attributes knowledge of the first principles to nous poietikos, 
since the possible intellect cannot provide them because it depends upon the comparison 
of sensations. So, Aristotle does not explain what nous poietikos is and what the limits 
of its domain are or how it generates knowledge. However, one thing is clear, that nous 
poietikos is the source of the first principles. For Aristotle says that some sciences work 
through perception and others by hypothesis, but the point is that they drive this basis 
from their own intellect. 146 
However, when it comes to how to understand the language of divinity, we are 
face to face with a real problem in Trendelenburg. Although he states that our irons 
poietikos is not the divine intellect, he nevertheless admits that it is akin to the deity. He 
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thinks that God is a nous poietikos also, for God is that nous from which the truth of 
things emanates. He also assumes that Aristotle has also pointed out this relation 
between the divine and the human intellect, but at the end he accepts that Aristotle 
nowhere explicitly states how the human intellect partakes of the divine. 147 
In virtue of regarding nous poietikos as something divine, he also assumed that it 
has nothing to do with matter. In his view, the nous poietikos comes to join the human 
being from outside. It enters into the foetus. 
Brandis broadly follows Trendelenburg in his account of the intellect in 
Aristotle. According to him, nous poietikos forms a part of the human soul. He also 
maintains that it is the source of knowledge of principles while he ascribes 
contemplation to the potential intellect, but the interesting point in his account is that he 
sees the true human self in nous poietikos. 
In connection with [the faculty of] representation it is to be described as 
possible intellect, in that it borrows from it and from sensory perception 
the stuff for mediating thought, and requires images [schemata]: in this 
respect it is neither simple nor eternal. To put it otherwise, it has neither 
simplicity nor eternity in so far as it acts as mediating thought. Only 
intellect in the narrower sense of the word, the theoretical or active 
[energetische] intellect, is said to be (and truly is) immortal and eternal 
when it is separated from the body, and upon it rests the actual ego or 
human self. It was imparted to us from outside and is said to be itself 
divine, or the most divine within us. This is meant to indicate its 
independence from the organic body, not that the universal world spirit 
is temporarily conferred upon us. (Brandis, C. A. Geschichte de 
Entwicklung der Griechischen Philosophie, Berlin, 1862-4) 
The accounts of Trendelenburg and Brandis do not diverge markedly from the 
view of Theophrastus and Aquinas, at least in that they attribute the noun poietikos to the 
human being. However, there are some recent scholars whose interpretations of 
Aristotle's theory of intellect are closely related to the views of Alexander and the 
Islamic-Aristotelian philosophers. These are Ravaisson and Renan.. However, in the 
main, the numerous but mostly German studies on the subject from the 19th and early 
20th centuries pursue Thomas' line of reasoning on the interpretation of De Aninta 111.4 
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and 111.5.148 In the 19th century Ravaisson and Renan construe nous poietikos in De 
Anima 111.5 as a principle which is at first external to the human being. (see Ravaisson, 
M-F, Essai sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, Paris, 1837-96 and De Philosophia 
Peripatetica apud Syros Commentation Historlca, Paris, 1852) 
Ravaisson, in his Essai sur la metaphysique d'Aristote, argues that Aristotle 
ascribes to the individual only a passive intellect in virtue of which the individual is able 
to comprehend forms, receive ideas. It is like matter that can become everything. He 
further says that the possible intellect is universal potentiality in the world of ideas, as 
prime matter is in the world of things. He sees an absolute contrast between the 
potential intellect and the nous poietikos, for the latter is the absolute intelligence and the 
principle of creative activity. It makes all potential forms actual. 
It is obvious that Avicenna is followed closely here, and interesting to see that 
the attributes of noun poietikos in a sense force us to consider it as not something divine- 
like, but divine. Avicenna maintained that every form and every thought flows instantly 
from the active intellect but Ravaisson departs from him here. According to him, 
Aristotle does not reject that corporeal beings can be secondary causes so that they bring 
forth other beings. He applies this relation to the subject of the intellect. Ravaisson 
thinks that thoughts are secondary principles and as such they are able to awaken other 
thoughts in our intellect. The need for a principle which is a first mover is required 
only occasionally. Of course, this active principle or a first mover is God itself which 
distributes the principles from which all knowledge and discursive thinking proceeds. 
Ravaisson also argues that what is valid in the theoretical field is also true and valid in 
the practical domain. The divine element within us provides the light to separate good 
from bad. It also gives rise to the will, and as a result virtue appears as a tool of 
absolute thought. 14' 
271 
In his account of the intellect in Aristotle, Ravaisson tries to give an account of it 
that is in complete agreement with Aristotle's philosophy, but particularly with 
Metaphysics and interestingly this was exactly the same goal that Islamic Aristotelian 
philosophers had tried to realise. 
Although Ravaisson deals with the question of the nous in Aristotle in more 
detail, he nevertheless follows Alexander very closely. He sees no difference between 
sensible, intellectual and rational, therefore he claims that the intellect distinguishes and 
compares the abstract form with the sensible form. The reason he gives for this is that 
the intellect unites them in one consciousness. The conclusion to be drawn from this 
argument is that sense and intellect reflect one and the same thing. They just represent, 
in other words, two aspects of the same being. Thus it is perfectly natural that the 
intellect in its existence is attached to the body. In this context an individual lacks any 
sense of immortality. 
I have already mentioned that Ravaisson tries to reach a consistent account of the 
intellect in Aristotle in relation to Aristotle's Metaphysics, therefore he emphasises the 
analogy of potential intellect and prime matter, and he believes firmly that they both 
necessitate God as a prime mover. 
Renan also agrees with Alexander and Zabarella that nous poietikos is an 
intellect separate from the human being. He is accused of being rather like Aristotelian- 
Malebranche, 'so but Renan himself accuses Aristotle of taking on the views of older 
schools and of not bothering himself with reconciling them with his own views, so he 
thinks that it would be wrong to think that one could ever give a consistent account of 
the intellect in Aristotle, for he himself had a concern with being consistent. '`' 
However, we are not particularly concerned here with whether Aristotle is consistent or 
not, but it is clear that Aristotle is circumspect in his dealing with previous theories or 
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views. He questions them and points out apparent inconsistencies and continues the 
matter from there. 
Finally, I would like to discuss Zeller's view on the subject of the intellect in 
Aristotle. Zeller does follow a different path from Ravaisson and Renan. Although the 
latter two mostly agree with Alexander's view on the intellect in Aristotle, they were 
less Islamic-Aristotelian compared with Zeller. He comes very close to the view of 
Averroes in general and construes nous poietikos to be a universal intellect. 
In his view, the highest and most perfect thought rests in its object. The human 
being is to think this thought in the universal intellect, therefore all intellectual activity 
of the human being is identical and one with the intellectual activity of God. It could be 
oversimplifying the case, but in other words Zeller appears to speak of the one and the 
same object of thinking for the human being and God. They think the same thing. 
However, I do not know any place where Aristotle says or implies that we think highest 
intellectual principles within the divine intellect. Furthermore, he also does not tell us 
that God contemplates the principles of our knowledge or any principles. He says that it 
solely thinks itself. He construes nous poietikos to be the world spirit, but on the other 
hand he describes it as an immaterial thing. 
So far, the views of ancient scholars, medieval scholars and recent thinkers have 
been presented. From time to time Aristotle's theory of the intellect in particular, and 
his philosophy generally, has been discussed in different worlds of thinking such as 
Islam and Christianity. Finally, views from the recent past have been discussed. It will 
be clear by now that almost none of them conveys to us what Aristotle really was 
interested in and what he enabled us to do in the search for understanding of the 
universe and the human being. The reason, I believe, is that they tried to understand 
what Aristotle was saying, but not to solve the puzzle that he was trying to solve, the 
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universe, human life, but most importantly the question of thinking. 
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66.. Walzer, R., Greek into Arabic, Essays on Islamic Philosophy, Oxford, 1962, 
pp. 177-178 and see also Chapter 12. Also compare and consult what Aristotle says in 
Metaphysics XII. 6, but particularly 1071b 12-22. 
67.. al-Sigasa al-Madariyya, 71,55,32; Philosophy of Aristotle, 127; al-Madina 
al-Fadila, 198-21. 
68.. Passive intellect, material intellect, rational faculty, 3-5,430-24.25; however, 
Themistius separates passive intellect from potential intellect: Themistius, Paraphrase of 
De Anima, in Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca, 5.3, ed. R. Heinze, Berlin, 1899. 
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Psychology of Aristotle, translated by George, F., Berkeley, 1977. 
124.. On the potential intellect, De Anima 429a 21; of the statement that the intellect 
is separate or separated from the body, De Anima 429b 5,430a 17. In the forthcoming 
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claim that we do not think without images: De Anima 431a 16; see on the superiority 
of the active principle to the affected, De Anima, 430a 18. 
127.. De Anima 432a 8; Brentano, 1977. 
128.. Brentano, p. 15. 
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the other hand there are things which admit exceptions or deviations in virtue of the 
material circumstances, and it is absolutely the case that the usual is absolutely different 
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poetischen und dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles, Munich, 1962. It 
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see Renan, p96. I do not think that Aristotle states what his predecessors had to say on 
the subject for the sake of narration. He deals with them and then goes on to present his 
view on the relevant issue. He especially clearly says that Anaxagoras does not tell us 
anything of the nature of noun and how it generates knowledge. De Anima 405b 21. 
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CONCLUSION 
Aristotle describes the activity of noes in terms of energeia. One of the loftiest 
achievements of the individual human being as a noetic subject is to activate its capacity 
for thinking and knowing reality. Although the search for understanding necessitates 
laborious effort -I also call this process of the human searching activity kinetic thinking 
- the search is directed to an end and in virtue of this destructive nature of kinesis leaves 
its place to the active thinking which enables us to contact, to live reality. Thus it has 
been argued that the human noetic activity contains two aspects, namely kinetic and 
active. On the contrary, divine noetic activity excludes any sense of kinesis and 
instantiates the perfect example of being pure energeia and notes. Thus I identify divine 
noetic activity with perfect non-discursive poetic activity. Therefore, the analysis of 
divine noetic activity in Metaphysics XII. 7 and 9 remains crucial to understanding 
Aristotle's conception of discursive and non-discursive noetic activity. Aristotle 
provides the account of the human noetic activity mainly in De Anima, Metaphysics and 
Ethics. Although Aristotle deals primarily with the problem of knowledge in Posterior 
Analytics, we find nothing about the characterisation of noetic activity as energeia there. 
He uses in fact the term energeia only once in Posterior Analytics. It is true that 
Aristotle regards the human nous and human poetic activity as something divine, but he 
speaks of divinity of bees as well. Thus is appears to be hard to see an absolute 
correspondence between human and divine nous. And for this reason it also seems tobe 
rather difficult to argue that human poetic activity is not different from divine poetic 
activity. The language Aristotle uses to describe the human nous does not necessarily 
suggest a genetic relation between the human nous and divine notes. However, this is not 
to deny that human nous and its poetic activity do not remain as something divine in 
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Aristotle and for Aristotle. The individual poetic activity is, perhaps, a divine-like 
activity and in virtue of this -I mean having the ability to realise ourselves as a poetic 
subject - we can transcend our physical being to become god-like by acting out our 
identity in the world. And, as a noetic subject, we can only actualise our identity 
through noetic activity. This is why it is essential to analyse the concept of noes and 
energeia in relation to the question of thinking, particularly discursive and non- 
discursive noetic activity in Aristotle, otherwise one seems to be destined to remain in 
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